

THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTION IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

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Out of the state of open warfare or armed peace that existed between traditional psychopathology and psychoanalysis ever since the inception of the latter, there comes with increasing clarity the realization that the conflict between the two is more a result of mental attitude than of scientific observation.

Viewed historically there appears to be an uninterrupted continuity of thought all along the developmental pathway of psychopathology from Pinel and Esquirol through Carus, Griesinger and Charcot to Breuer and Freud. This continuity is a historical fact no matter how much the views of Pinel may be in contrast with those of Freud—a century after Philippe Pinel. However, a number of older mental attitudes continue to linger and infiltrate some of the newer discoveries and developments in psychopathology. To be sure, this is true not only of psychopathology, which is empirical rather than experimental; even in the strictly experimental sciences we find frequently an older mental attitude dominating over and obscuring a new bit of experimental evidence, incontrovertible though it may be. The French Academy refused to be convinced by Pasteur, no matter how convincing his experimental chickens, and in our day we still find medical men having more “faith” in dietary treatment of diabetes than in insulin—and insulin is far from being a mere concept. This conservative and retarding power of tradition, so dynamic in all walks of human endeavor, quite naturally makes itself felt in the field of psychopathology. If we look at this phenomenon from the standpoint of purely external manifestations, the following traditions in psychiatry stand out:

(a) Mental disease is an organic disease, more definitely—a brain disease. This is a tradition carried over from Hippocrates, Galen, and Erasistratus, and forcefully reasserted by

Griesinger. This purely anatomico-cerebral orientation has gradually lost its absolute grip on psychiatry. It still persists among the non-clinicians (cf. the recent writings of Spielmeyer) and lingers in the form of a theoretical residuum in Bleuler's views on schizophrenia, but on the whole it may be considered in a state of recession.

(b) As the neuroanatomic orientation began to fade, psychopathology, true to its neurogenic physiological tradition, sought support in another Hippocratico-Galenic trend, namely the humoral one. Reënforced by the discoveries of Harvey, Haller, and Claude Bernard, the trend finally culminated in our day in the form of the endocrinological orientation in psychiatry. One may state in passing that out of the same tradition grew most recently the purely neural orientation in the form of the Pavlov-Bechterew reflexological theories; these and the endocrinological trend, like their predecessor, the anatomical one, continue to postulate "the hopelessness of all psychology" and prove rather deficient both from the point of view of therapy and as an aid to our understanding of the actual problems of psychic function, of the dynamics of various affective reactions, and of the quality and quantity of instinctual reactions. The old tradition that the mind cannot be diseased, that it is eternal and inalienable, and that only the body can interfere with one's mental function, is probably *the* now unconscious tradition responsible for the comparative stability of the neurophysiological and humoral trends which persisted from the time of Hippocrates and Galen to our day.

(c) However, neither the anatomical nor the humoral nor the neurophysiological traditions could persist unaltered in the face of the complex and multitudinous changes of a social nature which must needs leave an imprint on our scientific thought in general and on psychiatry in particular. These social changes which we have witnessed in the course of the past century can be grossly and briefly characterized as an extreme socialization of life with a corresponding diminution of the rôle of the individual. Historically speaking, at the beginning of the century psychiatry found itself at a

crossroad at which the path of individual reactions and individual life was barely marked, leading at once into a veritable *terra incognita*, while the other pathway, that of disindividualized social function was well nigh definitely cut, stamped, rolled and hardened. On the other hand, assisted by the extraordinary progress of biology and medicine—particularly pathology—psychiatry turned on to the general road, and the result of this turn is well summarized in the great system of Kraepelin, who, in search of a new and systematic nosology, crystalized for psychiatry what had become crystalized in general medicine, namely, that mental diseases like physical diseases are definite entities—circumscribed processes with a definite beginning, course, and outcome. Thus psychiatry in its greatest advance presented its most fundamental return to Hippocrates and his teaching on diagnosis and prognosis. While a systematic critique of the nosological orientation of Kraepelinian psychiatry is highly desirable, it is still awaiting its investigator and is out of the scope of the present communication. Suffice it to say that as long as a deeper knowledge of the workings of the psychic apparatus was not at hand, and as long as psychiatry remained unconscious of the unconscious, it was impossible to create any nosological system which would correspond scientifically with the substance of clinical facts. The Kraepelinian nosology was based on an assumption that mental diseases follow the pattern of exogenous physical diseases—an assumption that has never been proved and that a wealth of clinical data accumulated in the past forty years seems amply sufficient to refute. Moreover it followed the oldest tradition in psychiatry in that it stressed the intellectual aspects of mental pathology rather than the instinctual, affective ones. In other words, the most dynamic biological factors of psychic function were left out of consideration. Be that as it may, this Kraepelinian very new yet very old trend could not gain any practical foothold unless it coupled itself with the dominant social trends of the times. We thus gradually turned from pure nosology to typology (Kretschmer or Adolf Meyer's reaction types, for instance) and established an attitude which can be

formulated more or less as follows: human beings are what they are from birth; they possess certain anatomical and physiological characteristics which are hereditary, constitutional or congenital; this is the equipment with which they are called upon to meet life (which overtly or covertly means—society); those who find the demands of life too great for their anatomico-physiological, hence psychological, endowment usually succumb to a mental illness which, as a rule, runs a predetermined course. We thus were called upon to witness a definitely paradoxical situation: the medical psychologist faced with a sort of psychiatric fatalism was compelled to abandon the very thing he was trying to acquire, that is, an efficient and effective therapy; and rather unwillingly he had to become a therapeutic nihilist even though he would not willingly admit it; on the other hand, he would combat his own growing nihilism by trying to produce minor changes in the environment of the mentally sick and by trying to reason with the patient; in other words, he would thus deepen the paradox since he would attempt to combat such fatalities as psychological inheritance with minor and therefore *a priori* ineffectual environmental pressure. With this overemphasis of the rôle of constitution, as we shall see more definitely later, psychiatry unwittingly took up a uniquely isolated position in the system of medical sciences.

In the meantime, the other pathway, that of deeper study of the individual, while only vaguely defined and untrodden, was not permitted to be overgrown with grass: it is a matter of great interest to note that while Freud is considered the radical leader of a new and radical psychology, and while Kraepelin is considered the representative of the older, if not the old psychiatry, Freud's article on defense neuropsychoses appeared in 1894, i.e., two years before the appearance of that edition of Kraepelin's *Handbuch* in which he systematically described the onset, diagnosis, course and prognosis of dementia præcox. Moreover, in point of age, Kraepelin, had he lived, would have been almost of the same age as Freud today. In other words,

both were contemporaries in the strictest sense of the word, and natural scientific offspring of the same generation.

2.

This broad and brief and all too general survey of the development of some of the traditions in psychiatry is sufficient for the understanding of what was referred to above as the unique position of psychiatry in the system of medical sciences.

General medicine still follows Hippocrates in its attitude toward constitution. Hippocrates, the first systematic student of constitution, studied it definitely with a therapeutic goal in mind. He tried to acquaint himself thoroughly with the individual constitution of a patient in order to supply what appeared to be deficient and remove what appeared to be present in too great abundance. In this respect psychiatry of a century ago, standing more closely to the medico-surgical tradition of the day, appears to have been more consistent than it is today. One recalls in this connection Benjamin Rush who, at the beginning of the past century, trembled at the thought of what might have happened to the medical psychologist if he had not had at his disposal such invaluable therapeutic agencies as vomiting, purging, and blood letting. However, having abandoned this centuries old therapeutic triad, psychiatry unlike medicine began to ponder over the inevitability of the constitutional endowment of man. Hence, the therapeutic difficulties, if not embarrassment, which present-day psychiatry has to face. This appears to be due to the fact that the medical man from the days of Hippocrates insisted on treating a given individual, *despite* his constitution, while the psychiatrist had to capitulate as it were before the impenetrable wall of constitution. Granted that an individual has a certain constitutional weakness of his gastric mucosa or pulmonary tissue, the medical man will continue to practice surgical removal of gastric ulcer, and systematic treatment of pneumonia or tuberculosis. The psychiatrist on the other hand finds himself much more restrained in his possible effort, because the ultimate prognosis of a manic-depressive psychosis

or a dementia præcox is predetermined; the fate of the extreme cyclothymic or the severe schizoid individual is established in advance, thus stunting if not paralyzing one's therapeutic ambition.

As will be pointed out later in more detail, it is possible to explain this singular self-defeatist trend in a medical discipline; suffice it for the present to state that psychoanalysis, despite its drive to study and to heal, supported this tradition in many ways and treated it with more than justifiable respect. Thus Fenichel, among others, is inclined to see a "biological moment" in the very periodicity of manic-depressive reactions—that is to say a constitutional fatality and he like many others is inclined to separate psychoanalysis from psychiatry, leaving to the latter the field of psychoses as if these do not belong to the same domain of psychopathology. In other words, psychoanalysis having proved most successful in the treatment of neuroses and having made the majority of its contributions on the basis of material obtained from neuroses, has assisted up to now in the process of isolating psychiatry, thus indirectly strengthening its trend towards fatalism and therapeutic nihilism.

Two questions thus arise: first, what are the primary characteristics of the psychiatric studies on constitution and what is the psychology underlying the overemphasis of constitution; and second, what contribution, if any, has psychoanalysis to make to the problem of constitution and how does it approach this problem.

3.

Less than fifty years ago the neuropsychiatric literature still insisted on the hereditary nature of hysteria, and it spoke of the inheritance of neuropathies. Drawing parallels from what appears to have been purely neurological material, such as Friedreich's ataxia or Huntington's chorea, the psychiatrist felt convinced that various psychological abnormalities are hereditary. Today we do not speak any more of neuropathies when we discuss functional mental disorders; we use the word

psychopathy instead. It is obvious that the change of terms altered but little the fundamental hypothesis. However, the work of testing and verifying this hypothesis was left to the twentieth century. Instead of merely postulating that certain anatomical characteristics correspond to certain psychological aberrations ("stigmata of degeneration", for instance) a thoroughgoing and careful statistical study of large masses of individuals was undertaken, thus submitting the problem of constitution and heredity to the only scientific test possible. An enormous literature on the subject made its appearance, coming mainly from the Munich school. The very detailed investigations of Luxenburger, Hoffmann, Rüdin, Kahn, and many others were all based on the assumption that mental diseases are a result of an inherited constitution, and they all set themselves to the task of finding out to what extent the Mendelian laws were applicable to psychological morbidity. The problem is far from solved and no definite answer has as yet been found to the question of how mental diseases are inherited. However, some of the findings are highly instructive and quite suggestive of the main difficulties which this problem presents. It was thus disclosed that the number of schizophrenics among children in families in which both parents were schizophrenics were 50 per cent¹; this figure drops to 10 per cent in families in which only one of the parents was schizophrenic.² On the other hand, it would appear that direct inheritance of schizophrenia is highly doubtful: Zoller in reviewing the histories of 356 schizophrenics and their siblings found not a single case of parental schizophrenia and Rüdin studying one thousand families of schizophrenics found only 34 definite cases of parental schizophrenia and 18 doubtful ones. Evidently there seems to be no direct inheritance of

¹ This figure was derived by Eugen Kahn from a study of eight families and their twenty-six descendants. It is obvious that such a small number of individuals does not warrant the evaluation of the results in percentages.

² Most of the data on the subject as well as the quotations which follow are taken, unless otherwise indicated, from K. Beringer's excellent summary "*Die Erbllichkeit*" found in the *Handbuch der Geisteskrankheiten*, Vol. IX, Spezieller Teil V, issued under the general editorship of Oswald Bumke, Berlin, 1932.

schizophrenia. Yet the number of schizophrenic descendants appears to increase if the parents happen to suffer from mental disturbances other than schizophrenia. Rüdín thus states: "The frequency of dementia præcox among siblings does not depend only on the frequency with which this special disease is found in their parents, but also on the frequency with which other mental disturbances that are clinically different from dementia præcox are found among the parents." Recalling Kahn's conclusion that schizophrenia, as a rule, behaves like a recessive Mendelian characteristic, and schizoid reactions like dominant ones, one gains the impression that the clinical entities as they are known today are on the whole proven not to be subject to the laws of heredity and that in their statistical studies the various investigators are admittedly led to broaden the base, as it were, and to consider not clinical entities as such, but psychopathies in general which now are supposed to lead through obscure hereditary pathways to various psychoses and then to neuroses. We might add that a clear definition of psychopathies is still lacking and that the problem remains therefore as complex as it is confusing. This is apparently the reason why Beringer counsels us not to draw too rash practical conclusions and states that the findings (Rüdín's) should be viewed with reserve and that one should not rashly advise parents with psychopathic traits against having any children. This being the case, one naturally wonders what scientific criteria of morbid predisposition does present-day psychiatry use? One regrets to find a rather vague answer to this direct question. The answer usually is: psychopathies, psychopathic inferior individuals, peculiar personalities, maladjusted persons, etc. It is not difficult to discern that these appellations are more practical designations reflecting the point of view of the investigator rather than scientifically defined terms that point to objective facts, and the question naturally arises: What may be the cause of this scientific indefiniteness and definite confusion? In order to find a plausible answer to this question, one must bear in mind that concepts utilized in any scientific discipline are determined by the prevalent psychology

of the age and by the psychology of the individual investigator. Astronomy, for instance, was loath to abandon the geocentric theory of the universe primarily because of man's egocentric attitude towards life and his narcissistic unwillingness to give up his projected egocentricity, and thus relegate to the earth a secondary rôle in the sidereal and planetary systems. It is not ignorance that led man to hold on to his false ideas, but it is the psychological value these ideas had for him that kept him in ignorance of the true facts; it is the same narcissism and projected omnipotence combined with a passive idealization of the great unknown that made it easier for modern science at first to reject Pasteur than to give up the old concept of spontaneous generation. It is the same projected omnipotence and passive subjugation to fate that made one prefer the over-emphasis of the concept constitution and heredity (fate) rather than to undertake the investigation of mental disorders without more preconception than one has when investigating the source of an epidemic of typhoid fever or malaria. As has been mentioned above, psychiatry has a life-long tradition which claims the invulnerability of the spirit or the psyche or mind or reason, and which claimed for centuries that the mind is always morally pure and serenely healthy and that *mens sana* always depends upon *corpus sanum*. This attitude was well reflected even in the writings of the enlightened psychiatrists in the early part of the past century (Reil, for instance) when they spoke of psychological therapy as the use of those drugs which affect the mind. Such fundamental traditional trends die hard not because man is not curious but because they reflect the fundamental attitude of man towards the universe as a whole. This attitude, alive from the days of subjugation to the shaman or even earlier times, is that of primary overestimation of one's own psychic activity followed by secondary passive submission to an invisible, externalized force which bore a different name at different levels of man's developmental history; it has been known as benign and evil spirit, as punitive power from above, fate, heredity, etc. This attitude naturally obscured the vision of many generations of

industrious, honest, scientifically curious and careful investigators. Again, it must be emphasized that it was not lack of knowledge that kept the older scientific men ignorant, but their psychological unreadiness to give up a tradition that gratified them as social beings of a certain historical period and as individuals. This is perhaps the reason why every new truly scientific discovery, particularly if it was made in the field of psychopathology or social sciences, bore the earmarks of a revolutionary drive and never failed to arouse at first violent opposition. When Cornelius Agrippa wrote his *De Vanitate Scientiarum* in the sixteenth century, he aroused the same opposition among scientific men as Darwin in the nineteenth; and Cardanus in the seventeenth, who was one of the first to outline the concept of psychological constitution, was suspected of being a heretic. It must be stated quite definitely, however, that the above considerations are intended in no way to imply that the concept of constitution and heredity of mental disorders should be thus disposed of as survivals of a superstitious past; on the contrary, this valuable if not indispensable scientific concept denotes a series of highly important factors which cannot be overlooked clinically or theoretically. However, unless we take cognizance of the rôle that psychological tradition played in the formation of this concept, we shall not be able to establish with any degree of precision what is to be understood by constitution and what the specific thing is which may be looked upon as an inheritable property. The same point should be borne in mind with regard to the concept of psychopathic constitution, which connotes today the existence of a definite preconceived social ideal: any break in the conformity to this ill-defined yet persistent social ideal might be and actually is called today a psychopathy almost to the same extent as any mental deviation in the fourteenth or fifteenth century was considered a sin because those centuries were guided by an established ethico-religious dogma. It is of more than passing interest to recall that in order to break away from that tradition the critical mind of the time also resorted to what might be called pharmacological or somatological

theories: thus Johannes Weyer in the sixteenth century attempted to explain some of the manifestations of witchcraft by the action of arsenic and similar poisons which had been presumably put in the food of the afflicted by some malevolent relative or servant.

We can now return more directly to the problem of constitution as it is formulated today and see that under the influence of the above mentioned forces two fundamental factors which were brought to light by psychoanalysis are being overlooked.

First of all, clinical psychoanalytic practice has proved with sufficient certainty that no matter what the given clinical entity of mental disturbance, every psychopathological state has its intimate individual history; that is to say, that whatever the exogenous or the endogenous, fundamental or accidental causes that enter into the formation of a neurosis or a psychosis, it is the individual's subjective reaction to these causes that characterizes the given pathological condition. It is *what* the patient thinks, feels, and does that make up the symptomatology; in other words, a given set of exciting causes releases in one individual one set of subjective responses and others in another, the subjective responses being intimately related to and connected with the personal life history of the given individual. We cannot therefore investigate constitution and heredity by merely collecting a number of individuals and subjecting them to purely statistical disindividualization and failing to take into consideration each individual's *subjective* history, for if we continue to proceed in the traditional manner of statistics we are bound with the increasing number of disindividualized individuals to find an ever increasing number of similarities and our results will most probably be misleading, since in the ultimate analysis there is always a given set of traits common to all men. One should add at this point that this emphasis on the importance of the subjective state of the individual has misled many a scientific mind into raising the accusation that psychoanalysis preaches a subjectivistic psychology and leads astray and away from objective scientific

investigation. This is obviously a serious error no matter how common, for the subjective state of an individual is as legitimate an objective subject matter for scientific study as any other phenomenon that science chooses to investigate. This reproach raised against psychoanalysis for its alleged subjectivism is not without psychological interest because if we concentrate on the purely external, supposedly objective data presented by a given individual, and if we disregard his subjective reaction, and if we want to understand these data and try to explain or interpret them or give them a name (which is the same thing), we shall be able to do so only on the basis of our own evaluation of what we have observed. Whether we do it by means of intellectual construction and call the individual a psychopath, or invoking so-called common sense we call him an inferior maladjusted person, it is our own *subjective* attitude that we are thus expressing no matter how many adherents this *subjective* attitude might gather at a given period and state of our knowledge. It is therefore difficult to rid one's self of the impression that the so-called objective, dis-individualized studies of constitution are methodologically deficient and subjective and that only statistical data compiled on the added basis of the subjective individual histories will be adequate enough to stand the test of objective findings.

The lack of this additional source of information in the best studies on heredity is more responsible than any other factor for the general looseness of criteria; thus the terms dementia præcox and schizophrenia are used interchangeably without sufficient clinical differentiation and without regard to the variety of schizophrenias (Hoffmann) or the term schizoid is equated with peculiar individual (Beringer, Rüdin).

The other factor introduced by psychoanalysis and omitted heretofore from consideration by the student of constitution is the process of identification to which the individual is subjected at the various and most crucial points of his developmental history. To be able to establish with any degree of definiteness the rôle which a given constitutional *anlage* of a parent plays in the reaction of a son or daughter, we must be

able to evaluate and to take into account the process of identification of this son or daughter with the parent in question. We may not yet have at our disposal any definite criterion by means of which we could measure and subtract the degree of identification from direct hereditary influence, but we know that the influence of identification is real, and overlooking it means to vitiate in advance the results of any study of heredity. A beginning in the direction of differentiating the element of identification from the *anlage* proper will be shown below.

4.

The question as yet unanswered and raised above was this: What contribution, if any, has psychoanalysis to make to the problem of constitution and how does it approach this problem?

Let us attempt to answer the second half of the question first. In a general but quite definite way, Freud outlined this answer as early as 1896 in an address made to the pupils of Charcot. Referring to psychoanalysis as "a method that is somewhat subtle but irreplaceable",¹ Freud stated: ". . . in the pathogenesis of the major neuroses heredity plays the part of a *condition* potent in all cases and even indispensable in the majority of them. It cannot do without the assistance of the specific causes; but the importance of hereditary predisposition is demonstrated by the fact that the same specific causes operating on a sound person would produce no manifest pathological effect, while its presence in a predisposed person will precipitate a neurosis, the development of which will in intensity and extent be proportional to the degree of hereditary predisposition." But "there is another point to be noted in the relations between the hereditary condition and the specific causes of the neuroses. Experience shows, as might have been anticipated, that among the problems of etiology that of the quantitative relationship of the etiological factors to one another should not be neglected. But one would not have guessed the fact which seems to follow from my observations that heredity and the specific causes may replace one another quantitatively,

¹ Freud: *Heredity and Etiology of the Neuroses*. Coll. Papers I, 138-154.

that the same pathological effect will be produced by the coexistence of a very grave specific etiology and a moderate degree of predisposition as by that of a severe neuropathic heredity with a slight specific factor. So that it is merely a quite possible extreme in this series when one finds cases of neurosis in which a tangible degree of hereditary predisposition is looked for in vain, provided that this deficiency is compensated for by a powerful specific factor."

These statements present but a bare suggestion of a clinical method of investigation which psychoanalysis adopted and followed for almost forty years, but the therapeutic impulse, the mainspring of psychoanalysis, naturally led to a concentration on the search for the specific etiological factors and thus produced a serious gap between psychoanalysis and psychiatry, the latter concentrating more on the elusive hereditary factors. Moreover, while the psychoanalytic method had stated its position in regard to heredity, it was as yet unable to support it with sufficiently convincing clinical data until and unless it came into possession of the elements which enter into the formation of the so-called neuropathies. Not until Freud's theory of instincts was formulated was it possible to examine the various constellations of psychic elements that produce the various normal or pathological conditions. In other words, Freud's conception of the structural characteristics of the human personality and of its psychic economy were the first tools that made possible a real differentiation of certain hereditary elements from the acquired, as well as a real evaluation of their relative rôles in the variety of psychological isomeres, as it were. Freud sensed this at the time he addressed the pupils of Charcot when he said: "Since there is no such thing as chance in the pathogenesis of nervous diseases any more than elsewhere, it must be admitted that it is not heredity that controls the choice of a neuropathy developing in a member of a predisposed family, and there is ground for suspecting the existence of other etiological factors of a less incomprehensible nature which deserve to rank as the specific etiology of any such nervous disease. Without the existence of this special

etiological factor, heredity would have been powerless; it would have lent itself to the production of a different neuropathy if the specific etiology in a given case had been replaced by any other."

The above statements make it more than clear that while psychoanalysis became primarily interested in the specific factors which contribute to or coöperate with heredity, it was far from assuming that the human being's psychic apparatus is at birth a *tabula rasa* on to which environment and other "accidental causes" write the fate of a given individual. So much for the psychoanalytical attitude towards the problem of heredity. The approach to this problem thus becomes clear: if it were possible clinically to follow through the developmental vicissitudes of the various instinctual drives which in a variety of constellations make up the individual members of a family, it would be possible to gain some insight into which elements represent heredity and how a given individual happens to be affected by them. To this end one or two clinical facts will be examined.

5.

A severely suicidal woman of thirty-five presented a typical depression. She attempted to kill herself and her two children. She was the only daughter from a second marriage of both her parents. Her father had no living issue from his first wife; her mother had two living children by her first husband, a boy and a girl, nine and twelve years older than the patient. In the course of a prolonged analysis the patient revealed the typical structure and mechanisms of a depression: inordinate oral-sadistic fixation on her mother; endless cannibalistic fantasies, and an almost insurmountable inability to rid herself of the introjected mother with the corresponding armamentarium of anal reactions. It is not necessary for our purposes to enter into the details of the patient's illness and its specific characteristics. Suffice it to say that her whole personality appeared to be pervaded with strong oral trends which had been characteristic of her prepsychotic personality as well

as of her psychosis. Her father was a moody, irritable explosive individual, a man with a sharp tongue and rather violent temper, a generous but critical executive and father. He treated his daughter with a great deal of affection and warmth and always wished for her company. He was a great eater and therefore quite corpulent, and food was one of his outstanding interests, if not passions. He loved roast beef and the ceremony of carving it was a solemn although a frequent event in the life of the family; it was not only the process of carving meat that he seemingly enjoyed so much as the distribution of it. One would usually be able to guess his attitude towards a given person by the quality and size of the morsel of meat he would put on the platter of that person. He naturally always favored his daughter with one of the choicest morsels, and the stepson's ration would vary with the stepfather's estimate of his behavior on that day. He never had any mental illness, but as has been said he was given to moods and rather melancholy reminiscences of his first wife, who was dead, and of the two children she bore him who died in early infancy. In short, the father of our patient bore all the earmarks of an oral type of individual.

The patient's mother was a good housewife and partly out of natural interest and partly because of her husband's propensities, she was efficiently interested in the kitchen. She was proud of her ancestry and was greatly interested in dietetics and the hygiene of the gastrointestinal tract. While her personality did not appear as clearly defined as that of her husband, one could safely place her among the individuals who apparently had strong oral drives; these came particularly to expression in the fact that her little daughter, the future patient, was nursed until rather late; thus she would receive at least one bottle of milk a day even when she was three years old. As a matter of fact, her mother never had the heart to wean her and the little girl had to give up the bottle after a rather dramatic occasion: one day her half brother in a fit of impatience tore the bottle out of her mouth and threw it away. The mother had no mental disease and was well at the age of

seventy, at the time the patient's psychosis had reached its height. The two other children in the family showed no outstanding traits. The girl was very intimate with her mother and she never married. She always had a great penchant for beautiful and very feminine clothes but kept an intact and virginal attitude towards men and life in general. The boy showed some tendency to truancy and never was able to concentrate on anything definite. He had no career or profession.

Our patient was an affectionate and considerate little girl and very motherly; one of her favorite and most thrilling experiences was "stealing" meat from her plate to shove it over to her brother or stealthily to bring him food after dinner because she thought he had not had enough to eat.

If we were to approach this brief description from the traditional psychiatric point of view, we would have to state either that there was "nothing striking" in the family history, or that the girl apparently inherited some of the peculiarities of her father and possibly some of her mother, and later succumbed to a psychotic attack because of some inherent weakness of her personality. This impression would be particularly strengthened when we learned that the patient's main difficulties centered around her children. She accused herself of being a bad mother and thought that she and her children would be better dead. In other words, her maternal instinct was apparently of a pathological nature.

As has been said before, it is unnecessary for our purpose to report in detail the developmental history of the patient's instinctual life or the gradual growth of her illness. To what has been said above, we may add the following facts:

She was apparently happily married in her late twenties. She appears to have suffered, at first at least, from no disturbances of her psychosexual functions; she was extremely eager to have a baby; this eagerness was almost of lifelong standing; she remembered that ever since she was seven or eight years old, she yearned to grow up in order to have a baby. She was not frigid and her marital life as well as her general demeanor definitely pointed to the fact that she had reached the genital

level without apparent difficulties. Her first born was a boy who lived but a few hours. Her reaction to the loss of the child was outwardly that of quiet composure and almost serene resignation. Years later, in the course of her analysis, she discovered that in addition to the queer comfort she felt when she lost the baby, she suffered (unconsciously) from a great deal of resentment and hatred. She later had two more children—girls. The first signs of her neurosis, apparently hysterical in nature, began to appear after the second child was born when she gradually developed a moderately severe depressive state, from which she recovered. This happened about six years after the birth of the second child. Soon after she had the second girl and following this her suicidal depression set in. Throughout her childhood and early adolescence her life was filled with fantasies about her father's first wife who was dead. Her father spoke about her and had her photograph over his bed; he also had a photograph of his first born little son who died at the age of eighteen months. The photograph showed him sleeping peacefully; it was taken when the boy died. Our patient heard about it from her father when she was about five years old. At that time the dead woman's trunk stood in a little hall between our patient's room and the parental bedroom. One day she discovered in it the clothes of that woman, a layette for a little baby, a purse with some money, etc. In short her life was filled with fantasies about her father's first wife who was dead and to whom he continued to be dearly devoted. Our patient recalled how she and her mother would occasionally exchange a few words expressing resentment over that devotion. Her oedipal fantasy finally acquired the following unconscious formula: "If I were my father's first wife and bore him children, he would not have married my mother and would not sleep with her in the room next to mine and next to that trunk." This identification with a dead woman became the foundation of and the chief motivation for her severe depressive neurosis. As a matter of fact, in the complex texture of her illness no other elements—not even her deeply seated oral fixation—ever played such an important rôle as the

introjection of the dead woman who was also a dead mother of dead children.

If we return now to our chief question—that dealing with hereditary predisposition—we will see that the complete identification with a dead woman, while conditioned or assisted by the patient's strong orality, presented a specific circumstance without which the patient might never have become so severely afflicted, or she might (and probably would have) developed a more definitely hysterical reaction rather than a suicidal depression. What she appears to have inherited is not an illness, or the specific type of illness she had, but her intense orality. To be sure even the latter cannot be entirely laid at the door of heredity until we take into account the post-natal influence of her mother's orality, which made it imperative that the little girl be directly indulged by the gratification of her oral erotism until she was three years old, and later when both parents seemed to have joined hands in stimulating and catering to the oral component of her personality. These considerations can lead but to one conclusion.

Hereditary predisposition in psychology, as in biology, can be found only in the invariable *elements* which make up the whole, but not in the variable whole; these elements, when we deal with psychopathological problems, are the various instinctual (mostly pregenital and component) trends. The latter, however, (and one cannot repeat it too frequently) consist, even at an early age of the individual, of two cathexes: the congenital one and the one engrafted by parental predispositions or those of their surrogates. This fundamental and to a practicing psychoanalyst rather obvious conclusion is of great methodological importance, since it is a point which cannot be verified by traditional statistical procedures; only a careful, psychoanalytically tested statistical study can be adequate enough to warrant the hope that the problem will be adequately solved. It is unfortunate, of course, that psychoanalysis does not as yet possess any carefully compiled statistical material, while statistical psychiatry does not possess any carefully compiled psychological material.

The purpose of the present communication is not that of providing statistical material that is psychoanalytically tested; such an ambitious task will probably be fulfilled in time as our clinical data on the subject increase both in detail and in number. For the present one must limit one's self to single illustrative examples only. It is of interest, therefore, to cite another case illustrating the vicissitudes of another of the fundamental instinctual predispositions with which we are frequently called upon to deal clinically.

6.

A boy of twenty, after a number of difficulties and palliative peregrinations, finally came to be analyzed, presenting the following network of complaints.

His most outstanding difficulty was the compulsion to masturbate on women's clothes. He stole clothes from various women (the wives of his teachers) and masturbated to ejaculate on them. However, his preferred procedure was ejaculating on women's furs or fur collars or sleeve trimmings in the theatres, on trains, in crowds at the railroad stations or post offices, crowded streets, or other public places. On one or two occasions he got himself into conflict with the Law. He drank heavily at times and on occasion when alcohol in its usual form was unavailable, he would drink various extracts kept for cooking purposes in the kitchen. Also, he would carry a razor blade in his pocket and on one occasion cut off more than a dozen fur tails from ladies' fur pieces. He stole a fur coat from a girl friend. When he was thirteen or fourteen he once stole several fur coats, kept them in an adjoining empty house and masturbated on them at various intervals. Once or twice he had intercourse with prostitutes, but this happened in Europe and not while he lived at home. He used to dress up as a woman, using mostly his mother's clothes, and masturbate. Frequently he wanted to put dirt on his penis. As a matter of fact, he recalled that for a period of several years, from the age of ten on, he would run into the woods where he had a favorite swamp, and would lie face down, his penis exposed, and

masturbate into it while listening to the frogs. He would be particularly uncomfortable and reach a state of exceptional excitement on trains especially in the presence of negro women passengers. However, he would not avoid riding on trains but rather sought after such occasions. His conscious sense of guilt for his behavior was immense. He suffered a great deal, would cry bitterly, but yet was unable to control his behavior.

As in the previous case we shall refrain from going into the details of his neurosis any more than is necessary to illustrate the point that preoccupies us at present.

A prolonged and rather difficult analysis disclosed an early seduction by a negro maid (at the age of two). The patient was the only child and always slept in the parental bedroom. Later on when he was given a room of his own, at about the age of twelve, he developed and kept for a long time a special and complicated compulsion-neurotic ceremony in which his shoes played a considerable rôle; these he had to put together in a certain way, otherwise he would be unable to sleep. In the course of the analysis it was disclosed that he would put the shoes with the toes pointing exactly in the direction of the door leading into the parental bedroom. Unless the toes pointed in the right direction, he was tense, anxious and restless. The outstanding experience of his life (next to the seduction) was a night train ride when he was three years old. He was sleeping with his mother in the lower berth while his father occupied the upper one just above them. He dreamed that night that he saw a pair of his own short pants suspended in the air incessantly dancing up and down. He woke up crying and frightened and while doing so he wet himself and his mother. He never forgot the dream and his parents remembered that incident well, but he never understood it until eighteen years later when he was in the second year of his analysis. The next day after that dream occurred, he was restless and tearful; he did not want to go to sleep when put to bed in a hotel room, and complained of being chilly. His mother then put her own coat over him, a coat of velvet, fur trimmed, and he always remem-

bered that he was for some reason impressed, excited, and pacified by the smell of that coat.

Although the oral drives in this patient were of no small intensity, the outstanding and economically the most dominating factor in the various constellations of his reactions was his anality. This latter would at times appear in undisguised form; he thus would fantasize occasionally that he put feces on a woman's coat and this would give him intense sexual excitement; on one occasion during the analysis he actually took a piece of his own feces in a piece of paper and put it on the back of a woman's coat while riding home in a train.

His parents could be classified without any difficulty as simple, middle-class, sedate, comfortable, normal people. On closer inspection, however, one could observe the following: his mother was a punctual, methodical person who at times would become anxious about her health, particularly about her evacuations; this was one of her most cherished preoccupations. She had a number of theories about bowels and loved to talk about them. The patient's father was a typical compulsion-neurotic "normal" character. He, in coöperation with his wife, devoted a great deal of time, thought, energy, and conversation to regulating, arranging, investigating, and checking up on their bowel movements. He was very stingy and very punctual; to be on occasion a few minutes late for an appointment meant to him to stay irascible for several hours. He was a successful business man dealing in bathroom and toilet fixtures; he speculated in stocks, preferably in gold mine stocks. He was neat and clean to a fault. He taught his little son to wash his hands on every possible occasion to "avoid infection". Touching a match was an occasion for making the little boy wash his hands thoroughly "to wash off the poison". It must be said, however, that while all these traits when enumerated in this concentrated manner might give the impression of a pronounced and clinically obvious compulsion neurosis, the man functioned very well socially; subjectively he felt well and his compulsion-neurotic drives served rather than impeded his well regulated personal, business and social life.

It might also be of some interest to mention that the patient's maternal grandfather was a likeable and loving grandparent who, apparently, thought that a healthy mind was conditioned by healthy bowels and loved to lecture his little grandson on the subject. When this grandfather was about seventy years old and met his grandson after some five or six years separation, he greeted the twenty-one-year-old boy very cordially and in all seriousness asked him about his bowels and hastened to report about a new cathartic that he had recently discovered.

It is quite obvious that not all case histories offer such conspicuous consistency of familial character traits, but it is the conspicuousness rather than their presence or even their consistency that is exceptional; when reviewed from this point of view, one's clinical experience could seldom fail to demonstrate the consistent regularity with which certain pregenital instinctual characteristics run through two and three generations of the same family.

It is perhaps more difficult to see in this case how certain of his pregenital drives, particularly the anal ones, became hypercathected under the direct influence of the parents, but it is none the less quite clear from the above that the hereditary taint was primarily that of the anal element and not of the clinical entity or even of some individual symptoms characteristic of that entity. It is not without interest to note that our patient apparently by way of reaction formation never had any conscious interest in the functions of his bowels. The overerotization of his anal drives became inevitably coupled with his œdipus drives and castration anxiety, and led to the development of a set of complex perversions.

7.

The above two cases were chosen as illustrations not because there is a lack of clinical material among the so-called classical neuroses that would well give point to our hypothesis, but because clinically they stand closer to those psychopathological reactions which we have become accustomed to relegate to the field of psychiatry as differentiated from psychoanalysis. For

if we follow the traditional psychiatric classification, we should consider the first case as that of a depressive psychosis rather than that of a neurotic, hysterical depression, and the second case would undoubtedly fall under the rubric of a mild schizophrenia or "schizoid" reaction, rather than that of a very severe compulsion neurosis. This is particularly true if we add that the first case was very self-accusatory, retarded at times and almost delusional in that she had on occasion said that her children must die because she "gave" them a "terrible mother". As to the second case, the boy did feel on more than one occasion that he "sort of heard" his own thoughts, "felt like talking to himself" and gave at times the impression of being in a mute catatonic state, particularly in the course of his analysis, which incidentally yielded satisfactory if not complete therapeutic results.

These borderline, if not mildly psychotic, reactions are so much more instructive because the development of psychoanalytic theory and practice gradually led to the silent acquiescence that neuroses in general, like hysteria some fifty years ago, are probably not hereditary in nature, but that psychoses cannot be considered as subject to the same principles of psychopathology since they are presumably of a biological, i.e., constitutional origin. Apparently the contrary cannot be proved without more factual data, but the data at hand do seem to disprove the invulnerability of the traditional contention.

CLINICAL FRAGMENTS

BY DORIAN FEIGENBAUM (NEW YORK)

1.

S.S. LEVIATHAN: A SLIP OF THE PEN

An architect of high professional standing who had made America his home a few years before and was approaching the end of his analysis, with his transference almost fully worked through, his symptoms mostly gone and his heterosexuality satisfactorily adjusted, took a week-end trip to Halifax and back on the steamship Aquitania. Before leaving the boat at Halifax for a brief inspection of the city, he sent out cards to friends and relatives, but being dissatisfied with what he had written to Lewis and Lafite, two of his friends, he tore up their cards, making a mental note to write out two other cards. He forgot about them, however, until the boat was about to leave for the return trip, when he hurriedly bought two postal cards and filled them out. Dropping them into the post-office box, he noticed, to his surprise, that he had written the words "S.S. Leviathan" instead of "S.S. Aquitania" on the card addressed to Lafite. His surprise was intensified by the fact that he had never been on the Leviathan and had never thought of taking passage on it or otherwise concerned himself with the boat. Fascinated by the problem of this slip of the pen he proceeded to collect the associations to his parapraxia which he subsequently brought to the analytic session.

In the card to Lafite he had referred jestingly to the fog that had endangered the boat's passage to Halifax. Lafite and he were planning a partnership, the plan having originated with the patient. In the card he congratulated Lafite, his prospective partner, on the fact that the partnership had been saved by the timely appearance of the sun which had dissipated the ugly fog.

The patient had, as a matter of fact, felt very uneasy throughout the trip. The fog depressed him and also filled

him with a peculiar anxiety. At night when practically nothing could be seen because of the density of the fog, he had wandered over the deck and found a resting place near the stern where, looking down upon the waters, he lost himself in thoughts of darkness and helplessness and felt a horror of the water, though at the same time a fascination by it. He imagined himself drifting alone in mid-ocean, without knowing how he had gotten there and with no prospect of being saved, and was feeling his life "oozing out of him". Self-pity overwhelmed him when he thought of his wife and his child who could not be aware of his present danger. Nevertheless he felt drawn to the very fate he was afraid of and experienced an urge to throw himself into the water since he was doomed to perish anyhow. The feeling was so strong that he only saved himself by seeking refuge among the people who were drinking and dancing in the middle of the deck.

He recalled in connection with this experience an event from early childhood. Four and a half years old at the time, he had been left home late in the afternoon with his brother, who was about a year and a half older than he, and a sister, a year and a half younger. In order to keep them contented and occupied their parents had allowed them to have a party during their absence, and the children, after some slight uneasiness, abandoned themselves to play, decorating the room, setting the table like grown-ups, and singing. All was well until suddenly at sunset someone rapped at the door. In their fright the children remained motionless and keeping as quiet as possible decided not to open the door. After a few more raps on the door the visitor disappeared. However, the patient recalls that at the height of their anxiety the older brother and, following him, the sister and he himself had pointed their dull-edged fruit knives to their hearts. They had resolved to stab themselves in the heart in the frenzy of their despair.

He recalled his state of uneasiness before he wrote the cards to Lafite and Lewis. Upon leaving the boat he had gone sight-seeing alone through the narrow streets of the city. It was

Sunday and most of the streets were deserted, the houses were depressingly dilapidated and the city had a thoroughly uninviting appearance to the lonely traveler. Therefore when passing through several exceptionally narrow lanes he came across groups of fishermen crouching apathetically on the ground who seemed to be eyeing him suspiciously, he felt uncomfortable and turned back to the boat. Arriving at the pier he wrote out the postal cards and mailed them there.

He had also experienced a slight uneasiness in connection with a radiogram which he had sent his wife upon arriving at Halifax. He had written: "Floating slowly, safely, pleasantly through fog", but upon handing the message to the ship's officer he recalled that it might be construed as a reflection upon the tour tending to discourage prospective tourists, since he remembered hearing that the real danger to boats lay not so much in storms at sea as in fogs. Remembering how letters had been censored during the world war in which he had served as an officer he was afraid that the radiogram would never be sent.

With "Leviathan" he associated "Lewis, Lafite and Nathan". Lewis is an eminently wealthy and successful architect with whom he had found it difficult to establish friendly relations due to that individual's *parvenu* character traits. Lafite, the person with whom the patient was planning to establish a partnership, was a capable architect whom he had on several occasions envied for his excellent social connections. The patient, who had only recently established his residence in the country, felt socially at a disadvantage. With "Nathan" he associated two men of the same name whom he had envied for their success in his youth. One of them, a friend of his older brother, belonged to the series of brother images towards whom he manifested complex reactions interfering with his adjustment to them, which had been treated in analysis. To "Leviathan" he also associated the story of Jonah and the whale and the horror of being swallowed.

To "Aquitania", the name of the boat, he associated ocean and his fear of drowning produced by the fog at sea. The last three syllables of the word bore a close resemblance to his oldest brother's name, which is Anthony. He therefore saw an association between "Aquitania" and Anthony, the older brother around whom centered most of the painful experiences of childhood and boyhood which had been often the subject of analysis. Moreover, he associated "Aquitania" with tapeworm, "tænia". In early childhood he had been often frightened by the low contralto voice of a gypsy hunchback who used to sing in the courtyard for pennies. Whenever he appeared, the little boy tried to find out what produced this strangely deep and terrifying voice. One day the cook answered that eating worms was the cause, and thereafter the child dreaded the possibility of harboring a worm in his intestine.

Analysis of the slip of the pen, then, reveals multiple motivation. Anxiety centering around the word "Aquitania" produced its repression—a repression of both the ocean and the older brother, two related sources of discomfort. Hence the choice of another boat. The substitution of "Leviathan" for "Aquitania", however, exhibits the *similia-similibus* method of trying to overcome anxiety and fear (death) with anxiety and fear, for "Leviathan", as the ocean, as the whale that swallowed Jonah, the brother images and the social life beset with difficulties, is a new source of multiple dangers, and represents a return of the repressed. The technique of which the parapraxia makes use is a repetition, be it noted, of that which had been in evidence in the children's solution of anxiety through suicide when they met the threat of the supposed intruder with the idea of stabbing themselves in the heart.

The psychogenic parapraxia is, then, to be regarded as a defense phenomenon against an anxiety from which, paradoxically, an escape was effected by the production of another—disguised but identical—anxiety.

2.

LAUGHTER BETRAYING A NEGATIVE THERAPEUTIC REACTION

Psychoanalysis has so far contributed very little to the problem of technical prognosis based on analytic material. The importance of recording detailed observations bearing on the problem is therefore self-evident, provided that observations are sufficiently fundamental and constant to warrant theoretical evaluation. The so-called negative therapeutic reaction seems to be prognostically significant, and there must be a reason why Freud should have returned to it three times within fifteen years: first, in the *History of an Infantile Neurosis* (1918), then in the *Ego and the Id* (1923), and recently in *The New Introductory Lectures* (1933). The following observations corroborate Freud's findings in that they demonstrate, first, the presence of a deep sense of guilt underlying the negative reaction, and secondly, the justifiability of making a guarded prognosis whenever the negative therapeutic reaction is present.

A gifted and versatile lawyer in his forties, an only child, presented a large variety of anxiety and conversion symptoms on a background of character anomaly, of which from puberty onward the outstanding feature was the evolving of intense reaction formations of an exquisitely masochistic pattern such as self-imposed martyrdom, self-castigation in the form of prolonged fasting, etc.; he dreamed, on the other hand, of revolutionizing education and business, which he prosecuted energetically. He was thus a Christ-figure, in that he combined suffering with fulfilment. Among his most outspoken symptoms were wheezing spells and sexual impotence—the latter, as is often the case, running parallel with a compulsive urge to daily sexual indulgence, invariably ending in *fiasco* and depression.

During one session, in the fourth month of analysis, he recalled details of his feelings in early boyhood when his mother (who died after a second attempt at suicide) set him to spy on his father. He remembered the embarrassment and

distress which this caused him, and on the one hand his fear of his father, who often whipped him severely, but on the other his unwillingness to bear tales such as would verify his mother's suspicions in regard to her husband's maintaining relations with women of the neighborhood and frequenting brothels. Following this recollection, the patient reported that he was rather satisfied with the results of his analysis, that in this short time he had practically lost his wheezing spells and that, for the first time in a long while, he had been recently fairly potent on several occasions. He appeared to be pleased at being able to report this improvement, but suddenly he produced a strange, uncouth laughter never heard before in the analytic sessions. It was a mixture of gratified surprise and of self-depreciation and irony, with the latter predominant. The patient tried to gloss over his laughter and proceeded to associations relating to his business experiences. But his attention was called to his laughter, and he was asked for associations to it. He remained silent for a moment, then suddenly striking the couch in his embarrassment, he declared with surprise: "I don't know why, but a dirty song that the soldiers used to sing in war-time has just come to my mind." Then he repeated the song, which ran something like this:—

"I flog my dummy.
When I flog my dummy
I lose my memory;
When I lose my memory
I forget to flog my dummy."

From this his associations turned to England, English girls of masculine type and English male homosexuals, and he concluded with a reference to an old business friend, the relationship to whom, a latent homosexual one, had previously been the subject of analytic discussion.

The latent content of the poem is transparent, disclosing masturbation and the fear of punishment by loss of memory as its well-known alleged consequence. Penetrating further, the poem stresses loss of memory—that is, the threatened punishment of

masturbation—as a factor in the prevention of masturbation. Here is one more demonstration of the typical neurotic vicious circle of guilt begetting punishment and punishment acting as a preventive measure against further guilt. The patient's identification with the masturbating soldier goes to the very root of his symptoms, castration fear being the very foundation of his neurosis. It is to be noted that the associations in the same session, preceding the patient's symptomatic laughter, centered about his unbearable conflict in relation to his parents, especially his fear of his father. The narcissistic ego of the patient, which strives to be moral at all costs, converts overt masturbatory activity into symptoms which still his sense of guilt.

Now, it is to be noted that the patient's sudden burst of laughter occurred between his report of improvement in his symptoms and his recollection of the poem which contains, as we have seen, two basic ideas: (a) masturbation producing danger, (b) the resulting punishment (loss of memory—castration) preventing masturbation. The symptomatic laughter, with its irony and self-depreciation, expresses aversion to improvement, and, as might be expected, to the agent of the improvement, the analyst, for both, the improvement and its agent, have to be ridiculed and deprecated. On a number of occasions, a successful piece of analyzing was followed invariably by the patient's association concerning a "charlatan in California" or a "gangster in Chicago". What requires emphasis here is the fact that the patient's striking out at the analyst for the purpose of getting even with him is but a by-product. It is, rather, the unconscious sense of guilt which is the motive for the rejection of improvement in his symptoms. As a matter of fact the patient, on flimsy pretexts of urgent business appointments, did not appear for the next two sessions, and on returning to analysis brought complaints of renewed impotence. Thereafter, the analysis proceeded against intense resistance with frequent absences for about three months, and eventually the patient made his summer vacation the pretext for terminating analysis. He never came back.

It is to be noted that he had sought analytic treatment once

before in another city four years earlier, and he terminated it at his former analyst's suggestion after a year and a half. Before undertaking his analysis with me he had one month of analytic work with another analyst, whom he left on the pretext, once again, of being too absorbed in business problems.

3.

UTERUS FANTASIES WITH EJACULATIO PRAECOX

In a number of cases of ejaculatio praecox I have noted in particular, in addition to their typical urethral-anal-oral fixations, the presence of a wealth of utero-regressive fantasies which appeared to leave a characteristic stamp upon the entire personality. The influence of these fantasies made itself rather clearly felt in the relation of these patients to the analyst, a relation which I can only describe as a peculiar mixture of two opposing attitudes: one, a quasi mystical state of rapport consisting of an attitude of passive devotion; the other, a capriciously erupting antagonism suggesting a motivation by disappointment and disillusionment. No analyst, it is true, comes fully up to the expectations of any patient; but the discrepancy between fantasy and reality is perhaps at its maximum in those patients who manifest a profusion of utero-regressive fantasies.

How such fantasies may intrude in this sense upon the daily behavior of the individual is well illustrated in the following case excerpt which I have called A Birthday Poem. To this is added a second example illustrative of the apparently intimate connection between outspoken uterus fantasies and ejaculatio praecox.

A. A Birthday Poem

A highly intelligent professional man of thirty-three buys his wife a vase for her birthday and presents it to her with a poem which he has written for the occasion, signing it "Dorothy, the unborn baby".

Mother has two children
As cute as they can be.
Billy's on the outside
And the inside one is me.
Today is mother's birthday.
A very special one,
'Cause I'm along to celebrate
Though my age is less than none.
A birthday gift for mummy—
I've racked my little brain.
"Coöperate", cries Billy
As I dashed off for the train.
"He's right", my brain responded
And with joy I kicked your tummy,
For now I know an appropriate gift
That we could give for mummy.
So here's a vase just full of love
From your child and child-to-be,
The outside is from Billy
While the inside—is from me.

The patient, associating to this poem, declares that he is proud of having written it and is sure it will please his wife, who is in the sixth month of pregnancy with her second child. The idea of the poem suggested itself because his wife had sent her father a birthday poem supposedly written by her unborn baby to its grandfather shortly before she was confined with her first child. "Dorothy" is the name the patient and his wife are going to give the new baby if it is a girl. "Kicking in the tummy" reminds the poet of an unexpected meeting with his previous analyst in his present analyst's house. He also recalls playfully poking the elevator man of his office building in the stomach a few days ago. Analysis of the unexpected meeting with his former analyst and of his poking the elderly elevator man in the stomach brought forth the patient's ambivalence to his father and father-in-law (analyst). The patient also remembered a poem he had written to a recently married physician friend of his who was beginning to make his way in the world.

The poem, entitled "The Rising Doc", had been of a satirical nature, the expression "rising doc" being a *double entente*, referring both to the friend's material success and to the sexual fiasco caused by having to leave his wife's bed to answer an urgent telephone call. In the transference situation, the satirical poem to the young physician as well as the "kicking the tummy" of the birthday poem reveal the patient's desire to degrade the analyst.

Analysis of the poem reveals the patient's identification with his wife (and mother) for he writes a poem to her in the same manner as the latter had written to her father. He identifies himself also with the "inside one"—the unborn child, Dorothy. The patient's infantile attitude so conspicuous in his relation to his wife, had first come to light when he identified himself with his two-year-old son Billy, the "outside one" of the poem, whereby he looked for gratification to his wife-mother, whereas the frequent reference to the "outsider" was an expression of resentment against his son as an intruder between the patient and the wife-mother.

In reciting the poem the patient forgot two lines—the fourth line of the second stanza, "Though my age is less than none" and the second line of the fifth stanza, "From your child and child-to-be"—which were supplied by him next day. It is noteworthy that the failure of memory was a repression of the central motive of the birthday poem, the fantasy of rebirth. In the same session he recalled a birth theory of his early childhood, in accordance with which the mother's stomach bursts open suddenly when the baby arrives. He then produced a recent daydream: Walking in the street with a friend he develops sudden violent abdominal cramps and has to defæcate instantly in the middle of the street, whereupon a policeman arrests him. His friend, outraged by the officer's conduct, punches the latter in the nose, exclaiming, "Don't you see the man has cramps?" This daydream association was followed by a reflection that he has been gaining weight ever since he entered analysis. Conspicuous here are the patient's pregnancy fantasies, and, aligned with them, his rebellion against

the "policeman" (father, analyst) for the narcissistic injury which the patient's feminine cravings inflict upon his (masculine) ego.

The symbolic significance of the vase chosen by the patient as a birthday gift to his wife is quite evident; it represents, indeed, a condensation not only of the idea of the uterus but also, in his offering it to his wife (father), the desire to be impregnated.

B. Escape into Mother's Womb Through Simulation of Cure

A patient, suffering from *ejaculatio præcox* and conversion hysteria reports in the last period of his analysis incidents from the week-end, which seemed to him to show an improvement in his attitude towards his brother and towards friends. Continuing to boast of his improvement, he relates now that although he had failed to lock the door of his office—there was money in his desk—he was in no way disconcerted the following morning but proceeded with his breakfast instead of looking in at his office,—this in spite of his mother's remonstrances. He boasts even of spending an hour and a half after breakfast reading a book, as if there were nothing to worry about. "It was not a book, but a magazine", he corrected himself quickly. "It was *The Nation*." He then referred to other experiences over the week-end, and also to his intention of going on with his swimming and skating lessons.

A daydream which startled and shocked him followed: In order for him to have eight uninterrupted days for swimming and skating, his mother would have to die; in the event of her death he would be expected, in accordance with his religious custom, to remain confined at home ("to sit *shib'ah*"). Since he did not believe in this custom he would leave home and secretly indulge his desire for exercise. With a feeling of guilt and surprise he reproached himself: "Why do I have to daydream of my mother dying?" Reminded in the midst of his associations that he had committed a slip of the tongue in claiming

that he had read a book instead of *The Nation*, he is doubly surprised, for he remembers now that "it was not even *The Nation*, but a classbook of mine that I had been reading". This classbook is a kind of illustrated catalogue, containing photographs of his classmates and satirical references to them. It had been published in the year of his graduation from Law School. Among the photographs he had noticed Mr. Y., a conceited and snobbish individual who had been nicknamed "the aristocrat" at law school. The patient had met this man in the analyst's building towards the beginning of analysis and had been snubbed by him. Mr. Y., in addition to his overbearing manners, is six feet tall, whereas shortness of stature and penis have handicapped and discomfited our patient ever since puberty.

The patient interprets his slip of the tongue as a wish to impress the analyst. He has neglected his reading for the last five years. His brother, towards whom he entertains feelings of irritation and hostility, is an avid reader and is fond of engaging in intellectual discussions. Due largely to opposition to this brother, he reads only light mystery and detective stories, deriving from them sexual excitation, and books on sexology like Krafft-Ebing's. The patient had noticed *The Nation* on the analyst's waiting room table. He adds that his mistake was motivated by the desire to impress upon the analyst the fact of his improvement, his ability now to concentrate on something worth while, and the prospect of concluding his analysis. He also recognizes that the slip enabled him to conceal his irritation at the sight of Mr. Y.'s photograph in the classbook. Later in the hour he expresses the intention of taking postgraduate courses in corporation law which would cost him several hundred dollars and would necessitate staying several months in New York City (he lives in Connecticut), but he could not think of registering for the courses until he had first finished his analysis.

The content of the hour then consisted of (a) a double mistake (*book—The Nation—classbook*), (b) a string of associations relating to termination of the analysis, and (c) a daydream of

his mother's dying and leaving him free to "swim and skate". The slip of the tongue is associated with the idea of terminating the analysis. By means of it, he aims at misleading the analyst into the belief that he is cured. It also serves to conceal the still active conflict centering around the brother imago. The fantasy of his mother's death is transparent—the analyst has represented the patient's mother throughout the analysis, and mother's death is equivalent to elimination of the analyst, that is, termination of analysis. There is furthermore, an additional gain in this situation, for mother's death is the typical love-death whereby the mother is removed from the rest of the family and incorporated by the son himself.

Among the patient's hysterical symptoms was a peculiar headache and dizziness, which had become the focus of his complaints at the time of his applying for analysis. In connection with these headaches, moving objects such as automobiles, or even crowds of people, were sure to produce a spell of dizziness. Skating always made him dizzy. At the beginning of the analysis he frequently had dizzy spells upon rising from the couch which he would try to dissipate ceremonially by sitting up, closing his eyes, rubbing them and shaking his head. He could not skate without being afraid of falling and feeling a tenseness in his knees. Nor was he ever able to swim without feeling dizzy, and this difficulty made him dissatisfied with his progress in the sport. On one occasion he had an attack of dizziness lasting for an entire hour after a swim. (The patient attributed this to the strain of coughing produced by water getting into his windpipe and ears.) He had been playing football, basketball and tennis more or less intermittently ever since boyhood.

We see, accordingly, that the patient, when daydreaming of his mother dying, fantasies perfecting himself in skating and swimming, both of which are characterized by swinging in the air or in a fluid medium, and both of which are productive of dizziness. The patient calls skating "flying through the air" and connects this with the many flying dreams which have come up in analysis and which without doubt reveal sexual

gratification and compensation for the type of impotence from which he suffers. For the unconscious, of course, both types of muscular activity represent a fantasy of rebirth, the symbolic significance of water-air being the amniotic fluid.

In a word, we observe resistance under the pretext of improvement or cure; under the pressure of this resistance the patient attempts to escape from analysis, and he does this in the service of utero-regressive cravings.

4.

TAKE THE CASH AND LET THE CREDIT GO

The patient never paid his monthly bill on time but always six or eight, and on three occasions twelve days later. A week ago when studying his anal erotic complex he decided to be punctual for once. In fact he brings the check triumphantly, saying: "the first time I am punctual and am paying on the first of the month". He then spoke first of the revolution in Germany, praising Hitler's forcefulness but then reflects that after all his reaction is complex-determined in that he envies any individual powerful enough and courageous enough to act with decision. He then reports a vague dream in which he was with his partner and a woman and was discussing with X. Y. the possibilities of a greater career if they could avoid entanglements with women. As if the thought was, to take the cash and let the credit go. In the next part of the dream there is the theme of rescuing a girl. The dreamer, then, finds himself in a dining room in a hotel where he was the third party while another man was making love to the dreamer's wife in a fourflushing way—as though he were not interested in the wife but were showing off. Then, something about a carriage, falling into the lake and the rescue of a girl.

With X. Y. the patient associates his roommate in the second year of college, a brilliant man but a heavy drinker; on the one hand he envied him his brilliance and courage in daring to do what he wanted and in being recognized as a leader among his fellows; on the other he was much concerned about his alco-

holism which had once led to a scene in a cab of which the patient had formerly been proud and had boasted to his friends, but of which he is now much ashamed. On the vacation in question X. Y. was drunk and was sobbing heartily and reciting horrible occurrences which supposedly had happened to his father, but which were later proven to be fantasies. The patient, overwhelmed by his friend's weeping, fell on his shoulder, embraced him and kissed him.

With rescuing a girl the patient associates the same concern in regard to her as to X. Y., namely, the desire to reform her. Then he recalls what happened the day before the dream: A friend, Mary, was sleeping overnight in his house. His wife mentioned her desire to buy the patient a cool summer suit, to which the patient jestingly replied that what he needed was a very comfortable baggy silky pair of trousers cut sailor fashion, a Roumanian blouse with a low collar and a green sash. They laughed over this and next morning the visitor brought to the patient's bed a package containing her own silk blouse, pajama trousers and a sash, which created much amusement. Then he recalls a discussion the night before the dream in which he was energetically advocating the standpoint that one should think only of the present and not so exclusively of the future. Then he deplores his ability to see both sides of any question and to present them with equal conviction,—in other words a masochistic dependence upon the attitude he attributes to the second person.

Surely, he had not had satisfactory movements of the bowels the day before; he deliberately ate three heavy meals on the day preceding the dream in order to insure his having a copious evacuation. He then went on to relate a story he had read about a Russian peasant, six and a half feet in stature, whose only interest in life was eating. Unable to satisfy this craving, he went to America, where a restaurant keeper offered him abundant free meals as his pay for engaging in wrestling matches. Eventually, however, he encountered a professional wrestler and "broke him"—"no, was broken"—a slip of the tongue whereby the patient betrays the masochism which he conceals

under a veneer of bravado. The patient, indeed, added that it was his habit to employ the passive voice in writing in preference to the active, to the detriment of his style. At this point a funny story occurred to him: a man complaining to his friend that he has experienced all possible feelings except that of pregnancy and childbirth. The friend advises him to eat a good meal and plug the rectum with a cork. When the time for defæcation came, the cork exploded through an open window and hit a monkey belonging to an orangrinder, whereupon the monkey climbed through the open window and perched upon the man's abdomen.

Truly, we have here a wealth of analytic material concentrated in one analytic session which simultaneously reveals the deepest psychological substrata underlying a single resolve (namely, that of punctual payment) and allows us to perceive the conditions under which alone such a resolve can be successfully carried out. Of course, it must be granted that the motive force of this success consists in the favorable transference.

We notice in the first place the significance of his dream as both an intrapsychic preparation for the carrying out of his resolve and, at the same time, a fulfilment of deeply rooted desires which must be considered the prerequisite for the accomplishment of his purpose. The self-admonishing inner voice bids him : "take the cash and let the credit go"—that is: "give the cash and don't depend on credit" (chronic procrastination of the patient).

Secondly, we note that our patient has prepared himself not only in the dream but also in another fashion. In order to insure punctual payment he first takes steps to insure punctual defæcation which, as we have seen, he does by deliberately eating three heavy meals on the day preceding. But defæcation means to our patient: childbirth. The two are clearly equated, as we see from the absurd but psychologically illuminating story of fæces-pregnancy and monkey-birth. Thus, payment, defæcation, and childbirth are one. But, in order to give birth to a child our patient must first become a woman. And, in

fact, he accomplishes this also, for we have the transvestist fantasies (the feminine three-piece costume) of the night before. In a word, it is a requisite for the carrying out of practical simple resolutions in daily life without procrastination that the patient secure gratification of certain deeply unconscious cravings which consist in an identification with his mother, obviously, but much more dynamically, in an overcompensation of his masculine inferiority (castration complex).

5.

WHY PEOPLE BELIEVE IN HEREDITY

The patient was a woman of thirty concerning whom it is sufficient to know that severe penis envy and the castration complex were the moving forces in her neurotic character.

Of two successive sessions the first hour revealed through dreams, associations and reactions to current experiences an exceptionally intense demand for affection and attention from her acquaintances. The analyst, who was, for instance, accused of neglecting her when he failed to assist her with her coat, was likewise made the object of these demands. In addition to complaints of neglect, the symptom of hunger was predominant throughout the hour. The lady invariably arrived at the office exactly to the minute. To the next session she arrived five minutes early, and her first associations followed this unusual occurrence. She had thought of going to the bathroom to wash her hands, in order thus to be just on time. She then related three dreams:

(a) I am going to Mexico. I am supposed to take a 9:30 A.M. train but arrive too early at the station. I spend my free time attending to several matters, but on returning to the station I find that the train is leaving at 10:45 instead of 9:30. I avail myself of the extra time to run a few errands with the result that I am late for my train, which had left five minutes before.

(b) I am sitting on the grass in front of a bungalow. My father is present. A number of people in soldiers' uniforms,

marching in military fashion, appear. Among them is a young boy. They introduce themselves to one another and sit down on the grass to chat. A military gentleman sits down beside my sister. All the other people are seated in pairs. But nobody sits down next to me.

(c) I had a baby. But it was not properly shaped. It seemed, in fact, that there were two babies, one of them smaller than the other.

These dreams have the following associations:

(a) 9:30 A.M.—the patient's hour begins at this time. *Five minutes early*—the patient arrived five minutes early, which has never happened before. *Mexico*—the patient has a married brother in Mexico. His little son's birthday had been the day before. The patient recalled that when she received the news of the birth of the child a year ago she promptly forgot about it until three days later. *Coming too early*—the patient always arrives exactly on time for her appointment, in a frightened and excited state of mind. At the age of fifteen she traveled once to Los Angeles where she was awaited by her father and a classmate of hers. But she arrived at the station late and had to take the next train. They waited a long time for her at the station in Los Angeles with great anxiety, her father fearing that she might have met with an accident on the train, and being unwilling to leave the station because she would not know where to go upon her arrival.

(b) *Friends*—she had been at a friend's home the night before and there were many people present, but they were interested in each other, and failing to attract anyone, she felt very much neglected. *Soldiers*—the patient knows that the analyst saw service in the world war.

(c) *Child*—the patient declared that she had always feared that if she ever gave birth the child would be misshapen, and that she had entertained this fear long before she began to feel that there was something wrong with her. Before going to bed last night, she had glanced through a book of recipes which bore a peculiar dedication to "a future husband". The patient reflected that the author probably felt unhappy at having no

one in view as a husband. In the preface to the book there were curious remarks on poor housekeeping and its responsibility for unhappy marriages and divorces.

Penis-child-envy and accusations of neglect directed against parents and analyst evident in this session were derived of course from the feeling of castration. It is significant that the patient's fear of giving birth to a misshapen child is expressed in this matrix of castration complex complaints. The fear of having a malformed child is derived from the unconscious belief, rooted in narcissism, that through heredity a castrated woman must necessarily give birth to a misshapen or crippled child. The widespread attribution to heredity of all kinds of pathological formations may very well have an unconscious determinant in this belief, which may also play an unconscious rôle in the general acceptance of the theory of heredity.

6.

THE FINAL ANALYTIC HOUR

If we may regard the entire analysis from its very inception as a progressive process of weaning—a weaning, that is to say, from the images of neurotic fixation, but also in a deeper sense, a liberation from the tyranny of endopsychic authority, and therewith the ability to solve inner conflicts more constructively—then the terminal weeks or days of the analysis certainly constitute the end phase of this process of weaning. The last hour, moreover, not infrequently brings to light material which may even be altogether new and sometimes not a little surprising in its novelty.

What questions may it be possible to answer on the basis of the terminal analytic hour? Perhaps some of the following: (a) does the patient resent the final weaning, and how does he show this? (b) do we find him resigned to the weaning, and if so what is the emotional tone of this resignation? (c) or, on the other hand, does he give evidence of feeling gratitude? (d) or—is he both resentful and appreciative at the same time? (e) What

is the status of the transference as evidenced on the brink of the patient's departure? (f) Does he indicate more definitely than hitherto what direction his libido will take?

I have taken for a very brief presentation the following two examples as illustrative of the possibilities in the direction I have been indicating.

A. Lights Out

The patient enters the office, asking hesitantly whether she had done right in turning off the light in the waiting room. She declares that she had thought I would not need it any more! Her first associations are of an erotic situation with Mr. Z. on Wednesday. That night she dreamed of Mr. Z. lying close to her in bed, kissing her passionately and noticing that she is hot, something he had not observed previously. The patient then reports three dreams in succession:

1. She is in a dark room, badly frightened, not knowing what to do.
2. Some object is in the same dark room. There was something like a cat weeping in the room, but the patient thought of herself as the object and was weeping incessantly.
3. She is with some stage people. She has an actress friend on Long Island. The patient is dressed in an extraordinarily beautiful yellow hand-embroidered evening gown. She sees in the other room a group of women, all beautifully dressed in evening gowns. It looks like a row of women, and she entertains the idea of getting into line with them. But while approaching them she feels as if a wind were blowing from behind, lifting up her light evening dress, and exposing her entire back. She felt, however, as if she did not care: She thinks "what do I care? I am getting into line with the women".

To these dreams the patient associated copiously: *Room* reminded her of her home in childhood. They had a large social gathering last Thursday evening, playing murder game. Mr. Z. was there, and the patient noticed that she was ill at

ease because of her strong interest in Mr. Z., fearing that a certain Mrs. X. would attract his attention. She felt, indeed, extremely jealous and soon found herself behaving meanly in several instances towards Mr. Z. Later, reproaching herself for her behavior and realizing she had been unfair to him, she telephoned him and was happy when he conversed with her without anger, indeed quite tenderly. She recalls that when she was kissed at the party by Mr. Z. and another man during the game she was most excited and happy. *Cat weeping* leads the patient to her thoughts during last week. She had been wondering whether, and when, she would meet the analyst again. She compared Mr. Z. with him and was happy, on the one hand, to note the great difference between them, and to discover in herself no neurotic reactions to Mr. Z. due to transference. On the other hand, she could not help deploring the fact that Mr. Z., who is very much of a gentleman and attracts her emotionally, is not especially intellectual. After a momentary silence, she bursts into weeping for about ten minutes upon remembering that this is her last session of analysis and is overcome with gratitude to the analyst. Yesterday, when asked by an old friend of hers whether she did not regret having spent so much money for analysis (which had taken two years), she replied that she would not have missed a month or even a week of analysis for anything in the world. *Darkness* leads her to her thoughts upon entering the analyst's foyer today and seeing another lady's coat hanging on the hook. She surmised that this lady would now get her hour and experiencing an urge to be in darkness, she turned off the light in the waiting room, remarking to herself, "the doctor will not need it any more after I have entered the consulting room". *Evening dress*: She had recently bought two "very feminine" dresses, one for day and the other for evening wear, and a hat with a veil which reaches down to the nose. She was happy to observe how well such dresses became her. Finally, with the wind blowing behind her she associated a frequently repeated recollection of earliest infancy, before the age of three, when she

witnessed coitus while in her parents' bed, lying with her back to her father and feeling his body.

With regard to the questions we have previously posed, I think we may say with some confidence that the patient leaves analysis with a fair measure of positive transference to the analyst, and that heterosexuality has been definitely attained (jealousy), as contrasted with her previous overt homosexuality, even though, as we notice, there remains an appreciable admixture of anality in connection with her desires for impregnation. As to the direction of her libido in the immediate future the patient brings out clearly in one of her dreams narrated in her final hour that she is seriously considering a heterosexual relationship.

B. Restaging and Resolving of Conflicts

Within a week of the final analytic hour which I am about to outline, the patient furnished a very notable illustration of the weaning which the termination of the analysis entailed for her. She had mentioned the fact that the thought of the impending termination produced in her a distinct sensation of dryness of the mouth resulting in thirst. Although she unquestionably achieved a high degree of genitality within the preceding four or five months, this holding true of her transference, her dream-life, and her interest in men awakening for the first time at the age of thirty, we note in the symptom which has just been mentioned a reactivation of the orality which had been so conspicuous a characteristic of her libidinal organization. It is, of course, evident that this regression is stimulated by the approach of a reality-weaning—obviously enough, a repetition of the historic deprivation of the mother's breast.

On the night preceding her final hour, which was at eight A.M., she felt a strong reluctance to go to bed—this, as she herself said, because in so doing she only brought nearer the prospect of bidding goodbye to analysis.

In the final hour she brought the following three dreams:

(a) She is with a very unprepossessing old lady to whom she

has to read aloud from a very tiresome book. In addition she has to give the old lady the weekly sum of five dollars.

Associations: *old lady*: the analyst. *Book*: she had spoken about it to her friend Mary and her lover John. She says of Mary that her chin "breaks out like mine". *Five dollars*: fee for analysis.

(b) Her mother makes her a birthday present of an oil painting of herself. It is in a heavy frame and the room in which it is hung is filled to overflowing with furniture and odds and ends. The dreamer feels irritated in this milieu.

Associations. *Painting*: It is unflattering to her mother although it does portray her great strength of character which might well cause one to be afraid of her. It was in unpleasant contrast to her bridal picture in which she was young and beautiful. She also recalls a painting which she used to see as a young child, a picture in which the heads of the animals of the Nativity, mostly cows, would be faintly seen in the background, while in the foreground she could see on the straw a tiny baby with fragile limbs. The patient used to pity this infant and was afraid that the animals might harm it. Virgin Mary was standing before the child and gazing down upon it with great affection and concern. This picture was also associated in the patient's mind with her father. *The picture too heavy*: how can she live in the room with so many things? "I have to fight against both father and mother. Father and mother would be terrified if I wanted to marry". The portrait in the dream reminds her of the actual portrait of her mother which she has neglected to put under glass. She wants to get rid of the picture.

(c) About somebody who might have been her aunt Josephine and about a man.

Associations. Her aunt, her father's sister, had been in love with the patient's father; this had caused the patient's mother much jealousy. This aunt is now living with an old family friend, "It is unbelievable", the patient remarks, "that in these days of business depression he should spend money merely to make a hedge around his house to keep the

neighborhood children from coming into the garden". The patient then continues, gesticulating in her excitement: "Here, you have Josephine and Mr. Roberts living alone together and spending money for a hedge, as if afraid of being seen by the children, which means that they must be in love with each other".

The unconscious meaning of these dreams, as we can construe it from the associations, is, (1) reluctance to end the analysis, (2) revengeful rejection of the analyst (mother) whom she has to pay but without any return in pleasure, (3) she resolves to separate herself from mother (the painting) and thinks of father in connection with a baby (*Nativity*), (4) criticism of her aunt (mother) who was so enamored with her father, (5) indignation with Mr. Roberts (aunt Josephine, the analyst) who erects a barrier against her (*the neighborhood children*), (6) she resolves, accordingly, to rid herself of the injunctions and prohibitions on the part of the family (including the analyst) which have hemmed her in.

In conclusion, this final hour provides material from which we may gather that the end phase of weaning includes a resolution to throw off the yoke of parental ties and to go her own way towards heterosexuality. As a matter of fact, the patient met a man six weeks later whom she found congenial and whom she subsequently married.

7.

HOW A CATATONIC FEELS

Miss T. completed a successful though prolonged analysis which had been punctuated by episodes of unusually severe resistance that had made the prognosis throughout the greater part of the analysis extremely doubtful. In a session during its final period, when she was at the height of her productive efforts, the patient revealed the nature of her negativistic attitudes through the analysis in the following set of associations.

She referred to her friends Margaret and Harriet. Of Margaret she said: "I can talk freely to her and can say just

what I feel, because I know that she understands me." Of Harriet she declared: "I must be wary in talking to her and know exactly what I am going to say, because I never know how she is going to feel about it. It is very hard!" Analysis of the patient's attitude towards these two friends, which she herself recognizes now as a projection of her ambivalent feelings, leads to further revelations regarding her compulsive doubting and her transference to the analyst, in which ambivalence is prominent. "I do not seem to care at all how you feel about things, in spite of the fact that I do want to know what you think." Later in the hour, she says: "Just now I shut my eyes and opened them, and felt like a doll I had possessed when I was a little girl of six. The doll also opened and closed its eyes." Then suddenly, as if she were making a discovery, the patient, who is familiar with psychiatric terminology, exclaims: "Now I know what a catatonic stupor is. I can understand how a catatonic feels. He must feel himself quite big and strong, and must experience keen delight, as though he were saying to himself—'I am powerful but I am pretending to be powerless. Let me see what the world will do to me! Let me see how it will behave towards me!'. Her predominantly passive resistance to the analyst, the patient interprets a little later in the session as akin to the attitude she attributed to the catatonic: "As if I had enjoyed a tremendous sense of power by appearing so perfectly helpless before you—a kind of insidious way of challenging you." It should be noted that identification with inanimate objects, in addition to animals (dogs, cats), was a feature throughout the analysis. In her negativistic periods—during which she would remain mute from ten minutes to half an hour and on one occasion for the entire hour—her associations and posture on the couch presented a typical picture of motionlessness and lethargy.

Miss T.'s analysis of her negativism, in the light of its setting in the hour, exhibits the utilization of masochism as a disguise for sadistic satisfaction and the presence of ambivalence in negativistic conditions.

The subtlety of this disguise and the intense gratification afforded by it is perhaps most plastically described, not by a psychiatrist, but by Dostoyevski, who sensed it intuitively and gave distinct expression to it in his novels, especially in his *Notes from Underground*. In several penetrating passages, Dostoyevski's masochistic hero, obviously an autobiographic character, interprets the phenomenon as follows:

" . . . I, for instance, have a great deal of *amour propre*. I am as suspicious and prone to take offense as a humpback or a dwarf. But upon my word I sometimes have had moments when if I had happened to be slapped in the face I should, perhaps, have been positively glad of it. I say, in earnest, that I should probably have been able to discover even in that a peculiar sort of enjoyment—the enjoyment, of course, of despair; but in despair there are the most intense enjoyments, especially when one is very acutely conscious of the hopelessness of one's position. And when one is slapped in the face—why then the consciousness of being rubbed into a pulp would positively overwhelm one. . . ."

" . . . the enjoyment was just from the too intense consciousness of one's own degradation; it was from feeling oneself that one had reached the last barrier, that it was horrible, but that it could not be otherwise. . . ."

" . . . And the worst of it is, he himself, his very own self, looks on himself as a mouse; no one asks him to do so; and that is an important point. Now let us look at this mouse in action. Let us suppose, for instance, that it feels insulted . . . and wants to revenge itself, too. . . . Apart from the one fundamental nastiness the luckless mouse succeeds in creating around it so many other nastinesses in the form of doubts and questions, adds to the one question so many unsettled questions that there inevitably works up around it a sort of fatal brew, a stinking mess, made up of its doubts, emotions, and of the contempt spat upon it by the direct men of action who stand solemnly about it as judges and arbitrators, laughing at it till their healthy sides ache. Of course, the only thing left for it is to dismiss all that with a wave of its paw, and, with a smile of assumed contempt in which it does not even itself believe, creep ignominiously into its mouse-hole. There in its nasty, stinking, underground home our insulted, crushed and ridiculed mouse promptly becomes absorbed in cold, malignant

and, above all, everlasting spite. . . . It will itself be ashamed of its imaginings, but yet it will recall it all, . . . it will invent unheard of things against itself, pretending that those things might happen, and will forgive nothing. . . .”

“. . . You know the direct, legitimate fruit of consciousness is inertia, that is, conscious sitting-with-the-hands-folded. I have referred to this already. I repeat, I repeat with emphasis: all ‘direct’ persons and men of action are active just because they are stupid and limited. How explain that? I will tell you: in consequence of this limitation they take immediate and secondary causes for primary ones, and in that way persuade themselves more quickly and easily than other people do that they have found an infallible foundation for their activity, and their minds are at ease and you know that is the chief thing. . . .”

“. . . But do you know what: I am convinced that we underground folk ought to be kept on a curb. Though we may sit forty years underground without speaking, when we do come out into the light of day and break out we talk and talk and talk. . . .”

8.

NARCISSISTIC PAIN IN STATU NASCENDI

The question, whether the inability to cathect or the withdrawal of libido is an immediate cause in itself of suffering, has never been discussed. That, on the other hand, the consequences and complications of withdrawal of libido produce pain is a commonplace; indeed, they furnish the *raison d'être* of psychiatric practice. The following observation reported by a mother who possessed the faculty of making accurate observations on her children's behavior may serve as an experimental demonstration of the immediate emergence of pain following inability to establish a cathexis.

A ten months old girl had been regularly brought into her parents' bedroom and allowed to spend a quarter of an hour with them early in the morning. One morning the nurse, when she brought in the child, happened to stop midway between the two beds, and upon the parents' reaching for it simultaneously, the child regarded them tensely, looked alter-

nately from one parent to the other and, as nothing occurred to influence her making of a choice, she burst out crying and continued to cry until the father withdrew his arms. Thereupon the child instantly stopped crying and made a movement in the direction of the mother's outstretched arms.

We note in the foregoing observation that, confronted by two equally attractive libidinal objects, the child was unable to direct its libido in any one direction, and out of this situation arose a condition of distress and pain which was dissipated only when a choice was again made possible. The impossibility of effecting a cathexis leads in the individual who has passed the œdipal stage to narcissistic withdrawal of libido, of course. But, in the temporary situation of the child still in the stage of primary narcissism we cannot speak of withdrawal of libido; rather, perhaps, of an acute access of narcissistic pain due to a damming up of the libido current.

The singular condition likewise deserves consideration from the standpoint of object choice. For the child's situation actually represents a fundamental problem of behavior. Everyone is continually confronted with the problem of (consciously or unconsciously) selecting at any given moment and in any given situation one particular complex of actions or ideas. From an infinite number of potentialities of this kind, which may be designated *alpha*, the individual selects one complex of actions or ideas, that is, he makes, what we may call a *beta*-choice. In the behavior of the child we have described, a *beta*-choice was artificially prevented, and the child was held in a condition of temporary equilibrium, which we shall designate *gamma*.

There are various attributes which characterize this *gamma*-condition but their discussion must be reserved for another occasion. For the present, we must be content with indicating that the *gamma*-condition finds an analogue in the ambivalence of affects, and that there seems to be, in addition to the recognized types of resistance, a rigid resistance formation whose essence is a *gamma*-state.

THE VOICE AS (FEMALE) PHALLUS

BY HENRY ALDEN BUNKER, JR. (NEW YORK)

Two facts in regard to the human voice are noteworthy. First, the quality and especially the pitch of the voice as a function of the sex of the individual, constituting one of the major secondary sex characters; the effect of prepubertal castration in this respect is well known. Second and equally familiar is the rôle of the voice as a sensitive reflector of emotional states; its modulation and modification as the often quite involuntary expression of emotional *nuances*—of which, too, the subject may be more or less unaware—is a matter of daily experience. On a larger scale, it is not surprising, therefore, that disturbances of the voice and of voice production should occur not infrequently as the outward manifestation of emotional conflict—as a symptom of neurosis, in short. Indeed, vocal functioning seems to lend itself to becoming the *locus* of conversion processes with a facility surpassed in this respect only in the case of the gastrointestinal tract; such a conversion may result, in massive form, in the hysterical aphonia and mutism rather often encountered for example in the so called war neuroses, or, at the other extreme, in the more or less subtle changes in *timbre* which may on occasion be the reflection of unconscious conflict. It is surely noteworthy that the two groups of phenomena, somatic and psychological, referred to above should find a meeting ground in certain clinically observed situations—in a word, in the anomalies of voice and vocal functioning sometimes met with in what might be called psychogenic *castrati*, which may even approximate those characterizing the subjects of actual castration. One thinks of the alteration of the voice which a castration situation is capable of inducing in the individual as a transitory phenomenon; on the other hand, of the distinctive voice quality and enunciation characterizing a certain proportion of male overt (and unconscious) homosexuals; and of the extreme instance exemplified

in the two cases reported by Ferenczi,¹ of two patients who each had two voices of very different character and pitch, depending on whether the heterosexual or homosexual component was in possession of the field. Thus, in a psychological sense and on an unconscious level a correlation between maleness of sex and maleness of voice, and specifically of attenuation of the one with in some sense modification of the other, is almost as much a truism as is this correlation in the somatic sphere.

The material which I should like briefly to present portrays a kind of converse situation: instead of the conventional expression in one guise or another of a parallelism between male voice and male organ of generation, the patient here described seems to exemplify an (unconscious) equating of the female voice with the female phallus. If this is correct, as I hope to show, he is, accordingly, a fetishist with a fetish of a somewhat unusual order.

1.

The patient was a man of excellent appearance and address, who carried himself very erect and was always most carefully groomed. He was single, forty-seven years of age, the younger of two brothers. He entered analysis—of the applicability of which to his own case he was profoundly sceptical—with the alleged desire to obtain relief if possible from chronic unhappiness and depression; he stated that he did not believe he had ever in his life known a really happy day. He complained of a total lack of interest in either people or things; also of severe insomnia, in the form of inability to get to sleep before two or three o'clock and frequent wakefulness thereafter. He took veronal almost nightly, and a "bromo-seltzer" every morning. His earlier statements implied that most of his various symptoms were of more or less recent onset; it was later learned, however, that in almost every instance they were of years' duration.

His general adaptation, indeed, had been unsatisfactory

¹ Ferenczi, S.: *Psychogenic Anomalies of Voice Production*, in *Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psycho-Analysis*, London, 1926.

enough. Socially, he seemed to have a number of friends and acquaintances with whom he was popular; but whatever may once have been the case, of late he almost invariably rejected their advances or yielded to them with the greatest possible reluctance and ungraciousness. He had had physical relations with women on possibly a dozen occasions in his life; although these were apparently successful from the standpoint of *potestas coeundi*, despite a marked aversion on his part to the sight or touch of the female genital, they were entered into against the greatest resistance and were accompanied and followed by intense feelings of guilt. That intercourse was conceived of by the patient in sadistic terms is indicated by the fantasies which overwhelmed him after at least one such occasion—fantasies which plainly wrote the equation: I had intercourse with her—I killed her. In the analysis he was given to saying that to experience heterosexual desire was his one desideratum; in fact, he categorically demanded that the analyst promise that the analysis would supply him with this boon, which he alternately compared with the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow and with the carrot perpetually held in front of the donkey's nose. He was equally given to saying that if he ever became convinced that he was homosexual, he would commit suicide. (Subsequently he escaped from the dilemma upon which this threat had impaled him by alleging that the analysis had *made* him homosexual.) He affirmed positively that he had never masturbated. His economic career had been somewhat checkered. He had held a position as a reporter for eight years, giving this up about a year before he began analysis, and holding only temporary positions thereafter. Through eight of the fourteen months of the analysis he was entirely unemployed; his brother, by the way, financed his analysis throughout. During the last five of the eight years with his newspaper he was rather congenially employed—so far as work could ever be congenial—in its music department. For it was true of this as of other positions he had held that all the work he undertook he accomplished against the greatest possible resistance. Similarly, and despite reiterated statements to the contrary, he

manifested an even stronger resistance against putting an end to his period of unemployment (although this was ultimately overcome), a period which he spent living at home with his parents and supported by them and by his brother. In sharp contrast to the patient, this brother was unusually successful.

There were several respects, it is true, in which Fate had dealt far from kindly by the patient. In the first place, he had a congenital defect in the form of an extensive telangiectasis involving much of his left hand and some of the fingers, and extending over the anterior surface of the left chest. In adult life this had been the occasion for two operations. As a child he carried his left hand in such a way as to protect it from possible injury; he had, besides, the ever-present fear that the lesion over the sternum might rupture without warning and cause him to bleed to death. A second trauma undoubtedly consisted in the fact that his mother had desired a girl, had named him a girl before birth, and had kept him a girl as long as possible; certainly it must early have become apparent to the patient that his enactment of this rôle was pleasing to his mother, and in fact as late as puberty we find him washing the dishes and doing other household work as quite a part of the established order of things apparently. Finally, of his parents it was unquestionably the mother who "wore the trousers". This came about, according to the patient, because of the business failure of his father, necessitating the mother's becoming the principal support of the family. This she accomplished by taking in boarders; the patient's resentment at their intrusion is easily imagined. Through these years of financial harassment there was added to the mother's very considerable degree of natural reserve and undemonstrativeness an irritability and shortness of temper which she exhibited rather freely towards the father, but also, as the patient felt, in somewhat abundant measure towards himself.¹ On the other hand, he was able to collect three other mothers during the earlier years of his

¹ It is not altogether surprising that in the first dream in which his father appeared (in disguised form), he cut a figure to which the Ancient Mariner's description as a "grey-beard loon" seemed to the patient the only applicable one.

childhood, two of these being girls in their teens, the departure of one of whom for South Africa when the patient was about nine years old being the greatest tragedy of his life. His conscious attitude towards his parents was, in the main, one which repaid interest and solicitude on their part with irritation, impatience, intolerance and abysmal ennui on his—much more notably in the case of his mother. He met every advance of theirs with sullenness or defiance, was intolerant of entirely natural inquiries about his doings, and in particular was driven to fury by being “fussed at” by his mother in such matters as wearing rubbers, etc. Upon his equally critical and ungracious attitude towards his brother’s entirely tolerant and certainly generous treatment of him a certain light was thrown in the first week of the analysis, which the patient devoted to material relative to this latter topic, of which the unconscious gist was: “The gift without the giver is bare”.

From early adolescence the patient had evinced the greatest possible interest in the theatre; attendance at the play, especially under certain circumstances which will presently appear, was certainly for him one of the exquisite moments in the *mauvais quart d’heure* of life. It shortly became clear, however, that this interest did not so exclusively lie in the play, in the spectacle, as it was focussed upon the actress who took the leading rôle. In the course of the years he inevitably saw the greater number of actresses of note; but towering above all others, superfluous to say, was Sarah Bernhardt. In any case, and even apart from the divine Sarah, these actresses were for him radiant creatures of ineffable glamor, inaccessible, unattainable, unapproachable, infinitely remote, to be gazed on, like the stars in the heavens, only from afar. It might be added that the patient had himself occasionally entertained fantasies of going upon the stage; these had reached no further expression, however, than belonging to a club made up largely of members of the theatrical profession and persons interested in acting.

In the field of music it eventually became apparent likewise that, in similar fashion, his real interest lay hardly at all in

music *per se* but was almost exclusively centered upon singing and the voice, still more upon the female voice. Needless to say, opera furnished him with a combination of all that he found acutely pleasurable in both the respects which have just been mentioned; thus, obviously, prima donnas were for him actresses to whose glamor was added that of a golden voice. At the same time it could but be true that no *diva* quite filled the place occupied by Sarah Bernhardt. Nearest to this pinnacle, as it turned out, stood Mme. Calvé, elevated to this position doubtless by the fact that voluptuous appeal and certain erotic associations personal to the patient were added in her case to the possession of an outstanding voice.

Much later in the analysis it came to light that the patient had a hobby—in fact, the only hobby in any proper sense that he could be said ever to have had—namely, that of collecting phonographic records made in the old days when the voices of these prima donnas had been recorded. Many of these records had long since become difficult to obtain and necessitated search or happy accident for their discovery. (Having one day come by chance upon an out-of-print record of Emmy Destinn and one of another singer, which he bought, he dreamed that night that he was playing a record of Mme. Calvé.) It did not appear at any time that he often played these records which he occasionally and at increasingly long intervals purchased, although it is probable that formerly he had done so. But even though he may have lost much of his original interest in the whole subject, in the same way as he had long since lost interest in playing the piano, it is noteworthy that even at the period of the analysis, and in his straitened financial circumstances, he could not resist the temptation, when opportunity suddenly presented itself, to add phonographic records of two greatly admired women's voices to his fairly large if little utilized collection of these.

Now this collection of phonograph records was paralleled by a far more remarkable collection, regarding which the patient was at least equally reticent. This was a collection, which the patient had kept for years in a trunk in his parents'

home, of boots of all descriptions—hip boots and knee boots, black boots and brown boots, rubber boots and leather boots. With regard to boots themselves, a considerable amount of significant material had already come out. Of primary interest is the fact that late in adolescence he had on occasion slept with a pair of boots, and on at least one occasion—he was certain it was only once—he had masturbated between a pair of boots. From adolescence and in fact long before, he had experienced on a number of occasions a compulsion to wear boots more or less regardless of whether the state of the weather justified such apparel. Whereas such a temptation had come to assail him with rather diminished frequency with the passage of the years, there was one occasion during the analysis on which he overcame with some difficulty a desire to take advantage of a heavy rainfall to come down to New York from the country and enter the Harvard Club in hip boots. That despite the considerably diminished frequency and urgency of such a desire he still maintained an active if intermittent interest in this particular article of apparel is indicated by the fact that he was still fond at times of “window shopping” for boots and of fantasizing their purchase. The patient’s subjective state during these episodes of compulsive boot-wearing deserves especial notice. It was compounded of elation, inordinate pride, a desire to parade himself before others, and, on the other hand, a feeling of shame and guilt of which a not inconsiderable minimum was present in any case but which was greatly increased in the presence of certain people or upon any risk of being seen by them. It was difficult to make out what quality distinguished people of this latter sort from those before whom his pride outweighed his guilt; they were apparently persons to whom the patient had somehow ascribed an ability to “see through you”; he cited as an example a former City Editor—an elderly and seemingly rather jejune individual whom one would scarcely suspect, from his description otherwise, of possessing second sight. Finally, and before dismissing the subject of boots for the present, mention must be made of a dream occurring late in the analysis in which the patient’s mother stood

beside his bed clad in a pair of boots, boots which he recognized as his; she was going away on a journey; his father waited outside in the hall.

Thus it appears that the phonographic records and the boots were treated by the patient in altogether similar fashion in respect of the fact that both were treasured in a manner quite at variance with their intrinsic worth or even, in the case of the records, their ostensible value to the patient; both were accumulated and retained in possession in a manner more or less pointless and apparently compulsive. Both, moreover, were old, actually and in being reminiscent of the long ago.

One further category of unconscious material requires some description at this point. An extremely large proportion of the patient's dreams from first to last was populated by women whose phallic character was clearly if very variously expressed; the patient, indeed, rang almost every possible change upon this theme. Among the numerous, largely unidentified women of these dreams, for example, were tall women, large women, stout women, women of wealth, women of social position, managing women, executive and dictatorial women, women who ruled their husbands, presidents of women's clubs, and, rather surprisingly, Mary Roberts Rinehart's Tish—the last-named in a dream in which the patient was sucking a cow's teat, which then changed into a penis, the latter being covered with a cheesy substance which was known as "tish". It was almost inevitable that one of the actual persons to appear in his dreams should have been Amelia Earhart, for whom, although he did not know her, the patient had always felt a strong dislike. The dream in which she was represented was noteworthy for the fact that in it the patient was dressed or made up or masquerading as Amelia, and that he was very much pleased with the result and called the attention of two or three other women to it—a "pleasure in disguise" quite paralleling the narcissistic pleasure which he had derived in the past in parading in boots. Though not explicit in the dream, the transvestist character of the professional costume of the aviatrix will not escape notice. This leads to the men-

tion of another actual person who appeared in at least one dream, and who, moreover, combined a transvestist appearance with being an actress. I refer to Maude Adams, who, of course, played the rôle not only of Peter Pan but also of L'Aiglon. In the dream referred to, Maude Adams had been cast for the part of Hamlet—most unsuitably, as the patient thought in the dream. In any case she is a double for Sarah Bernhardt,¹ since L'Aiglon was not only one of the latter's rôles but one with which the patient particularly fondly associated her.² To the play *L'Aiglon* itself the patient's emotional response had always been considerable—as well it might have been, considering its title and its subject—while at the same time he felt ashamed of his affection for it; and at all events it is obvious enough that the patient was himself Peter Pan and Hamlet and L'Aiglon and Hippolytus.—This gives us, then, Sarah Bernhardt as a woman whose “phallicism” is evident to the naked eye. Indeed, even without this concrete evidence, it is clear that all the patient's actresses, and all his prima donnas, are just as much phallic women as are the various managing and dictatorial women and the women of wealth and position of so many of his dreams. This we might, indeed, have assumed from the first; for not only are these figures of the theatrical and operatic stage women of outstanding—and, in a double sense, conspicuous—ability and, so to say, potency, but did not the Goncourt brothers write in their *Journal*, “There are no women of genius; women of genius are men”? It will hardly come as a surprise to the reader that Sarah Bernhardt—on the one hand a definitely phallic woman, the undoubted possessor of a penis (on one occasion, moreover, the patient made reference to her artificial leg, surely the penis hidden under the clothing), and yet at the same time a woman of the most glamorous femininity, an unattainable *princesse*

¹ Who did play Hamlet, if I am not mistaken.

² The other rôle which as played by Sarah Bernhardt made an ineffaceable impression on the patient was that of Phèdre, in Racine's play of that name. Phædra, it will be recalled, was the second wife of Theseus, who fell in love with her stepson, Hippolytus; he repulsed her, and she hanged herself.

lointaine, one who moreover remained forever young—that Sarah Bernhardt should have appeared in a dream in which she was absolutely identified with the patient's mother, for in this dream his mother, in a somewhat sexual setting, changed into Sarah Bernhardt.

2.

From the foregoing evidence in regard to the paramount concern of the patient with phallic women (the multiplicity of dreams in which a woman endowed with a penis figured), women who had in a number of significant instances, moreover, an intense scopophilic interest for the patient (actresses→Sarah Bernhardt→mother), we return for a moment to the boots. That these were definitely a sexual object is clear from the example of the patient's masturbation with them. That they were a penis is perhaps sufficiently indicated in the fact that the patient's regular and uniform dream symbol for masculinity, virility, potency, took the form of the rough costume worn by laboring men and men who do heavy manual work (reminiscent of the expression "rough trade", in the *argot* of overt homosexuals, for homosexual objects drawn from the ranks of stevedores, truck drivers, *et al.*), a costume that in his dreams was sometimes supplemented and sometimes not by a pair of boots, which in any case, however, especially if they were hip boots, meant for the patient a certain swaggeringness; and also in the fact that when asked directly to associate to boots, he invariably recalled the (black and elastic) penis of a negro boy of some six or seven years of age, of which he had a vivid memory, but regarding whom he was never able to produce any further recollections. That the boots were his mother's is made entirely evident, apart from the fact that in any case she "wore the trousers", in the dream in which his mother was wearing a pair of boots; we can hardly be misled by the fact that in the dream the boots are the patient's, and it is the mother who has apparently done the borrowing. Hence the boots represent indubitably a penis—and equally indubitably, his mother's penis. This, moreover,

as we have seen, he borrowed on occasion—to the accompaniment of considerable sexual excitement, in which exhibitionistic gratification on the one hand, and on the other hand guilt, especially in the presence of those thought of as able to see through his disguise, were extremely conspicuous elements. The patient's identification with a female possessor of a penis is further shown in the dream in which he identifies himself with Amelia Earhart, once again to strut in borrowed plumage. The boots in this patient's case meet every criterion, therefore, of a fetish. And even though almost no emphasis is in this patient placed upon the fetish as a *conditio sine qua non* of orgasm, as an object of sexual intercourse, it was nevertheless true of him, as was evident enough from both his life and his dreams, that he could love only when he had supplied his female love-object with an illusory penis.

To this patient, furthermore, apply the two formulæ which, as Fenichel¹ has neatly expressed it, simultaneously apply to the transvestist: "he has not been able to give up his belief in the phallic nature of women, and, in addition, he has identified himself with the woman with the penis". What is true of the transvestist, in terms of this formulation, is completely true of the present patient. If on this basis he is not a transvestist, it is because the article of apparel which he puts on, wears, and obtains marked sexual and narcissistic gratification from wearing, is not a typically feminine article of apparel—is not a corset or an apron, for example; in other words, he does not manifest the overestimation of feminine clothing nor does he possess the specific sexual wish to assume the dress of the opposite sex which characterizes the transvestist. So far at least as concerns the boots, the patient is a fetishist: as has, I think, been conclusively shown, (1) he has been unable to give up the belief in the phallic nature of women; (2) the boots represent the woman's (his mother's) penis. At the same time, his particular fetish is one which is capable of being put on and worn, and capable of thereby furnishing sexual and narcissistic grati-

¹ Fenichel, Otto: *The Psychology of Transvestism*. Int. J. Ps-A. XI, 211, 1930.

fication to the wearer—in which respect it coincides exactly with the female clothing, likewise representing the female penis, donned by the transvestist, whereby he identifies himself with the woman with the penis. So that the patient is like the transvestist in this respect—that is, in the exhibitionistic wearing of an article of clothing which symbolizes the woman's (the mother's) penis, and in the resultant identification of himself (which we have noted in other connections as well) with the woman with the penis. Thus he might be said to be a fetishist with transvestistic features. More than that, so far at least as the boots are concerned, he is, clinically speaking, almost as much, and in terms of Fenichel's formulation, fully as much, a transvestist as he is a fetishist; at least he can quite legitimately be said, I think, to occupy a kind of intermediate position between fetishism and transvestism.

3.

The intention with which I started out, however, was to show that for this patient the female voice was a fetish, in that it represented for him a female penis. Have we now evidence that will support such a theorem? We have to do, of course, not only with the voice proper but also with the phonographic records which represent and likewise preserve it. Regarding the latter, it has already been noted that the patient behaved towards them in much the same manner as he behaved towards boots, in that he made them the objects of acquisition and of hoarding, treasuring them up in a collection which was almost as pointless in the case of the records—so far as the patient ever actually played them or replayed them—as it obviously was in the case of the boots. Further, if on this showing it be true that the voice or its counterfeit presentment represented to the unconscious of the patient what the boots indubitably did, a female penis, then the patient, in getting these phonograph records into his possession through their searching out and purchase, may be said to have borrowed the penis which they represent in exactly the same way as at times he borrowed a penis in the guise of donning and wearing a pair of boots—the

only notable difference being that the exhibitionistic element which was so marked an accompaniment of the latter was missing from the former. But this element—or, more precisely, its complement, scopophilia—was strongly present in that other sphere of the patient's interest in which the voice played so prominent a part, namely, the theatrical and operatic stage. We have already seen that it is impossible to doubt the phallic character of the resplendent luminaries of the stage—of whom the prototype is Sarah Bernhardt, and who is, furthermore, the mother herself. The prima donnas of the operatic stage are phallic women for the same reasons as the actresses are. And as regards their outstanding attribute, the voice, we already know what must have been its significance in the unconscious of the patient; we already know this from the phonographic records which the patient treated, like the boots, as if they were a female penis. In a word, then, of these phallic women, of these opera stars, the voice was, and must have been, the phallus.¹

As a matter of fact, this equation is virtually written for us in a dream which the patient brought early in the analysis. He was standing at the head of a flight of stairs; his father and mother seemed to be standing behind him; there was somehow something reassuring in the dream about their presence there. At the foot of the stairs, or part way down them, was a snake. The snake chirped like a bird. The patient's only association

¹ While it is true that the operatic stars had no such distinguished lineage as the actresses could provide in Sarah Bernhardt, nor so diagnostic a feature as then springs from the equation: Sarah Bernhardt=mother, the prima donnas can be said to stem in a somewhat similar sense from Mme. Calvé, who, it is to be noted, was definitely associated in the patient's mind, in life and in dreams, with an older woman (weight, over 200 pounds) for whom he had a "Platonic" attachment which was an almost ludicrous replica of the oedipus situation.

It might also be remarked that—over and above their "phallicism"—the male aspect of the bisexual picture supplied in the case of the actresses by the transvestist rôles of Sarah Bernhardt and Maude Adams was supplied in some measure if in apparently contrary sense in the case of the singers in a dream in which Lucrezia Bori was singing *Ritorne vincitor*—the dreamer being of course Rhadames; in view of the total context as we now know it, Aida-Bori-mother might almost have been saying—the boots *motif*—"Take my penis!"

to this dream was to the effect that birds are closely related to snakes phylogenetically; that, in fact, the scales on a hen's legs are like the scales of a snake's skin. In other words, a snake and a bird are much the same thing; a snake is a penis, and birds often sing. Furthermore, that which covers a hen's leg—as a boot covers the leg—looks a good deal like a snake.

4.

Fetishism, as we know,¹ is a denial of castration; and a fetish is one of the somewhat numerous means, a rather bizarre one, whereby this denial is effected. To the fetishist what the fetish says is: "See! She has a penis, too! See! There *are* no people without a penis!" Thus a fetish is a reassurance against castration, for it asserts that there is no ground for fearing loss of the penis. Obviously, fetishism is a product of castration anxiety; the castration complex, together with the œdipus complex, is the crucial etiological factor. Fetishism is, besides, a perfect instance of the process of partial repression whereby, as Fenichel has concisely expressed it, it is possible for a *pars pro toto* to be retained in consciousness (in the form of the fetish), while the "*totum*" remains repressed.² Clearly, the present account would not be reasonably complete without some description of the patient's orientation with respect to castration.

On this score the patient furnished a wealth of material, of which only the barest synopsis can here be given, but enough, I hope, to suggest the overwhelming need of the patient—though the specific factors, in the sense of "choice of neurosis", remain obscure—to deny the idea of castration and the cause of his castration anxiety by (1) the demand that the love-object possess a penis either illusional (fetishism) or real (passive homosexuality), (2) the denial that anybody without a penis exists (fetishism; transvestism), and (3) the demonstration that

¹ Freud: *Fetishism*. Int. J. Ps.-A. IX, 1928.

² Fenichel, Otto: *Outline of Clinical Psychoanalysis*. PSA. QUARTERLY II, 1933; see especially pp. 290 *seq.*

no such person exists (exhibitionism and scoptophilia; transvestism).

For the patient, death and castration were interchangeable terms; they were one and the same thing. Not only did he have many fantasies of death and of suicide (simultaneously with a terror of death) and numerous dreams involving various appurtenances of death (cemeteries, etc.)—not only, if it may be so expressed, was much of his actual life dominated by the “O that this too too solid flesh would melt” of his favorite Hamlet, but his equating of death and castration was unequivocally proved to him by an occasion on which, seeing a young man stretched out naked on a table in the morgue, his instantaneous thought was, “It will never rise again”.

In the first dream which the patient brought to the analysis he was in the rear seat of an automobile which his brother was driving; it was night; he was blind; they were about to turn into a courtyard where seemed to be a hospital. Besides the obvious allusion to the analysis and the part played in it (already mentioned) by his brother (there was also, in the hospital, a reference to his conflict in 1919 over proceeding from Europe to the Near East with the Red Cross, or returning to his—*sc.* parents’—home¹), we have here the patient’s passive orientation to his brother, and also, in his blindness, both castration and scoptophilic punishment. The element of reassurance, which I may say figured in a very considerable number of his dreams, is plain.

A much later dream was especially revealing in the foregoing respects. He was walking across country; he had with him the fifty dollars which his mother had given him the previous evening—in other words, he had, once again, as in the case of the boots, his mother’s penis with him. As he reached a railroad embankment, a train bore down upon him; he was barely able to save himself by grabbing a handrail and clinging to the side of one of the cars. The locomotive was of a very antiquated type—“of the vintage of 1849”, were the patient’s

¹ It is of interest that in the Army the patient was (of his own choice) an officer with an aviation unit, but a ground officer.

words. (His father was born within three years of that date.) He then found himself in a kind of camp; an acquaintance of his appeared, one whom in life he suspected of homosexual leanings. The patient thought he would somehow inveigle this man into performing coitus per rectum upon him. While the patient had some thought in the dream of the pleurability to him of such an experience, the idea which, also in the dream, he tried to keep uppermost in his mind was that his true purpose was to trap the man into betraying himself, thus at last "getting the goods on him", and thus himself, one might add, running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. This acquaintance not only had the same initials as the patient's brother, but the given name and the surname were both disyllables in both cases, with the first syllable and the final letter of the given name identical.

One final dream, which the patient brought in the first two weeks of the analysis, is especially relevant to our theme. He was in a room with an elephant from which in mortal terror he was trying to escape. The danger was that the elephant would pick him up with its trunk and convey him to its mouth, in the manner of a peanut; or else it actually did pick him up. It seemed to the patient that he tried to still his terror with the thought that no harm would come of this, that an elephant if it did such a thing would set one down unhurt, etc. In a corner of the room his brother's seventeen-year-old daughter was standing; she was singing. Finally the patient managed to gain the staircase, up which he fled. Upstairs a youngish man in his undershirt was shaving; he was very nonchalant, and ridiculed the idea that the elephant could possibly mount the stairs.—The patient's sole association to this dream was that an elephant's mouth always made him think of a vagina. On this basis the elephant is exquisitely adapted to representing vagina plus penis: the phallic female. In addition, there is the flight to the analysis perhaps, into homosexuality certainly; the man upstairs is in part the analyst (who was younger than the patient), in part the brother (his protective rôle, and his daughter downstairs), and, perhaps in chief measure, himself;

in any case, he is "the man who shaves" ("the man who saves"?), and in shaving he performs what is a symbolic castration, but one which is, so to speak, reparable, since the shaved hair will of course grow again. Apart from the equally evident projection of the patient's own oedipus desires—insertion of the penis (elephant's trunk, patient's body) into the (huge) vagina, with castration as the punishment therefor—which the dream also embodies, what is especially noteworthy is the emphasis on the theme of reassurance; not only is this plain in the manifest content ("elephants don't mean any harm"; the nonchalant attitude and reassuring words of the man upstairs), but we have too the temporary and remediable character of the castration symbolized by shaving, the elephant's trunk itself, and—as I think we are entitled to add, in the light of the total picture as now developed—the female voice which is singing. If we are justified in thus accounting for the presence in the dream of the last-named detail, then the female voice not only meets the criterion of the fetish in symbolizing, as do the boots, the female phallus, as I think has already been fairly conclusively shown, but in this dream we see it in the very act of carrying out the function which it is the fundamental task of the fetish, dynamically and economically, to fulfil—that of reassurance in regard to castration.

Of other forms of reassurance in this regard, in addition to the fetishistic (voice) and the fetishistic-transvestistic (boots), the patient made some use of that of exhibitionism—although, since he did not exhibit the real penis (save on two occasions during the period of the analysis, when drunk), he was not of course a true exhibitionist. The strongly narcissistic-exhibitionistic flavor of his episodes of compulsive boot-wearing will be recalled, as will also his fantasies of going upon the stage and his well marked scopophilic tendencies in connection with the stage and otherwise. One thinks too of his noticeably erect bearing and of his carefully groomed appearance. Finally, we may cite a dream in which a man, clad in the rough clothes of a laborer, stood upon a housetop with his erect and very large penis exposed to view; the patient was one of a throng in the

street below. Later—after the man had said to the patient, to the latter's great surprise, "You looked funny!", to which the patient rejoined, "It was you who looked funny!"—the man of the housetop entered the patient's house and went upstairs, where he somewhat resembled, in other respects as well, the man upstairs in the elephant dream; from an adjoining room the father was heard to remark, "It's fantastic!"—The man on the housetop somewhat suggested the janitor of the apartment building where the patient had lived alone for some years; he was further associated to a statuette which the patient had considered buying for this apartment, a statue bearing the designation "Narcissus". On the other hand, the house in the dream was the house in a distant town to which the family had removed for some years when the patient was about nine years of age. This change of residence had been marked by a return of the patient's childhood enuresis, and also by the protracted absences of the patient's father. The patient recalled in this latter connection that on more than one occasion he slipped into his parents' bedroom to inspect the sheets on the morning following his father's return.¹

To return to the patient's castration complex. When he was either five or six years of age (so far as he recalled), there occurred an episode of which the patient preserved a vivid memory throughout the succeeding forty years. He was in the outhouse with Minnie, also aged about six; she was seated over one of the openings, when she asked him to kiss her genital; and then, about to comply with great reluctance with her request, the patient discovered to his "horror" (this was the word he used) that she had no penis.

Not without bearing in this connection is the fact, already alluded to, that the patient was slated, so to speak, to be a girl,

¹ Of somewhat the same tenor was a slip of the tongue which the patient once made—a slip which deserves to rank fairly high in any hierarchy of *lapsus linguae*. He knew long passages from *Hamlet* by heart, and on one occasion chose for quotation, significantly enough, the speech wherein Hamlet upbraids his mother; but instead of saying, "Go not to my uncle's bed", the patient quoted it, "Go not to my father's bed".

and that he heard a good deal from his mother, who moreover suited the action to the word, about this miscarriage of program. Undoubtedly relevant to the patient's castration anxiety, furthermore, was his sadistic conception of sexual intercourse (which had survived to the present and was demonstrable in the very evident equation previously noted: I had intercourse with her—I killed her), whereby it would follow that a talion punishment (i.e., castration) might well be visited upon the instrument of death in question.

This brings us to the final group of clinical data to be adduced in this connection: the patient's attitude to hair and to hair-cutting. Briefly, the patient recalled that in very early childhood he took great pleasure in braiding his mother's hair; besides this, he recalled the definite sexual excitement that he experienced as a child on one occasion on seeing a little girl's hair being cut off. Throughout life he has experienced marked sexual excitement, accompanied by erection, on having his hair cut by a barber; the most intense experience of this kind was on the occasion, some ten years since, of his pubic hair being shaved by a hospital orderly, an elderly man, preparatory to an operation for inguinal hernia.—So that we have here a symbolic castration (but at the same time a non-irreparable one), and a castration of the female (the little girl), and clearly, too, an identification on the patient's part with the female who is castrated—with which last we may compare, on the other hand, his demonstrated identification with the woman *with* a penis (Amelia Earhart dream; boot-wearing).

But the hair-cutting is at the same time a symbolic coitus: hair-cutting is castration, and coitus is death (castration). For we know that for the patient the penis is a death-dealing, a castrating, instrument (the "I killed her" equation; the elephant's trunk); coitus, an infliction of death (castration) by means of the penis.¹ As a defense against such fantasies and against the punishment in kind to which they expose him

¹ Small wonder that marked anxiety resulted for the patient from having a knife left about at home (his parents' home).

(i.e., castration, or the fear of castration), he not only effects the familiar displacement from genital to hair¹ but he turns the sadism of these fantasies against himself² and plays the passive and receptive rôle in this displaced and symbolic coitus and/or castration. From the standpoint of the former of these, he enjoys a coitus robbed of the anxiety which surrounds real coitus, in that (in part) he has already paid for it in an attenuated and symbolic castration; from the standpoint of the latter, the castration which he fears has become an end in itself and its own source of gratification. It is alone the second of the two processes indicated above (the masochistic transformation) that seems to differentiate the patient from the individual who, substituting symbolic castration of the woman for normal intercourse, obtains sexual gratification from cutting off a lock of women's hair (the *Zopfabschneider*, for brevity; or "hair-despoiler", in Havelock Ellis's term). For our patient, as we have seen, obtains sexual gratification from the converse rôle of being the passive recipient, *in persona feminae*, of the hair-cutting process. But the underlying mechanism remains, apart from this, the same; so that, just as to this patient apply the two formulæ that simultaneously apply to the transvestist, as we have already noted, so to him apply also the two incompatible formulæ which, as Hárník has made clear,³ apply to the *Zopfabschneider*: The woman (mother) has a penis; the father has castrated the mother.⁴ Or, in other words, just as this patient differs from the true transvestist, not in fundamental mechanism, but chiefly in the fact that the fetishistic article of apparel which he puts on and wears (and exhibits)

¹ Hárník calls attention to the fact that anthropological parallels between defloration and hair-cutting are described in Marcuse's *Handwörterbuch der Sexualwissenschaft*, in the articles "Feste und Riten" and "Haar".

² A type of reaction habitual with the patient from the very beginning, if we may judge by the story told of how at the age of two he would react to frustration by beating his head with his fists—a practice in which his grandfather delightedly encouraged him.

³ Hárník, J.: *Zur Psychologie des Zopfabschneiders*. *Ztschr. f. Sexualwiss.* XIV, 451, 1927-28.

⁴ Cf. the sheet-inspecting episodes.

is not an intrinsically feminine article of attire, so he differs from the true *Zopfabschneider*, not in fundamental mechanism, but solely in the fact that he has turned upon himself, in a manner altogether characteristic for him, the sadism which gains overt expression in the activities of the true *Zopfabschneider*.

As a fetishist—with two different fetishes, one feminine (the voice), the other not patently so (the boots), one an object that can be donned and worn, the other not, although the latter too can in allotropic form be borrowed, acquired, and treasured up; as a quasi-transvestist—with too the well marked exhibitionist and inspectionist tendencies that often characterize the fetishist and the transvestist; as a quasi-*Zopfabschneider*—as all of these at once, the patient has seemingly run almost the gamut of mechanisms acting in the service of defense against castration anxiety and of the denial of castration and reassurance in regard to it.

A POSTSCRIPT ON WHAT SONG THE SYRENS SANG

The singing voice, and especially the voice in its capacity to allure, brings immediately to mind the creatures of mythology whose possession of a voice seducing to destruction was their outstanding attribute—notably the Lorelei of Germanic myth, and the Sirens of Greek.

As all know from Heine's poem, the Lorelei was a mermaid of the Rhine, part fish, part woman, who lured the unwary fisherman to destruction by the seduction of her song. With a golden comb the Lorelei combed her golden hair, as did also Ligeia (one of the Sirens) in Milton's *Comus*—"sleeking her soft alluring hair". In one variant of the myth, to stay to hearken to her song was death; to look upon her meant either blindness or madness.

It is only in the modern conception that the Sirens are fish-tailed mermaids, like the Lorelei; their original form, their art-form, preserved even into the Middle Ages, was that of a creature part woman, part bird, a bird-woman with the pro-

portion of bird to woman varying but the bird element constant. For, though they sang to mariners, to Ulysses and to the Argonauts, they were not sea-creatures, but, as Homer tells us, inhabited an island, "crouching within the meadow"; their mother was Chthon, the Earth. As does the Lorelei, they "all men do beguile"; they lure away "from wife and babes", and the end of their song is death, a slow and wasting death, a death by starvation. To be noted too are their mantic powers, their knowledge of all things past and future. From the Sirens who are represented on tombs the erotic element has wholly disappeared; in this form, as on the famous Harpy Tomb from Lydia, they embody the notion of Death-Angel; originally apotropaic perhaps in their function, a spirit to keep off spirits, later they appear as actual mourners; in any case, their whole association is with death. Their other and major aspect, the erotic and at the same time the forbidden, comes especially to the fore in their representation in vase paintings as members of the crew of Centaurs and Satyrs who revel with Dionysus, a conjunction most significant if we take into account the true character of Dionysus as a Son-god (and his revels as the celebration of the death of the father). Most striking of all in its erotic connotation is a Hellenistic relief¹ in which a winged and bird-footed woman, to all appearances a Siren, is shown sitting astride a recumbent wayfarer who has fallen asleep—a very Incuba; and indeed, a nightmare, or even "a troubled tormenting illicit dream",² was the work of a Siren, in popular belief—for, as Ernest Jones has recently reminded us, ". . . with the sole exception of modern physicians, people have constantly regarded the Nightmare as a sexual assault on the part of a lewd demon".³

¹ Illustrated and described in Harrison, Jane Ellen: *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, 3d ed., Cambridge, 1922; pp. 202-3.

² Harrison: *loc. cit.*, p. 203.

³ Ernest Jones: *Nightmare, Witches, and Devils*, New York, n.d. [1931], pp. 77-8. And, as Dr. Jones states in the same passage, "Even the scientific terms used to designate the Nightmare, namely Incubus and Ephialtes, originally signified a lewd demon"; and in a footnote thereto quotes the *Anatomy of Melancholy*: "if they lie on their back, they suppose an old woman rides and

Elaborated, mysticized, made abstract as the Sirens easily lent themselves to being, so that for example they find an exalted place in the cosmography of Plato's Republic, it is their original nature which is significant and instructive—a nature which on the more poetic side, at least, Miss Harrison has expressed in a passage which I should like to quote *verbatim*: The Sirens “stand, it would seem, to the ancient as to the modern, for the impulses in life as yet unmoralized, imperious longings, ecstasies, whether of love or art or philosophy, magical voices calling to a man from his ‘Land of Heart’s Desire’ and to which if he hearken it may be he will return home no more—voices, too, which, whether a man sail by or stay to hearken, still sing on”.¹ Much more prosaically stated, their most striking feature would seem to be the opposition of antithetic attributes which so clearly characterizes them, the combination of attraction and repulsion, of the alluring and the fearsome, which they so plainly embody—their beauty as woman, their predatory character as bird; the all but irresistible lure of their song, the wasting death which inevitably overtakes the victim of its seductiveness.² Added to this we have their dream character, their nightmare quality: their appearance in—and supposed causation of—the “troubled tormenting illicit dream”, the anxiety dream of erotic coloring; and finally, their possession of an omniscience such that in the Homeric account, indeed, it is their ability to satisfy the desire to know which

sits so hard on them, that they are almost stifled for want of breath’”—a conception in which obviously the force of inhibition, as contrasted with desire, comes much more to the fore than in that of the Siren.

“Ephialtes” means “He who leaps upon”. While his name became attached to the Ker of nightmare, Ephialtes was, originally, one of the Aloadae, who were culture heroes (hence Son-figures) like the Titan Prometheus, and who, again like the Titans, contended against Zeus the Father—a reference to the *œdipus* situation which can hardly be accidental.

¹ Harrison: *loc. cit.*, p. 206.

² A further suggestive detail is supplied by the fact that when Ulysses, by having himself lashed to the mast, remained proof against their enticements, the Sirens drowned themselves—just as the Sphinx killed herself when *Œdipus* solved the riddle she posed to him, and Phædra hanged herself when Hippolytus repulsed her.

they hold forth as a lure more powerful than their song.¹ Taking these several facts together, it seems scarcely possible to doubt that the Siren is the forbidden mother, in the sense of the *œdipus* situation; more accurately, that the Siren represents the projection or exteriorization of repressed sexual wishes—specifically, of repressed incestuous wishes—together with the affects pertaining to these. If this is true, we may allow that Sir Thomas Browne was correct in his belief that “what song the Syrens sang, or what name Achilles assumed when he hid himself among women,² though puzzling questions, are not beyond all conjecture”.³

¹ Their implied promise, “You shall know”, must certainly contain also the sexual meaning present in our expression “carnal knowledge”, and in the Biblical (and Greek) locution “to know a woman”.

² Achilles as transvestist! It was Thetis (his mother) who, to keep him as long as possible out of the Trojan conflict, hid him “among women”. Even apart from this interesting variation (which seems to represent a lesser castration to avert a greater), we appear to have here a close approximation to the familiar theme of the hiding away of the son from the jealous sire on the part of the mother, as Gaia hid her children from Ouranos, Rhea Zeus from Kronos, the infant Dionysus (or Zagreus) from the Titans (whose name means “Kings”; they smeared themselves with white clay, apparently to represent ghosts—to impersonate, as certain savage tribes do in similar fashion, dead ancestors, a magical identification with the father)—and, one may add, as Mary took flight into Egypt with the infant Jesus to escape from Herod, who, it will be recalled, had received a prophecy very similar to that given Laius, father of *œdipus*, and to Zeus, should he beget a son by Thetis.—In any case—but it ultimately amounts to the same thing in the sense of the *œdipus* situation—the Thetis-Achilles episode is a pretty representation in miniature of one of the ideas underlying ceremonies of initiation: prior to initiation one is non-male or female (Achilles as a girl); before one can take one's place beside one's fellows (the Trojan war), one must undergo castration (circumcision, penis mutilation, etc.; Achilles unsexed by being made a girl).—It may be remarked in passing that the Trojan war, from which Achilles was kept as long as possible by his mother, is itself a reflection of the *œdipus* situation. Moreover, Helen, whose theft by Paris from Menelaus was its occasion, was not only of the fabulous beauty that launched a thousand ships and burnt the topless towers of Ilium, but she was also, be it noted, the daughter of Nemesis, and in a sense, therefore, a doublet of Nemesis—Nemesis, “a bane for mortal men” (Hesiod); Nemesis, with her connotations of tribal sanctions, of retribution, and of the divine envy; Nemesis, who was at the same time a swan; Nemesis, who was also fused and confused with Aphrodite, so that as instigator of Paris and at the same time mother of Helen, the goddess of love is made at once the seducer and the

But I think that additional light is thrown upon the Sirens, and upon matters of related interest, by some consideration of certain sister-beings inhabiting the world of Greek demonology. I refer especially to the Gorgon, the Harpies, the Sphinx, and the Erinyes (sometimes known as the Furies)—creatures which manifest a kind of underlying unity, in that all of them possess certain features in common, and some of them have certain additional characteristics in common, while furthermore some particular attribute is to be found emphasized in each and subordinated in the others. Particularly indicative of this fundamental unity is the occurrence of various intermediate and combination forms.¹

To begin with, all are of the female sex, and all are the incarnation of fear, anxiety, for all are, if in somewhat varying degree (the Gorgon most, the Siren least), savage, malign, terrifying, punitive. All—except perhaps the Sphinx—have that almost universal attribute of the bogey, the power of swift flight through the air: besides the winged Harpies and Sirens, the Erinyes and even the Gorgons are represented as often as not as having wings, and the Erinyes, besides, as pursuers, are depicted as clothed in huntress garb, with short skirt and high boots; and one of the Gorgons was named Euryale (Wide-leaping), and one of the Harpies Ocypete (Swift-wing) and another Podarge (Fleet-foot). Except for the Erinyes, perhaps the least clearly visualized of these creatures,² and the Medusa,

scourge of mankind—even as the Sirens (see More, Paul Elmer: "Nemesis", in *Shelburne Essays*, 2nd series, Boston, 1905); while Helen herself had an association with mariners (Sirens, Lorelei), to whom she appeared as St. Elmo's fire—by a significant doubleness of attitude, a bad sign according to some accounts, according to others a favorable one.

³ Sir Thomas Browne: *Hydriotaphia*, ch. v.

¹ For example, two striding winged female figures of ominous aspect are represented in a vase painting which depicts the slaying of Medusa; they are therefore the other two Gorgons, her sisters, and yet the vase painter has labeled them Harpies.

² Miss Harrison thinks that up to the time when Æschylus brought them upon the stage—in the *Eumenides*, where they are explicitly described as part Gorgon, part Harpy—the Erinyes were "unseen horrors which art up to that time had never crystalized into set form" (*loc. cit.*, p. 223), although they seem to have been thought of, too, as rather beautiful if of terrifying aspect.

they are part bird (or animal) at the same time as they are part woman; the Sirens were bird-women, as we have seen, and so were the Harpies; the Sphinx had the body of a lion, but was also winged. But the outstanding attribute which they possess in common is, of course, that all bring death, destruction, in their train; this is, in the case of the Sirens, implicitly at least, death by starvation, but explicitly so in the case of the Harpies, who carry off or foul their victim's food¹—yet in another respect, be it noted, Siren and Harpy stand at opposite ends of the scale, the one personating enticement as a leading *motif*, the other typifying disgust (i.e., guilt). And if the Sirens were “lovely-voiced”² and so lured men to their ultimate doom, the lovely terrible face of the Gorgon (Medusa) had the power to turn men into stone. Of interest in this connection is certainly the fact that “in her essence Medusa is a head and nothing more; her potency only begins when her head is severed, and that potency resides in the head; she is in a word a mask with a body later appended”.³ And in relation to the fascination in—for fascination is very clearly a quality of the Medusa—and punishment consequent upon “looking” which the Medusa so plainly represents, we recall the variant of the Lorelei myth wherein he who looks upon her is rendered mad or blind. Notable in particular is the genealogy of the Medusa as suggested in a portrayal on a Rhodian plate in the British Museum, in which, as described by Miss Harrison,⁴ “the Gorgoneion has been furnished with a body tricked out with wings, but the mask-head is still dominant. The figure is conceived in the typical heraldic fashion of the Mistress of Wild Things (πότνια θηρῶν); she is in fact the ugly bogey-

¹ At least in the case of Phineus, whose punishment, in addition to being blinded, this was. Phineus betrayed the secrets of the gods to all and sundry. The similar sin of Sisyphus is given an outspokenly sexual coloring, indicative of its fundamental meaning, in the fact that he betrayed the intrigue of Zeus with Ægina. Tantalus, too, betrayed the parental secrets; what was almost worse, as also in both Judaism and Christianity, he tested the gods' omniscience.

² As labeled in a vase painting depicting the Ulysses episode.

³ Harrison: *loc. cit.*, p. 187.

⁴ Harrison: *loc. cit.*, p. 194.

Erinyes-side of the Great Mother; she is a potent goddess, not as in later days a monster to be slain by heroes".¹ (And the Erinyes possessed too—at least in Æschylus—the Medusa's power of destroying whom they looked upon or who looked on them). Finally, the Sphinx shares with the Sirens one of her two major characteristics—her mantic powers, her omniscience; while in the other of them, her practice of carrying off men, and especially, in her case, young men, to destruction, she differs not at all from the Harpies (and the Erinyes); and like the Sirens, again, she is a tomb-haunter, though ultimately fading, like them, into a decorative tomb monument.

The anxiety—an anxiety clearly of intense degree—of which these beings are the externalization and personification is sufficiently obvious. Equally arresting is the emphasis placed—in the Medusa, the Sirens, the Sphinx, and even the Erinyes—upon one in particular of the "polymorphous-perverse" components of infantile sexuality: scopophilia, sexual curiosity. And if death is castration and castration is death, then the association of these same beings with the theme of castration and of castration anxiety is similarly plain. We draw nearer still to the œdipus situation on noting that we are told, almost in so many words, that one or another of these beings is a figurization in some sense of the mother: the Sirens daughters of Chthon, the Earth; Medusa the Mistress of Wild Things, the Great Mother.² In even more direct association to the œdipus situation are, indeed, the Erinyes ("The Angry Ones"); for they—wholly retributive in their function, the very personification of guilt and punishment, with the scourge as one of

¹ A curious fact, not without revelance, is available from the inexhaustible store of the late Miss Harrison's learning. She quotes Athenæus as stating that the Libyans had a beast which they called Gorgon, and which had *a mane hanging over its eyes* (italics mine) so heavy that it could only shake it aside with difficulty; it killed whomever it looked at, not by its breath but by a destructive exhalation from its eyes. (*Loc. cit.*, p. 196.)

² "Medusa", moreover, means "Queen"; she was, besides, the mortal member of the group of three into which the Gorgon became expanded—as the Erinyes became expanded into three Erinyes, and as three was the canonical number of Sirens, Graiæ, Charites, Moiræ, etc.

their attributes—wreaked vengeance on those who violated the ties of kinship, hearing above all the prayer of a father or mother wronged by a son; they were regularly on the side not only of fathers and mothers but also of older brothers. The most familiar example of their vengeful pursuit is that of Orestes;¹ he finally rendered atonement by biting off one of his fingers, when the Erinyes, who had appeared black, suddenly turned to white—a clear enough expression of release from guilt. Another point of contact of the Erinyes with the œdipus situation is discernible in their genealogy, as given in the Theogony of Hesiod. They sprang from the drops of blood that fell upon the earth from the severed phallus of Ouranos when Kronos, his son, cut it off and flung it into the sea.²

Now the evidence is conclusive—we need not detail it here, and in fact some of it is implicit in what has already been said—that the beings we have been discussing represent one and all

¹ The extremely close correspondence, not only in the main but in respect of a number of outwardly insignificant details, between the Orestes saga and the Hamlet saga is perhaps familiar. See in particular Murray, Gilbert: "Hamlet and Orestes", in *The Classical Tradition in Poetry*, London, 1927.

² So too did the Giants; they were born from Earth when the drops of blood from the castration of Ouranos fell upon her. The Giants, obviously, are Son-figures, for they—instigated by their mother, as Kronos too had been—revolted against and attacked the gods. This favorite theme is set forth twice more, indeed, in the story of how Typhon, born of Earth and Tartarus, contended against Zeus and actually succeeded in cutting out the sinews of his hands and feet (!) with a harpé, the same instrument, a kind of sickle or sickle-knife, which Kronos is stated to have used against Ouranos; and in the story of how the Aloadaî (of whom Ephialtes was one; see page 412, footnote 3), when nine years old, thought to pile Ossa upon Olympus and Pelion on Ossa, in their attempt to scale the heavens.—Almost invariably, as we here note once again, the mother takes the part of the son—actively, in inciting to rebellion, as in the instances just cited; or passively, in hiding away the child, as in the case of Gaia, Rhea, Thetis, Mary (see page 414, footnote 2); or in a manner more or less intermediate between the two, as in the case of the mother of Hamlet and of all the mothers of the several variants of Hamlet, to say nothing of Jocasta herself.

It might be noted in passing that "Kronos", according to the very plausible derivation put forward by A. B. Cook (*Zeus*, vol. I, p. 550), means "The Chopper". It should be unnecessary to add that his name has no possible connection with Chronos.

of them differentiated forms, developed in slightly different directions, of certain omnipresent spirit-beings whom the Greeks called Keres.¹ These were thought of by them as little winged creatures, swarming unknown and unseen evils, diseases, misfortunes, "woes and calamities that none may scape" (Hesiod), which afflicted man from the cradle to the grave.² There was a Ker of death, and of old age, of blindness, of madness, even a Ker of nightmare, as we have seen; Keres were even connected with the "lusts of the flesh", as indeed Hope and other emotions and emotional states were, by a universal animistic projection, thought of as Keres; but there was, too, a Ker of life, and his name was Eros—again but a specialized form of Ker, and yet by the same token indistinguishable *au fond* from Death and Sleep.³

The evidence is equally conclusive that the Keres are

¹ The word is scarcely translatable into English, having as might be supposed various connotations which cannot be conveyed by any single term. It is very suggestive, at all events, that, according to Liddell and Scott, κῆρ is "perhaps cognate with" the verb *κεραῖζειν*, to *ravage*, *plunder*; of living beings, to *slaughter*; also, to *carry off as plunder*.

² The reader is of course well aware that such a conception was in no way peculiar to the Greeks. The element of the inexplicable and fortuitous—in the sense of the untoward, the frustrating, the unfavorable, for what is favorable or auspicious passes always unnoticed, is taken for granted—the element of chance or luck, what Sumner and Keller call the "aleatory element", has always been looked upon (and adjusted to) in much the same way throughout mankind. "The savage was terrified by the aleatory element and under the necessity of somehow dealing with it. He had to have some sort of theory to go on in order to develop methods of procedure. By a sort of marvelous coincidence the theory was there, right at hand. The theory was that of the spirit-environment. It is not asserted that the recognition, conscious or unconscious, of the element of chance in life summoned into being the idea of that environment. *That conception arose from other sources altogether* [italics mine]. Nevertheless it was there, and it explained the otherwise inexplicable".—Sumner and Keller: *The Science of Society*, 1928; vol. II, p. 771.

Of course there was a Golden Age, before these ills afflicted mankind—before they escaped from the great grave-jar of Pandora, the Earth-Mother, leaving only Hope (Elpis) behind.

³ Furthermore, it is possible, as Miss Harrison suggests (*loc. cit.*, p. 175), that some notion of the double nature, good and bad, of Keres survives in the Homeric expression "two-fold Keres" (διχόαδαι κῆρες) which bear Achilles on.

ghosts, souls;¹ that they are, in the last analysis, the souls of the departed (and hence the souls of ancestors), souls that—in accordance with a very widespread belief—bear away souls, ghosts of the dead that draw the living into death. There is nothing novel, of course, in the idea of the soul as winged,² nor, to take a very slight further step, in that of the soul as a bird³—the *Seelenvogel* conception;⁴ nor it is a much further step to the bird-woman which we have seen the Harpies and the Sirens to be, or to the winged Gorgon, Sphinx, and Erinys. If, then, there is no doubt that Harpies and Sirens, Gorgon and

¹ For example, at the end of the last day of the Anthesteria, a festival of the revocation of souls, a Greek All-Souls' Day, the householder exclaims, "Out of the house, ye Keres! It is no longer Anthesteria".—In a vase painting illustrated by Miss Harrison (*loc. cit.*, p. 43) three winged Keres are seen escaping from a grave-jar, under the ministration of Hermes Psychopompos, Hermes the Evoker and Revoker of Souls, who as *κηρυξ* summons *κηρες* forth with his *κηρυκεῖον*, his herald's staff or kerykeion, with its *twain twisted snakes*.

² The Greek word "psyche" means both soul and butterfly. The use of the same word for both is said to be true of the Burmese and the Shans.

³ We note too, consistent with their soul-nature and soul-descent, the mantic qualities attributed to birds, their power of prophecy in their possession of all-wisdom (again the appearance of this (parental) attribute), their use therefore in augury, and the fact, for instance, that *ὄρνις* means both *bird* and, derivatively, *omen*.

It is a familiar fact, among many others of daimonistic flavor which could be cited, that, like the Siren and the Sphinx in still another of their aspects (than that of omniscience), the cock is a spirit to keep off spirits; we still use its effigy upon church steeples and elsewhere. Indeed, its use in this way is entirely analogous to that of a broomstick or sharp knife to keep off the Nightmare. In other words, the cock—as also the Siren and the Sphinx in their apotropaic and prophylactic aspect, that of the spirit to keep off spirits—is a fetish (in the anthropological sense), that is, the abode of a spirit, hence of the principle of generation, of fertility, of sexual potency (wherewith compare fetish in the psychopathological sense). Compare also *genius* (noting the stem *gen-*) as a guardian spirit, more fundamentally as the soul and represented often as a serpent (See Roheim, G.: *Animism Magic and the Divine King*, 1930; pp. 17-19). In connection with the apotropaic function, one thinks of the deity Priapus—he of the large and erect penis—who was a luck-bringer, and often found therefore at the door of houses.

⁴ As something saltant, light, mobile, fleeting, hovering, primitive man saw the soul, in the shape of concrete forms which he knew and which embodied such qualities, as a bird, an insect, a snake, etc.—Paraphrased from Sumner and Keller, *loc. cit.*, p. 804.

Sphinx, are but somewhat specialized forms of Keres, and that on the other hand Keres are, in the last analysis, none other than the ghosts of the departed, the souls of ancestors, the fundamental parent origin of these beings is placed beyond dispute—a conclusion supported by the conspicuously ambivalent attitude in regard to them, by the (parental) characteristics attributed to them of *inter alia* awesomeness on the one hand and omniscience on the other, and by their several points of contact, of which the more obvious ones have been mentioned, with infantile sexuality and with the œdipus situation and the castration complex and the anxiety pertaining thereto—including their undoubted association with the spectres of dreams.¹

Closest to their actual origin in the souls of the dead, however, stand the Harpies. For, on the one hand, their almost exclusive feature is that of psychopomp, to bear off the souls of the living—and indeed their name signifies The Snatchers;² and on the other, they are thought of as winds—in Homer, forming a combination of the two ideas, as storm-winds bearing off the daughters of Pandareos to the underworld. Their identity as winds at the same time as they are souls is of course not surprising in view of the widespread association between the ideas of soul, ghost, spirit, breath and wind.³ Wind, however, may denote flatus as well as breath; and we think of the filthiness of the Harpies (in the Phineus story) as confirmatory of this anal aspect of their being. Immediately, too, at all events, we come upon the further idea of winds as life-giving (winds may impregnate mares, according to Vergil),⁴ and of

¹ In *The Sacred Disease* Hippocrates speaks—scathingly, of course—of the belief that nocturnal fears and terrors are due to the “onsets” of Hecate or of dead men (ἡρώων—i.e., dead (and canonized, if I may put it so) forbears, ancestors, fathers)—περὶ ἱερῆς νόσου, iv, 30–33.—As for Hecate, it might well be noted in this particular connection that she is an unequivocal mother representative.

² Cf. κραίρειν, page 419, footnote 1.

³ E.g., ψυχῶ I breathe, blow; ψυχῇ breath, soul

ἄνεμος wind (cf. anemone: wind-flower), animus spirit

spiro I breathe; spiritus spirit.

⁴ Ernest Jones, citing psychoanalytic evidence for the fantasy that the act of procreation may consist in the passage of flatus from one body to another,

Harpies as life-giving as well as death-dealing—an extremely common conjunction of ideas.¹ It is as though nothing brought death but also brings life, and nothing brings life but also brings death. The winds are life-begetting because they are also souls, and only a soul can beget a soul; or, he who in the body begot life, also, and even *a fortiori*, as a ghost begets life likewise; for the ghost, ancestor, father, *is* power, potency, procreation.² Indeed, it is from ghosts of dead men, Hippocrates tells us, that there come “nurture and growth and seeds”.³ Now this life-giving begetting aspect includes in the case of the Harpies curious horse associations, as though the horse were the very paradigm (an idea familiar enough in dreams) of reproductive potency. A Harpy was the mother by Zephyros of the swift horses of Achilles; so that at the same time as both parents are in a sense winds, the Harpy is part wind and part horse and part woman. The famous horse Pegasus, moreover, was born of Medusa by Poseidon, the sea-god, in the guise of a stallion—although he is a horse-god in any case, as shown not only by one of his epithets (*ἵππιος*—Lord of steeds, or he of the steed) but by the many associations, among the Greeks as elsewhere, between horse and water.⁴ (There is

suspects that the infantile interest in flatus has played a large part in the idea of the relation of wind to fertility (and is concerned, by the way, in the notion of “action at a distance”). “The act of passing flatus is so evident with horses”, he goes on to say, “that it is not surprising to find how many beliefs there are about their being fertilized by the wind”.—*loc. cit.*, pp. 307–309.

¹ To give but one example out of an innumerable list, there is “divine Astarte [Aphrodite], the strength, the life, the salvation of men and gods”, and yet at the same time “the power of destruction, death and decay”.—Farnell, *L. R.: Cults of the Greek States*, vol. II, p. 651.

² A very clear-cut illustration of this idea is furnished by the Tritopatores, Miss Harrison’s description of whom I should like to quote: “When an Athenian was about to be married he prayed and sacrificed, Suidas tells us, to the Tritopatores. . . . Suidas tells us also who the Tritopatores were. They were, as we might have guessed from their name, fathers in the third degree, forefathers, ancestors, ghosts, and Démon in his *Atthis* said they were winds. The idea that the Tritopatores were winds as well as ghosts was never lost”.—*loc. cit.*, pp. 179–80.

³ *περὶ ἐνυπνίων*—in *περὶ διατρῆς* iv, 92, 4–5; ed. Littré, 1840, vol. VI, page 659.

⁴ The basis of this very widespread association is not obvious at first sight. Linguistic evidence makes it seem that it is mobility that was thought of as

even, besides, a very archaic Bœotian vase depicting Medusa as half Gorgon, half horse¹—a kind of centauress.) Poseidon had a similar adventure with Demeter the Earth-Mother, who gave birth to the wonderful horse Areion (the Very Swift). In one version of this story, Areion was begotten by Poseidon out of an Erinys.² Thus we have a clear equating of both Medusa and Erinys with Demeter the Earth-Mother, since almost exactly the same story is told about each; so that we have, in fact, not only a Harpy begetting (swift) horses by a wind, but

the conspicuous attribute of both horse and water; for, according to Harper's Latin Dictionary, *aqua* (*acva*) is probably ultimately connected with Sanscrit *acus* swift, *acer*, and *ᾠκός*, from the notion of quickly, easily moving—while *equus*, Sanscrit *acvas*, Greek *ἵππος* (*ἵκκος*) have as their root *ak-*, to be sharp or swift.—But unquestionably both are also regarded from the standpoint of their fertility, their reproductive powers—an idea with which, in any case, that of motion is by no means inconsistent. On a pregenital level it would seem, indeed, that the basic *tertium comparationis* may well be urination: water, stream → urine, urination ← horse. In these days of the automobile it is easy to be forgetful of the horse's excretory virtuosity: how notable is his copious and surprisingly frequent defæcation as compared with man's merely diurnal accomplishment, while his micturition constitutes nothing less than a foaming cataract. (To the infantile idea of impregnation as urination into the female, it might be remarked parenthetically, Orion owes his name. Originally Urion (*οὐρεῖν* to urinate), his name commemorates the act of Zeus, Hermes and Poseidon in urinating upon an ox-hide and burying it in the earth for ten lunar months, whence he was born.) Further determinants of the association between horse and water are discussed at length, with a wealth of illustration, by Ernest Jones in Part III, chapter 3, of *Nightmare, Witches, and Devils*, pp. 273–319. He refers *inter alia* to the anal elements which enter into the conception of the horse: his flowing mane (hair being not infrequently equated with fæces, the idea of periodic shedding being common to both); the many tales of the golden mane of the magic horse (reminding us of the Lorelei's golden hair, while both the Lorelei and Ligeia had a golden comb); and the "association between the ideas of movement and excremental performances, one easily illustrated by the fact that 'movement' and 'motion' are even in adult years still the commonest phrases used to designate the act of defæcation". To these examples might be added the name of one of Achilles' Harpy-born horses, Xanthos (yellow), and the fact that Poseidon gave the horse Areion which he begot by Demeter to Kopreus (*κόπρος* excrement), king of Haliartos.

¹ Harrison: *loc. cit.*, p. 179.

² Farnell, L. R., *loc. cit.*, vol. III, p. 54. "We may go a step further than K. O. Müller and regard 'Ερινύς as we have regarded Demeter, as a specialized form of Gaia."

we have Medusa and Erinys and Demeter herself begetting a (swift) horse by a horse-god, Poseidon.

We have already seen reason for supposing that Gorgon (Medusa) and Harpy and even Erinys (as well as, equally, Siren and Sphinx) are symbolizations in various wise of the mother; and here we find these three equated with Demeter in terms of giving birth to swift horses by a wind or a horse-god or of being in fact themselves part horse. In this mythopoeic restatement of the theme of swift flight and rapid motion which are already among the most salient characteristics of these beings, not only is special emphasis thereby placed upon their generative function, their procreative power, their sexual potency, but a definite assimilation to them of what can only be a phallic symbolism seems to occur besides. There is, for example, Medusa as half horse, as we have seen in the Bœotian vase, and there is even a horse-headed Demeter;¹ we have too, of course, the lion's body of the Sphinx, and we have the snakes which are so frequent an attribute of Medusa—the snake-form of her hair, or a snake held in each hand, to say nothing of “a vague record of snakes attached to the head of the Phigaleian Demeter”.² Moreover, we encounter on occasion a direct equating of the Erinys with a snake,³ so that the Erinyes make their appearance in the actual form of snakes. We have, besides, the three Graiæ, women who were old but also fair, doublets seemingly of the Gorgons whose sisters they were, in the account of whom so much emphasis is placed upon their single eye and single tooth. Particularly striking is the fact that Medusa, the most unequivocal mother-figure of the five types we have been discussing, at the same time has the greatest number of phallic attributes. The snakes and her horse form have already been noted; but in addition we have the significant fact, suggestive of numerous parallels of specifi-

¹ “We have to confess that the dimly remembered horse-headed Demeter at Phigaleia is a type that is not naturally explained by totemism nor by any known Greek symbolism of the underworld or of vegetation.”—Farnell, L. R.: *loc. cit.*, p. 62.

² Farnell, L. R.: *loc. cit.*, p. 57.

³ Harrison: *loc. cit.*, pp. 232–239.

cally phallic meaning in mythology and folklore, that she is a head without a body, a being therefore whose potency resides in her head.¹ Not only this, but she has the equivalent of what was in later times called the Evil Eye, through the ramifications of which concept, from the Sun down, one can certainly trace the idea of the phallus.² Nor is it going too far afield, perhaps, to suggest that the very revealing account of the fabulous animal which the Libyans called a Gorgon definitely contains the notion of a penis (evil eye) concealed under the pubic hair (extraordinary mane).—It is, indeed, as though this whole confused *mélange* of imaginings expressed a confusion and a doubt which is itself significant—a doubt (which rises more or less to the surface, so to speak, in the compulsion neurotic, and not alone in him) as to whether women have or have not a penis, that is, as to whether mother has or has not a penis (and even whether I (if a woman) have or have not a penis). One can never after all be quite certain about this; and in their expression of this uncertainty these myth-fantasies about the mother crystalize a definite element of the infantile state of mind—an element, needless to add, utterly foreign to the conscious mentality.

Is the foregoing antinomy—in part, at least—but one expression of the duality of nature which strikingly characterizes a not inconsiderable number of the female beings who inhabit the Greek Pantheon? Whether this be so or not, it is certainly an arresting fact, at all events, that even the most outspokenly maternal and benign divinities possess at the same time an aspect angry, threatening, harsh or terrifying. As an expression of this duality in its barest form we have the Eumenides distinguished in cult and legend as the black goddesses and white goddesses,³ reminiscent of the black Erinyes who changed

¹ Cf. Ernest Jones: *loc. cit.*, pp. 270, 287.

² Indeed, the effigy of the Medusa's head (the Gorgoneion) found wide application—particularly on tombs and in connection with fire, ovens, baking, pottery making—in the same apotropaic sense as the Siren and Sphinx on tombs, the cock, the broom-stick and knife against the Nightmare, Priapus and also Hecate (the Hekateion) before the doors of houses, etc.

³ Farnell: *loc. cit.*, vol. III, p. 54.

to white on Orestes' expiation of his crime—and in fact the Eumenides are in any case but another name for the Erinyes. There is also Black Demeter and likewise Demeter Erinys, Demeter the Angry One;¹ while there is record of the application of the latter appellation—Erinys, the Angry One—even to Aphrodite.² Grim Hecate (whose name means, significantly, "Worker from Afar"),³ usually thought of as a witch, priestess of magic, queen of the ghosts and goddess of the cross-roads, whose attribute was a scourge (*cf.* the Erinyes), was originally an unmistakable mother-goddess who made the earth to bring forth abundantly. In the eventual absorption of the latter rôle by Artemis, it is as though these two aspects of Hecate had become allocated between two persons who remain the same person (a device familiar enough in dreams), for Artemis on the one hand was also originally a mother-deity, a patroness of wild things (like the Cretan goddess who is called in ignorance of her name Mistress of Wild Things; *cf.* the Medusa of the Rhodian plate, *supra*), goddess of birth, Nursing Mother—while on the other hand the equivalence in function and nature of Hecate and Artemis is mirrored in the mythological kinship between them, for their mothers are sisters or they even have the same mother (Demeter). There is Brimo,⁴ who is Hecate under another name,⁵ and who is simultaneously described as "she who haunts the night, the Nursing Mother . . . Queen

¹ Confined to two localities in Arcadia, the most primitive and backward of the Greek states, it is true; it was in these two towns and in Haliartos in Bœotia that the story of Demeter begetting Areion was told. It is perhaps of some relevance that in the last-named region a goddess Praxidiké, Exactress of Vengeance, whose images were (like Medusa) heads only and whose sacrifices were the same, was worshipped.

² Farnell: *loc. cit.*, p. 55.

³ *Cf.* Hippocrates' allusion to the belief in Hecate as a cause of nightmare (page 421, footnote 1).

⁴ The name seems to contain the idea of a loud noise or of an angry or terrifying noise. *Cf.* βριμάζω roar like a lion; βριμάσθαι snort (a horse association?) with anger.

⁵ It would add but another digression to an excessive number thereof to enlarge upon the fact that in the Sacred Marriage and Miraculous Birth of the Eleusinian Mysteries the Mother was Brimo and the Son Brimos.

of the dead".¹ The same "defusion" which seems to occur in the case of Hecate and Artemis is possibly seen also in the instance of Nemesis, who "was no mere personification but a real divinity akin to Aphrodite, if not another form of her, and possessing a marked character of doom or punishment",² but whose daughter Helen, on the other hand, was the fairest of all women. But clearest of all in this respect is certainly Demeter, the Earth-Mother; for not only had she an aboriginal aspect as a deity of the world of death, there being unmistakable testimony that primitively her cult was chthonian rather than agrarian,³ but she had too a daughter, "dread" Persephone (or Koré⁴ or Koré-Persephone), ruler of the underworld and queen of the dead. Finally, Aphrodite—whom we have already found described (under the name of Astarte) as "the strength, the life, the salvation of men and gods" and yet as "the power of destruction, death and decay"—goddess of love, beauty and marriage, and in Sparta as in her original Cyprus a goddess of war as well, was frequently worshipped as a divinity of death and the lower world—an aspect of her which Farnell states can be regarded as derived from the original tradition.⁵

Thus all these deities embody a double conception; they are givers of life and love, but they are no less givers of death. In this the Sirens entirely resemble them; but the resemblance goes further, just as the significance of this antinomy goes deeper. The song of the Sirens, as we have seen reason to believe, symbolizes the love of the mother in all its allurements,

¹ Apollonius Rhodius; quoted by Harrison, *loc. cit.*, p. 560.

² Farnell: *loc. cit.*, vol. II, p. 653.

³ Farnell: *loc. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 64-5.—Plutarch says that at one time the Athenians called the buried dead *Δημήτριοι*, Demeter's people—once again the conjunction between birth from the womb and the return to the womb.

⁴ The Maiden. The word is from a root which reveals its connotation of shorn hair (A. B. Cook: *Zeus*, vol. I, p. 24). And in fact Euripides gives us in the *Hippolytus*, lines 1425-6, the equation between the cutting off of hair and defloration which was referred to in the clinical part of this paper:—

"For yokeless maids before their bridal night
Shall shear for thee their tresses".

(See Jane Ellen Harrison: *Themis*, pp. 336-7.)

⁵ Farnell: *loc. cit.*, vol. II, p. 652.

holding forth the promise of the Land of Heart's Desire which symbolizes the possession of the beloved mother;¹ but the end of that song is death (castration). Yet what is this, after all, but the version reduced to its simplest terms of the story told over and over again of the mother-deities who, like Hecate and Brimo and Nemesis and Praxidike, bring terror and doom and punishment in their train, or whom, like Demeter and Aphrodite and Rhea-Cybele, to love (as it is in their case still more explicitly stated) is to suffer death or castration? For there was Adonis—himself born of the incestuous love of Myrrha for her father with which Aphrodite had smitten her—who was the lover of Aphrodite, and who was killed by a boar sent by Artemis or by Ares, or by Ares himself disguised as a boar.² Another version of the selfsame story, and a more explicit one, is that of the love of Anchises, father of Æneas, for Aphrodite; for here we have not death as the consequence of this love, but castration, for in the so called Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite, Anchises, after he discovers who his mistress is (*cf.* the Ædipus saga), is much afraid that he will become "strengthless"; for revealing the goddess's secret, it may be added, he was subsequently smitten by a thunderbolt—as was the mortal, Iasion, at least in the Homeric story, who lay with Demeter in a thrice-plowed field. In later versions of the story, Iasion was a great sinner who tried to violate the goddess and was struck down by Zeus. And there was Attis, one of the many son-heroes to be exposed at birth and brought up by an animal as a foster-parent (in this case a goat), who was loved by the great Asiatic mother-goddess, Cybele—herself bisexual until the gods by surgical means reduced her to a female(!). Out of jealousy over his projected marriage she drove him mad, so that he castrated himself and died. But—and here emerges the theme of the denial of and reassurance against castration, which is a long chapter in itself—she repented of her harshness, and Zeus

¹ The Promised Land was a similar symbol—Reik, Th.: *Ritual: Psycho-analytic Studies*, New York, n.d.; p. 157.

² As Reik has pointed out, this is an exact parallel of the killing by the totem-animal, the father, in initiation ceremonies (*loc. cit.*, p. 158). And *cf.* Róheim (*Animism, Magic, etc.*, p. 213) on the identity of the boar with the father.

granted her prayer that the body of Attis should never decay, the little finger should continue to move and the hair to grow.¹

With these mighty mother-deities, whose conception is at the same time so regularly bound up with ideas of death and retribution, whose lovers (where these take on individual form) are so clearly son-figures, while their love has as its inevitable consequence death and castration—with these divinities we complete the circle and are back with the Sirens again. From the origin and genealogy of the latter, their attributes and the attributes of their less seductive and more fearsome sister-beings, their sexual connotations and their definite points of contact with the oedipus situation, on the one hand, and from the striking circumstance that, on the other hand, they embody the identical conjunction of longing and fear, of desire and dread, of love and death, of love and castration, as do the great mother-deities and queens of heaven who have ruled men's imagination—from all this we may surely conclude that the Siren is none other than the beloved and incestuously desired mother. It is she, the creation of infantile fantasy, who is the Siren—the Siren whose all but unconquerable lure brings death (castration) in its train, yet whose voice nevertheless, "whether a man sail by or stay to hearken, still sings on".

¹ In the case of Orpheus, a most outstanding son-god, the Mænads who decapitated and dismembered him also repented of their act, which again was actuated by jealousy, since Orpheus after the loss of Eurydice had turned away from all women, in the same way (and for the same psychological reason) as Jesus had said, "Woman, what have I to do with thee?" We have in this instance too a denial of castration in the fact (among others) that the severed head of Orpheus lived on—at least, when it was found some days later, "it was still singing".—The other aspect of the ambivalent incest situation is seen in the story of Orpheus's descent into the underworld to rescue Eurydice his wife (mother); as in many a similar tale throughout the world, he lost her because of breaking a taboo. So too did Pygmalion bring to life the statue—Pygmalion being a Cypriote synonym for Adonis, and the image which he loved and brought to life definitely identifiable as Aphrodite herself (Farnell: *loc. cit.*, vol. II, p. 651).

BODY SYMBOLIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE

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Pavlov has proved that no new reflex can be conditioned in a satiated animal, and that therefore all processes of learning depend upon the existence of a state of craving. Approaching the problem from another angle and by another method, psychoanalysis made the same discovery, proving that the acquisition of new knowledge depends upon the existence of a state of instinctual tension and deprivation. Since in infancy and childhood cravings arise in body tensions, it is inevitable that the child's thought world should begin with his body, and that his first concepts must deal with the parts, the products, the needs and the feelings of the body. In order to understand the growth of language one must observe closely what the child wants, what parts of the body become involved in the process of wanting, and ultimately how he learns to speak and think of the different parts of the body and of the desires and feelings associated with them.

These considerations may seem banal; yet they are far-reaching in their significance. Since the child's world begins inevitably with his body, and since the force which instigates the child to expand his knowledge is always the pressure of bodily desires, and since every new fact of experience which enters into psychic life can make its entrance only by relating itself to that which is already present, it follows that every new fact apperceived by the child must somehow relate itself to bodily things. Schematically the process can be represented as follows:

A.....	A'.....	A''.....etc.
(Body concepts)	(New data of the first order, related to A directly.)	(New data of the second order, related to A' directly, but to A only through the mediation of A'.)

If this represents with any degree of fidelity the process of expanding knowledge, it must also represent the process of expanding speech. It means that there is at first a long period in which concepts are vague, broad and overlapping; and that with advancing years these concepts become discrete and distinct. Schematically again one might represent the situation as in Figure 1. Therefore it is not surprising to find that in




FIGURE 1.

sleep, in a state of semidozing, and in delirium, we drop back from our topmost level of development, I, at which all concepts are completely separate one from another, to lower levels of imagery such as II, III, or IV, in which ideas and their related feelings fuse and interact. It is also clear then that some of the energy infusing speech derives not from level I alone, but from deeper, broader, more inclusive meanings.

In this paper I shall present a group of naïve and spontaneous examples of this type of "symbolic" language from children

and from patients. There are several reasons for seeking examples of this process in the speech and behavior of very young children. In the first place, under the conditions of modern education, the young child is becoming more articulate about his fantasies than was true in the past. We hesitate to check a child's naïve fantastic production, we are less heedless of what he is trying to express through these fantasies, and we no longer feel impelled to correct him at once with considerations of reality before making an effort to understand him. (It may be, of course, that modern educational methods err by going too far in this direction. Experience alone will settle that; but in the meantime one may profit by current errors to the extent of studying these childhood fantasies.) There is one further advantage to be derived from beginning with the spontaneous and naïve productions of childhood, namely, that by so doing one subjects to a fairly critical test many of the psychoanalytic interpretations of adult speech, dreams, and symptoms. If in earliest childhood one finds examples of the naïve use of similar symbolizations, where the interpretation is self-evident, and where the possibility of adult suggestion is excluded, it has the value of evidence in support of the psychoanalytic position.

In the following examples we shall meet one surprising fact. It will appear that children, at least in some phases, seem to develop certain individual and characteristic kinds of body-language. One child, for instance, for a time consistently used articles of furniture, familiar household shapes, buildings, etc., as representatives of the body; another child used clothing; a third child used animals. Still a fourth used machinery. We are not yet in a position to say whether this represents different stages of instinctual development, different age periods, the influence of sex, the effects of special interests on the part of the parents, or whether it correlates with different types of personality development, or with different neurotic structures. We can only record the observation tentatively and pose the problem for further investigation.

Let us turn to a very simple example: A little boy of seven, on a picnic in the woods, has a bowel movement which stands

up straight on end in the underbrush. Pointing to it with evident amusement and satisfaction, he says, "Look, I made the Chrysler Building." One can share in his little joke without feeling that the analogy is too "far-fetched" or surprising. But then one asks whether such a joke uttered by a naïve child provides any hint as to what may be meant when a man in soberer and politer years dreams of making a tall building. Of course, it must not be overlooked that this is only *one* of the possible meanings of such a dream element. The same little boy, three years before, had made drawings to represent each day of the week. One day would be a "black slide", another day would be an oven, and so on,—each day being represented by some form or shape, mostly suggesting familiar household objects. This is a very complex type of fantasy, evidently related to its source only by a series of intervening steps which in the absence of careful analysis could not be made clear.

Another more complex, and more surprising, bit of symbolic speech and behavior was found in a girl of three and a half, who consistently used little animals as her idiom. The child had been reporting to her nurse and mother repeated dreams of a little mouse that got into her bed and tried to nip her. There had been no evidence of anxiety during the night, no undue restlessness, and no waking in terror as from a nightmare. The child's report, however, was uneasy, as though given half in jest and half in pursuit of reassurance. The little girl had frequently seen her older brother in his bath and had shown a direct interest in his body and in the difference between his genitals and her own. One morning, however, she burst into her parents' bedroom, just as her father emerged naked from the tub. She marched directly up to him and stared at his genital with unembarrassed attention for at least a minute. She then heaved a little sigh, smiled, and looked off thoughtfully into the distance with an arresting expression—which made her father ask, "What are you thinking of?" To this the child replied airily, "Oh, I was just looking at a little mouse." Here it seems an inescapable conclusion that the

child was using both the image and the word-symbol for a mouse interchangeably with the word-symbol for a penis (a word which, incidentally, she knew quite well). Of course, the substitution of a little, furry, biting animal for a part of the body has its special significance.

A further and even more surprising example of the naïve use of an animal idiom is given in the following story. The same little girl, at about the same age, is standing on her father's shoulders looking down at him as she faces him and as he looks up at her. Suddenly she crouches, and quite deliberately presses her genital region against his face, so that he has to draw his head back in order not to participate in her little seduction. As he smiles up at her silently she suddenly says, "Would you like to see me naked?" The father parries with the counter question, "Why? Would you like me to?" to which the child replies, "Yes, but not when I'm asleep." Then to the amazement of her father, she slides swiftly down to the ground and says, "*Come, let's play you're a snake.*" Here, perhaps, one is on more debatable ground; and yet the quick sequence of ideas, speech, and action almost makes one suspect that this three-year-old infant had been reading the text books. First there is the deliberate genital approach to the father; then the fantasy of exhibiting her body; then the faint flurry of anxiety as to what dangerous things might occur if this happened in her sleep; and the final resolution in a game in which the paternal partner of all of this play of instinctual trend is to assume the classical rôle of a snake.

To these anxiety laden fantasies one finds a sharp contrast in those of a little girl of five, whose habitual idiom was to a rather striking extent a language of clothing. It was characteristic of this child, for instance, that in her effort to solve the problem of the penis, she would put little pieces of chalk inside the trousers of her dolls in order to convert them into boys, and insisted on pinning a safety-pin to the front of her little shirt as a "pretend" substitute for the lacking organ. She called the pin her penis. (At her home psychoanalysis was held in highly critical doubt and any active suggestions to the

child were scrupulously avoided.) This child had broken a shoe lace, and took a new lace and a shoe to her father so that he could replace the broken one. The repair completed, she moved reflectively into a room where her mother sat, and said to her, "Daddy took the shoe lace and put it in and out of my little hole, in and out, in and out." Since this was a term which the child ordinarily used to describe her urinary orifice, her mother looked up sharply and said, "What?" To which the child replied, indulgently, "Oh, I meant in and out of the little holes in my shoe."¹ Then she was silent for a moment and breathed a deep sigh, "I wish I were married." Here again one faces a perplexing phenomenon, the use by the child of such "far-fetched" objects as a shoe, a shoe lace, and the holes in the shoe to represent her concept of genital reproductive functions, and a thinly disguised fantasy of intercourse with her father. Again one must confess that how such symbolic representations are laid down, is, up to the present time, a mystery. That it cannot rest, to any very large extent, upon the basis of racial imprints of old experience, is proved by the fact that so often the objects used are shoes, automobiles, airplanes and the like, whose racial history can hardly be said to be a lengthy one.

The fourth child cited above is the only son of an artist. In the atmosphere and daily life of his home machinery plays a negligible rôle; yet in the child's fantasies machinery is used rather strikingly to represent the body and its functions. At four this child had never had contact either with newborn babies or newborn animals. He had, however, asked the usual questions as to their origin. He was playing with an automobile jack one day, busily unscrewing all the bolts and taking it apart. His father came upon the scene and remonstrated, saying, "I wouldn't do that if I were you. You'll spoil it." Whereupon the child became quite excited, and protested, "No, Dad, no. I've got to. You see, if I can get way down into this hole, I will find a baby."

¹ Obscene jokes often use this method of simple emphasis upon an innocent word, thus attending to its sexual significance.

A year later the child was in a drawing class, in which the teacher was wont to call on the children for ideas before they sat down to draw. The youngster shouted out, "I've got an idea, Miss X.—It's night, a black, black night. There are two engines—on the same track—with great *big* headlights. They rush at each other and there's a wreck. I am going to draw a train wreck." "All right, Johnnie", said the teacher, "Go ahead." A few minutes later she strolled over to see the picture of the railroad wreck in the black night, and found that the child had drawn a *man and a woman*.

Food can also become for the child a representative of his bodily problems. There is, for instance, the case of the youngster of four who came to discuss a certain matter with her mother. She said that after she had touched her anal orifice, her finger smelled like chocolate. Here it is less surprising that the child had made a connection in her mind between *fæces* and chocolate, on the basis of general appearance, color, suspected consistency and the like, than that the child distorted her real sensory impression and converted the actual odor from the anal orifice to conform to her preconceived expectation, namely, the smell of chocolate. She repressed, or denied to herself what she actually smelled, and in a sense hallucinated the expected smell. On this basis it is not difficult to understand how that child, when a trifle older, a little wiser in the ways of the world and a little more sensitive to the world's disgust, might reverse the process and refuse to eat chocolate because of the relationship which she had built up in her mind between chocolate and *fæces*; and this even if, in the meantime, the connection had been rendered unconscious.

A colleague of mine actually had an opportunity to watch the development of a transient food-phobia in a boy of six. The birth of a baby had led this child to ask insistent questions, in answer to which he had been told that a child was carried within the mother's body, and that it grew there as a result of the implantation of a "seed". Not very long after this the child was eating fresh peas, to which were attached unusually long points of implantation. After examining these with

interest, the child turned to its nurse and said, "What are these?" The nurse replied, "They are seeds." The child looked startled, gulped once or twice, pushed his plate away, and for several months thereafter could not be induced to eat peas at all. An amusing contrast to this is a three-and-a-half-year old girl, who ate grapes, and with each mouthful said proudly, "I eat the seeds, I like them." After repeating this boastfully several times, the child grew rather reflective, then suddenly turned to her father on whose knee she was sitting and said, "Aren't these the kind of seeds that Aunt Jane uses to make babies?" Here again one faces the child's persistent notion that conception occurs by the ingestion of something through the mouth, although in response to direct questions this had already been specifically denied. Nor again is it difficult to picture this child at a later date refusing food on the basis of conscious or unconscious fears of pregnancy, just as she, at this early and more fearless age, dramatized her desire to have a baby by proudly swallowing the grape seeds.

These examples may stand alone as evidence that the indirect representation of those parts of the body which are connected with our emotional and vegetative functions occurs exceedingly early in the formation of language in the growing child. It would seem that the sharp focus and definition of concepts and of words is something which develops only later in life; that in the early years concepts, images, words and feelings overlap to an extraordinary extent, and become separated into independent entities only with advancing years. In the schematic diagram already shown (Figure 1,) the bases of the triangles represent overlapping conceptual and verbal units with their concurrent emotional charges. With advancing years these units become more and more clearly defined; but in sleep and under stress in the neuroses and psychoses it is easy to see how the less isolated conceptual units of childhood are brought into play. Furthermore they stand as a fringe and background tonus behind all conscious adult thought and feeling—and it is into that well that one dips with the analytic technique of free association.

It is worth while pointing out that from nonanalytical sources somewhat similar conclusions have been forced upon most critical and objective observers. For instance, Piaget, on page 127 of his book, *The Language and Thought of the Child* (1), describes a phenomenon which he calls "verbal syncretism", and in his description recognizes the use of symbolism in the speech of a child, that is, the use of apparently arbitrary imagery and loose analogy.

Occasionally it falls to the lot of some observer to be presented with a ready-made experiment. In the observations on very young children this opportunity comes not infrequently. As the years go on, however, with the sharper definition of thought, feeling and concept, the opportunities become rare, and the example which proves the case becomes correspondingly more valuable. Such an opportunity occurred during the illness of a patient in the Henry Phipps Psychiatric Clinic of the Johns Hopkins Hospital in 1921. The patient was a gifted and attractive young woman of eighteen, in some ways unusually naïve, and formally educated according to quite old-fashioned ideas. She had literally never heard the name of Freud. Despite her conventional background, however, she had been subjected to certain very disturbing influences through the fact that her father, an alcoholic, on rare occasions had made erotic advances to his wife in the presence of the children, and through the fact that her brother had manic-depressive spells, in which he was sexually exhibitionistic. The patient's illness was a mild depression, which had been precipitated by her first proposal of marriage. Not long after her admission to the hospital she had a nightmare which was as disturbing to her as it was interesting to the physician. The dream was that she was walking along a narrow street whose high, grey buildings converged at one end. Suddenly an airplane appeared overhead and began to shower her with bombs. She repeated twice that it was a "funny looking airplane". In the airplane was a man whom she later recognized as her brother. In terror she ran up the narrowing street, and finally hid in a box at the end of it—a box which she again charac-

terized as a "funny looking box". The emphasis which she laid upon the peculiar appearance of the airplane and the box led her physician to ask her to draw them. She began by making a long oblong shaft from the upper right-hand corner of the page. This, she said, was the fuselage of the airplane. Then as she looked at it, she said, "Oh, I know what was funny about it—the wings were round", and she proceeded to draw two circles at the upper end of this oblong. Then she added, "Oh, yes, the propeller was here in the rear", and she made a blur of scribbled lines at the rear of the plane. When completed, the drawing was an unmistakable phallus with testicles and pubic hair. The patient's repressive mechanism was so strong, however, that her own drawing excited no comments from her and no recognition. Nothing was said to her except to ask her to draw the box. This she did in the lower left hand corner of the page, in the direction towards which the plane was pointing. She drew a triangular box, then hesitated a moment, and said, "Oh yes, and up here at the base was a funny little bit of a cover that didn't cover the whole box." Again she failed to realize that she had drawn the vaginal orifice with a clitoris. The completed drawing is shown in Figure 2. It is worth stressing that although when she had finished these drawings she still did not realize their nature. When shown the same drawings several months later, without any intervening interpretation, she recognized them at once. Not only had she dreamed of sexual objects in this form, but of sexual practices, as an attack, a showering with bombs (semen?), from which she retreats by going back inside a vagina—the box. Beside this dream one might place that of another patient who dreamed that he was about to take his first flight in an airplane; but just as the machine was about to leave the ground he awoke having a spontaneous seminal emission.

A third patient, a woman physician, while talking in the analytic session, suddenly had an image before her eyes of a penis and testicles—but as she spoke of this, they turned first

into a cannon on wheels, and then into a large scissors—i.e., the phallus became first a shooting and then a cutting weapon.

The next example concerns a young woman of seventeen, who was first seen in a mild elation, which necessitated her being sent to Bloomingdale Hospital. Before going to the hospital during one of several visits to the office, she rehearsed with rapid, flighty excitement and resentment a whole series




FIGURE 2.

of minor injuries to which she had been subjected in childhood—cuts, sprains and bruises, an accident in which her brothers accidentally broke her collar-bone at five, and finally a tonsillectomy at eight or nine. In a final burst of exasperation, she said, "*They took my tonsils out in the worst PLACE possible*", and then, correcting herself, said, "I mean in the worst *way* possible". Several months later, after her discharge from the hospital, recovered from her elation but in a mild depressive swing, she returned to the problem of early injuries, referring slowly and thoughtfully to the same series of accidents and operations. This time the meaning of her slip, and the significance which somehow or other had become attached to this tonsillectomy was made clear by the sequence of her

thoughts over a series of days of analytic work. In the first place, her earliest years had been filled with an unhappy craving to have been born a boy like her two older brothers. Boys, she said, were her ideals; and as she said this, she described an image of an airplane taking off into the air; and a moment later she visualized a sudden image of a tiny ear of corn. The next day she brought an array of memories of childhood games of playing doctor, the game consisting always of a series of operations with knives, followed by the placing of bandages on the body, the chest and the arms. Two days later she gave a still fuller account of the tonsillectomy at the age of eight, with details of the inadequate warning and preparation which had been given her, of her final paroxysm of blind terror, and her sense of betrayal by her father. In the succeeding days of analysis she provided further data on her sense of injury in childhood, and the feeling that women in general are an injured lot. There were vivid memories of a wounded toad, and of a doddering old man who was an invalid. Then, finally, after another interval, the entire story of the tonsillectomy in its final form came through. It seems that she either had the actual experience or a dreamlike fantasy of seeing her tonsils immediately after the operation. She asked if they were not like little round red balls, about the size of olives, and if they were not like the material which is *underneath* the tongue. She added that she thought she had seen the hand of a man in a white coat holding these round, red balls like olives, or like scooped-out pieces of watermelon, on a piece of gauze. Linked to it was a memory of her uncle, who was a physician, of how she kicked, of someone holding her legs down, and of terror almost to the point of desperation. Suddenly as she recounted these thoughts she broke off and said, "I just had a very disgusting thought—a disgusting name for a man's organs is balls. I thought of these, too, but I didn't want to mention them." We see, therefore, a long series of minor childhood injuries and accidents built into a fantasy of the damage that women suffer at the hands of men, and culminating in a tonsillectomy which in turn is linked directly

to the idea of literal castration. Furthermore it is significant that this idea of castration contained the picture of two round red balls which were thought of as testicles and yet were made from material from *underneath* the tongue, so that the tongue takes its classical place as a representative of the phallus.

Again it is needless to say that one faces a perplexing phenomenon when one tries to understand how in this young woman's mind, totally unschooled or undirected into psycho-analytic ways of thinking or interpretation, such a spontaneous production of castration imagery in response to an experience of a tonsillectomy can have occurred. And yet, that it occurred is evident. (It should be stated that the young woman was undergoing analysis in a mild depressive swing in the hope that the analytic experience might forestall further episodes of elation or depression. The material just presented appeared spontaneously in her free associations during the course of the first two weeks of analysis, before interpretations of any kind had been offered her.)

Not long ago an opportunity occurred to observe a bodily dramatization of the same problem, again in a manner which left no room for doubt as to the interpretation of the phenomenon, although in this case not a word was spoken. It was necessary to perform a lumbar puncture on a young man of twenty-six. Some years earlier this young man had been subjected to the same procedure, and at the time had suffered intense pain. As a result, he was excessively apprehensive, and consented to the lumbar puncture only on condition that it be performed under a general anæsthetic. He was admitted to the Neurological Institute and the lumbar puncture was made under nitrous oxide-oxygen anæsthesia. As the equipment was wheeled into his room his terror mounted visibly, and he began to do a rather peculiar thing: although normally modest, despite the presence of the nurses he made quick impulsive gestures which would repeatedly expose his genitals. Then, to our amazement, as he began to be affected by the anæsthetic, but before he was completely relaxed, he did exactly the reverse: that is, he reached out for all the bedclothes that he

could grasp, for his bathrobe, for a pillow, for anything which his groping hands chanced to touch, and piled a protecting mountain of clothes and bedding over his genitals.

Again the question arises why an attack directed against one part of the body is deflected in the patient's mind in such a way that it apparently represents to him an attack upon his genitalia. Such a deflection seems extraordinarily uneconomical from the point of view of psychological tension and peace of mind. Without entering into a discussion of this problem, it is worth stressing that its solution may lie close to the heart of the problem of anxiety and its genesis.

The phenomenon of "displacement upward from below" is only a special instance of this phenomenon; and it might be better to speak of centrifugal and centripetal displacements, that is, of displacements away from or towards the instinctual zones. That displacement can occur in both directions is clear. The displacement centrifugally is readily explained, because it can be employed so readily to lessen tension and anxiety; but the occurrence of centripetal displacement, with its inevitable increase in anxiety, is a perplexing phenomenon.

SUMMARY

I. The basis for the symbolic representation of the body:—
1. The growth of knowledge and the growth of language depend upon states of instinctual tension in the infant and child.—2. This tension is a body function.—3. The first learning therefore concerns itself almost entirely with bodily things, the child learns the parts, the products, the needs and feelings of the body, and so on.—4. All new knowledge must relate itself automatically to that already known.—5. Therefore all new knowledge must have special points of reference to bodily things.—6. Therefore as the outside world is apperceived, each new unit comes to have special significance with relation to various parts of the body,—i.e., representing parts of the body by analogy, at first consciously and later unconsciously.—7. This "body language" is used freely in early childhood, but later in

life occurs chiefly in dreams, in dozing states, in delirious reactions, and in symptom productions.

II. The examples given indicate that the indirect or symbolic representation of the body can be classified into two general types. There is one large group of representative objects which are drawn from the outside world: household objects and buildings, animals, machinery of various kinds, clothing, food, and so on. There is a suggestion that the type of symbol used may be correlated with different types of personality development, or with different neurotic structures. At any rate it is clear that this representation of the body by external objects is linked to the process of projection, and to the externalization of internal problems in the psychoses and psychoneuroses.

The second main form of representation is that in which one part of the body is substituted for another part of the body; and this can occur in either of two directions. Under certain conditions those parts of the body which are relatively slightly involved in any direct expression of instinctual yearnings can be substituted for parts of the body which are more intimately connected with emotional drives. And contrariwise, the opposite can occur; that is, those parts of the body which are directly involved in instinctual need and expression, may be substituted for the more indifferent zones of the body. In other words, the translation can be made either towards the instinctual zone or away from it. It is clear that in this translation of experience and feeling from one part of the body to another, one approaches closely the problem of anxiety, hysteria, and hypochondriasis.

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A CRITICAL CONSIDERATION OF BERNFELD AND FEITELBERG'S THEORY OF PSYCHIC ENERGY

BY WILLIAM J. SPRING (NEW YORK)

The theory of Bernfeld and Feitelberg is an attempt to apply to psychic phenomena the concept of energy, as it is used in physics. It is necessary to preface a consideration of this theory with a brief review of certain concepts in physics.

Quantities of energy may be expressed as the product of two factors, an intensity factor and a capacity factor. A good example would be the energy contained in a volume of gas under pressure. This would be expressed as the product of the pressure (intensity factor) and the volume (capacity factor). Another example would be that of heat. The total heat (energy) contained in a body would be the product of its temperature (intensity factor) and its thermal capacity (capacity factor). Thermal capacity is that quantity which, expressed in terms of unit volume, is called specific heat. The intensity factor is always the one which determines the direction in which energy will flow. Thus heat flows from a region of higher temperature to one of lower temperature and the pressure of a volume of gas can be used to compress other volumes of gas only if the latter are at a lower pressure originally.¹ The law which states that energy flows only from regions of higher intensity to regions of lower intensity is called the second law of thermodynamics.²

The theory of Bernfeld and Feitelberg is an attempt to explain psychological phenomena in terms of displacements of energy, in the sense in which that word is used in physics.

¹ Strictly speaking, this is true only if intensity differences of other sorts, e.g., temperature differences, are excluded.

² This statement also involves an oversimplification. For further discussion of the second law of thermodynamics see below.

Leaving open the question whether there is a specific form of energy to be called psychic energy, the theory assumes that only a part of the energies of the cells are used for the purposes of the individual as a whole, the remainder being used by the cells for their own purposes. To clarify this point the authors use the analogy of a football team. All the individuals are doing work but only a part of their energies at any one time are available for the purposes of the team. Only part of the energy is "collectivized". Analogously only part of the energy of the cells is available for the purposes of the system individual (*System Person*), since the cell is not merely a part of the person but is itself a system which is integrated within the larger system.

This individualized (*personiert*) energy is defined as "that part of the cell energies by means of which the apparatus of the system individual carries on resistance and adaptation, that is, a quantity of energy which is given off by the cells to the individual". (1, p. 17; 3, p. 70.) Individualized energy is further described as "that part of the cell energy which is given off to the central nervous system, for the work performed by the apparatus of the system individual is performed by the central nervous system, the central apparatus as we shall call it". (1, p. 19; 3, p. 72.) Elsewhere the following definition occurs: "The energies of the system individual, with the exception of the cell energies, . . . we group together as individualized energy. . . . We have not distinguished the energies of the central apparatus terminologically from the other individualized energies. They correspond approximately to 'psychic energy' in the sense used in consciousness psychology plus the energies of the vegetative nervous system". (1, p. 63; 3, p. 116.)

The "central apparatus" is the structure which carries out the functions of the system individual using energies derived from the cells. While from these definitions the "central apparatus" would appear to be identical with the central nervous system, and in all actual examples is so used, the authors state that this identification is only tentative and approximate, that the energy of the ganglion cells need not be wholly indi-

vidualized and that the central apparatus may include for instance the endocrine system. (7, p. 414.) However, it is an essential part of the theory that the functions of the system individual, as distinguished from the functions of the cells, are carried out by a central apparatus. The authors state: "the person is made up of two spatially separate but functionally united systems, the cells and the central apparatus; or, more exactly, it is the synthetic unity of these two opposites". (1, p. 19; 3, p. 72.) According to the authors the amount of energy individualized at any one time depends not only on the total energy available in the cells but also on the task which is to be performed, which they interpret in terms of stimuli to be responded to or energy quantities from the external world which must be overcome.

The central apparatus is thought of as a system capable of containing energy, with a definite capacity and at a definite intensity. With the exception of one ambiguity to be considered below "the individualized (personalized) energy" is thought of as the energy contained in the central apparatus. Similarly the system cells (*Zellensystem*) is thought of as having a definite capacity and intensity. The individualized energy is called E_P , the energy in the cells E_C , and the energy introduced by a stimulus E_R .

In applying the theory to the phenomena of sensation the authors assume that an act of sensation consists of energy passing from the stimulus into the person. For reasons which will be discussed below the assumption is made that the alteration in cell energy, E_C , is negligible and that the energy increment all enters the central apparatus so as to increase E_P .

Fechner's law, which applies empirically to a wide range of sensory phenomena, states that the minimum change of stimulus which can be distinguished is proportional to the total stimulus. For example, if eleven grams can barely be distinguished from ten grams, 110 grams can barely be distinguished from 100. Mathematically this is expressed in Fechner's formula

$$\Delta E = k \frac{\Delta R}{R}$$

where ΔR is the barely distinguishable difference in stimulus, R is the total stimulus, ΔE is the difference in sensation between two barely distinguishable sensations and k is a constant.¹

If one assumes continuity the barely distinguishable finite differences can be replaced by infinitesimals

$$dE = k \frac{dR}{R},$$

and the equation can be integrated to give

$$E = k \log_e R + \text{constant},$$

which expresses the relation between E , the total sensation, and R the total stimulus. It will be seen that the relation is not a simple proportional one. At high stimulus values the intensity of sensation does not keep pace with increases in stimulus.

Bernfeld and Feitelberg attempt an "energetic interpretation of the Weber-Fechner law". If Fechner's E which stood for sensation is to be thought of as an amount of energy absorbed, it is clear that R , the stimulus, cannot be the energy obtained from the stimulus; otherwise the equation would contradict the law of conservation of energy. To solve this problem they undertake the consideration of the sensations produced by weights on the skin. In this case the quantity which satisfies R in the equation is obviously not the energy of the weight,

¹ It should be pointed out that Fechner's formula is not purely empirical. The experimental data can be fully expressed in the simpler formula $\Delta R = k_1 R$ (Weber's law). This however says nothing about the subjective, psychic experience of sensation. This can be introduced only by means of two assumptions: 1. That there is a quantity called sensation. Fechner calls it E (*Empfindung*). 2. That the unit of E is in all parts of the scale proportional to the smallest distinguishable difference, or: $\Delta E = k_2$. That is, in units of E , ΔE is a constant. This assumption is essentially a decision as to how the scale of E shall be divided into units. Dividing the second equation by the first one

obtains $\Delta E = \frac{k_2}{k_1} \cdot \frac{\Delta R}{R} = k \frac{\Delta R}{R}$ which is Fechner's formula. ΔE and k are in units of E , while ΔR and R are in units of R . These of course depend on the stimulus. The physical nature of E cannot be determined from this formula, only its quantitative dependence on R .

i.e., its potential energy, but the *force* with which the weight impinges upon the skin, that is the *intensity* factor of the potential energy, the *extensity* (or capacity) factor being its distance from the center of the earth.¹ By generalizing this the authors derive inductively an equation connecting the increase in individualized energy with the increase in the intensity factor of the stimulus,

$$dE_P = k \frac{dJ_R}{J_R}$$

in which J_R is the intensity factor of the stimulus.

The authors describe a hypothetical model in which increases in pressure on a gas chamber produce transfers of energy to a sphere. The relation between the quantity of energy transferred to the sphere and the increase in pressure (an intensity factor) causing it is identical with the relation between dE_P and dJ_R in the equation.

The authors then conclude: "This gives considerable reason to suspect that Weber's law is caused by those 'machine characteristics' of the organism which are similar to those of the model". (1, p. 31; 3, p. 84.) "So it is probably no accident that the coupled system which we have described in our model clearly finds its counterpart in the structure of the cell." (1, p. 32; 3, p. 85.) They refer to the nucleus and the cytoplasm. That is, the nucleus is supposed to have in the cell a function similar to that of the central apparatus in the body.

By taking account of the fact that even when no stimulus is being applied, the tactile receptors are constantly subjected to a pressure consisting of atmospheric pressure plus tissue tensions, the authors deduce an equation slightly at variance with that of Fechner. The authors claim that this equation accounts more closely for the empirical facts than does that of Fechner.

If every act of sensation brings more energy into the central apparatus, the question arises, What happens to this energy?

¹ This involves an oversimplification which, however, does not invalidate the argument.

There are several theoretical possibilities. It could be discharged in some manner, or it might remain in the central apparatus. In the latter case there are again two possibilities. Either the intensity factor might increase progressively or the capacity factor might increase. This distinction can best be made clear by an analogy. If one were to pump air continuously into a vessel the pressure (intensity factor) would increase. Such an increase of pressure could be avoided, however, by allowing the walls of the vessel to expand like a balloon, thus increasing the volume (capacity factor) instead. If the capacity factor increases adequately the additional energy can be accommodated without increasing the intensity.

This is the manner in which the authors believe the central apparatus takes care of the energy it is constantly receiving from sensation. This increase in capacity is thought of as consisting of memory traces, dispositions (*Dispositionen*), *Gestalten* or "structurization processes" (*Strukturierungsvorgänge*) in the central apparatus. The conception is "that as a result of conscious processes certain actual changes occur in the central apparatus, which effect its progressive structurization. This determines the capacity of the central apparatus, that is the extensity component of individualized energy". (1, p. 36; 3, p. 89.)

The increase in capacity, or as the authors call it "*Struktur*", is thought of as a gradual process which does not take up the energy as quickly as it enters. It is thought that for this reason sudden increments of energy from sensations first make themselves felt as increases in *intensity* which disappear only when the increase in *capacity* has had time to occur. To return to the balloon analogy, if the wall is distensible only gradually, each pump stroke will result in a momentary increase in pressure, which will return to normal when the volume of the balloon has had time to expand. It is these momentary increases in the *intensity* factor of psychic energy which are thought to be directly perceived. "Consciousness is the perception of alterations in the energy intensities in the environment and in the body. But these energies are not perceived

as such, but by the effects they have upon individualized energy, as changes in the intensity component of individualized energy." (1, p. 35; 3, p. 88.)

The authors' conception of libido is the following: There are quantities of energy, arising from the cells, which must be mastered. This "free energy" must be diminished, i.e., changed into "bound energy".

Bound energy in physicochemical systems is that energy which is at the lowest intensity of any in the system and can therefore do no work, since work is done only when energy passes from a higher intensity to a lower. In the theory of Bernfeld and Feitelberg the energy of the central apparatus is thought of as bound. The energy of the cells is at a higher intensity, otherwise it could not pass to the central apparatus. That part of it which could pass to the central apparatus is called free energy. "The free energy which is produced in the body gives an inner impulse to carry out spontaneous actions, instinctive acts. At the same time it is the energy supply with which this 'work' is done, and the inner aim of the work is to use up the free energy. With this the nature of an instinct or a libidinous striving is fully designated, with the exception of the historical character of the means of gratification." (1, p. 53; 3, p. 106.) The tendency of energy to flow from the cells to the central apparatus depends on the difference in the intensities of these two systems. This intensity difference the authors call the potential of the system. They state, "For the energy theory, . . . which for the present neglects the dynamic concept of the libido and its structural significance, libido as a magnitude of energy is equal to the potential of the individual." (1, p. 55; 3, p. 108.)¹ When the authors speak of

¹ This cannot be taken literally. The difference between two *intensities* cannot be a quantity of *energy*. The total free energy cannot be $I_C - I_P$ as this definition would indicate, but, to be consistent with the theory, would have to be $E_C - C_C \frac{E_P + E_C}{C_P + C_C}$. This free energy would lie in the cells. As soon as it became individualized by entering the central apparatus it would cease to be free.

"libidometry" it is this quantity which they hope to measure. *Pleasure* is defined as the rate of decrease of libido.

Since the majority of libidinal excitations, both conscious and unconscious, leave memory traces, i.e., in terms of the theory structural changes increasing the energy capacity of the central apparatus, the authors believe it highly probable that within the system energy travels only *toward* the central apparatus. This point, which is essential to the theory, means that in carrying out acts, the central apparatus does not *discharge* energy, but *receives* it from the cells. Motor actions are therefore thought to be caused by *centripetal* movements of energy. Energy which has once reached the central apparatus is irreversibly bound. The paradox of centrifugal motor impulses being accompanied by a centripetal transfer of energy is made more plausible by an analogy. If the tip of a heated wire is made to touch a cold body, the cooling begins at the tip and travels away from the cold body while the heat is known to travel in the opposite direction.

This conception that throughout life energy flows into the central apparatus, where it is irreversibly bound in the form of "structure" is brought in relation to the theory of the biologist Ehrenberg who regards all life processes in the cell as tending to increase "structurization" in the nucleus, a process which is also thought of as irreversible. The authors believe that if the theory is essentially correct, "the question whether libido can be measured can fundamentally, i.e. in theory, be answered in the affirmative". (1, p. 61; 3, p. 114.)

In the paper on 'The Difference of Temperature between the Brain and the Body', (4) which is called "a libidometric investigation" an attempt is made to study the differences in energy intensity between brain and body in waking life, during sleep and in narcosis. The particular type of intensity chosen was the temperature, since experimental data are available. These data show that in some cases the temperature difference is in the wrong direction, that in some experiments the temperature of the brain (which represents the central apparatus) was higher than that of the body (which represents the system

cells). But the authors state: ". . . for our problem the sign of the difference is without importance because in this case it is not the sign but it is the behavior of the difference that is decisive." (1, p. 69; 4, p. 176.) From a number of curves the authors draw the conclusion that the potential, that is, body temperature minus brain temperature (regardless of sign) rises during sleep or rest and falls during activity.

The authors conclude: "The temperature difference behaves exactly as the free energy of the system individual should behave. The free energy, as a measure of the ability of the system individual to carry on work must be reduced during work and increased during a state of rest." (1, p. 69; 4, p. 176.)

Before entering on Bernfeld and Feitelberg's discussion of the death instinct and the law of entropy it is necessary to discuss the second law of thermodynamics. This law, which states that energy flows only from regions of greater to regions of less intensity, is the only law in physics which has anything to say about the direction (in time) in which things happen. It is the only law which distinguishes between a happening and what the White Queen called an "unhappening". If a man jumps into a lake he produces waves which spread over the surface. All the kinetic energy of his fall is transmitted to the water. If one wished to describe the events, as occurring in reverse order, and to say that circular waves converged to a center and struck the swimming man so forcibly as to throw him up on to the springboard one could describe the events with perfect accuracy, obeying all physical laws—except the second law of thermodynamics. It is for this reason that Eddington called this law "Time's Arrow". (11, p. 68.)

There is another important characteristic of this law. It is not quite true. Physical science does not state that an "unhappening" of the type described could not occur; it merely states that it is extremely improbable and, moreover, that if enough details are known the probability of such an event can be calculated. This can be illustrated more clearly by a simpler example. Assume that there is a box with two compartments, one of which is a vacuum, the other containing gas under pres-

sure. If the partition is opened gas will escape into the vacuum until the pressures are equalized. This is an example of energy (in this case the kinetic energy of the gas molecules) flowing from a region of high intensity (in this case pressure) to one of low intensity. Could the reverse process occur? Could all the molecules in both chambers collect in one chamber and leave the other empty? The answer is, Yes. They could do so. If one knows the total number of molecules, their average kinetic energy, the size of the opening, etc., it is a simple matter (for a mathematician) to calculate the probability of such an occurrence. If one assumes that each molecule has an equal chance of being in either compartment the chances of their all collecting in the same compartment are equal to the chances of a man tossing heads successively as many times as there are molecules, a definite but exceedingly remote possibility.

There are numerous particular states of the system (grossly indistinguishable from each other) in which the number of molecules are about equal in the two chambers and comparatively very few in which they are all in one chamber. The latter arrangement is therefore far less probable than the former. In general the spontaneous changes occurring in systems left to themselves consist in alterations from a less probable to a more probable state.

Actual probabilities are difficult to work with and it is customary to use instead a certain function of the probability, namely, its natural logarithm. The natural logarithm of the probability of a particular state of a system is called the *entropy* of the system in that state, and the statement that systems tend to seek more probable states can be restated as the principle of entropy, namely, *entropy tends toward a maximum*. It is important to note that entropy is not a state, or a tendency or a striving, but a *number* characteristic of any state of any system. Those changes of state which are likely to occur are those in which the entropy increases.

Now as in the case of the molecules in the box, the most probable states are those in which energy intensities are equal-

ized. The second law of thermodynamics, which states that energy flows from regions of higher to regions of lower intensity, i.e., that energy intensities tend to become equalized, is therefore only another way of saying that systems tend to seek states of greater probability, i.e., greater entropy. The principle of entropy is identical with the second law of thermodynamics. By extrapolation it has been predicted that eventually all inequalities of intensity will be equalized and the world will come to a permanent rest, the so-called "heat death" (*Wärmetod*). Such a state of the universe would be a state of maximum entropy.

If it could be shown that a fundamental characteristic of psychic phenomena, such as the pleasure principle, is a special case of (i.e., could be deduced from) the second law of thermodynamics, it would be a very strong argument in favor of the mechanistic viewpoint.

In applying the concept of entropy to the two systems, cells and central apparatus, Bernfeld and Feitelberg assume that any process which results in equalizing the intensities in the two systems, that is any process in which the potential or the libido as they define it is diminished, represents an increase in entropy.

It follows from the theory that the pleasure principle is a special case of the law of entropy. For the intensity of pleasure is proportional to the rate of decrease of excitement or tension, and if the excitement and tension should be experimentally proven to be dependent on differences of energy intensity between the two systems, i.e., libido as defined above, it would follow that pleasurable processes would be those in which entropy increases. The pleasure principle would be a special case of the law of entropy.

From consideration of measurements of brain temperature the authors conclude that intensity differences increase during sleep. Rest therefore does not tend to increase entropy. During sleep, however, the system individual is not in action. In waking life when the system individual is in action the potential decreases. The authors believe therefore that

decreasing the potential, i.e., increasing entropy, is a function of the system individual. "The shunting out of the system individual (state of rest) produces an energy situation which is opposed to the principle of entropy; the function of the system therefore stands "in the service of entropy'." (1, p. 88; 5, p. 195.) The authors say: "So we reach the conception, that through the active metabolism of the cells during sleep, a considerable measure of potential difference becomes collected, which strives for diminution. The individual awakes and the energies become individualized and are decreased through the psychic work accomplished in waking life. It may be that spontaneous awakening occurs just because the potential is too great." (1, p. 89; 5, p. 196.)

The fact that the well rested person, whose potential should be high, turns toward objects and shows a "hunger for stimuli", i.e., seeks situations in which more energy will enter from without, is considered consistent with the theory, since sensory energy goes to the central apparatus and increases the intensity there. Since libido or potential consists in a difference of intensity between the cells and the central apparatus the increase in intensity in the latter tends to equalize the intensities and reduce the potential. The authors say: "Only by addition of energy can the potential be decreased." (1, p. 90; 5, p. 197.) If on the other hand the potential is low, say in a fatigued person, the energy which enters the body in sensation must remain in the cells, since its tendency to pass to the central apparatus depends on a difference of intensities, i.e., on potential. If the energy remains in the cells it increases the energy intensity in the cells and consequently increases the potential, which must cause displeasure. The authors say: "Thus it is shown that the concept of the duality of systems makes possible an interpretation of pain (*Unlust*) in terms of energy. Pain is connected with states of low potential, such as have been assumed to exist in fatigue or before falling asleep. This also agrees with experience for it is characteristic of these states that stimuli are experienced as unpleasant, and their causes (objects) are avoided." (1, p. 91; 5, p. 198.)

States of high potential are then characterized by stimulus hunger, and a turning toward objects, while states of low potential are characterized by flight from objects or narcissism.

In discussing the question whether death instinct may be considered a special case of the law of entropy the authors distinguish between death instinct in the psychological dynamic sense (as opposed to sexual instinct) and death instinct in the biological sense (as opposed to *Eros*). Death instinct in the first sense, as an instinct with definite aims and objects they prefer to call destructive instinct (*Destruktionstrieb*). For death instinct in the second sense, as a general tendency of organic matter to seek states of rest they prefer the term "Nirvana principle".

The authors consider whether dying causes an increase in the entropy of the system individual and conclude that dying can have no significance from the point of view of the system because at the moment of death the system ceases to exist. They say that from the point of view of energy theory death is "not a comprehensible concept" (1, p. 93; 5, p. 200) and therefore death instinct as an instinct, the aim of which is the process of dying, cannot be a special case of the principle of entropy. Moreover death instinct as destructive instinct with a particular means of gratification cannot be considered deducible from the law of entropy. "The gratification sought (even if physically it is an increase in the entropy of the system) is always a qualitatively definite situation historically developed, and partly conditioned by factors other than energetic ones. From the point of view of energy theory only its quantitative aspects can be significantly considered." (1, p. 96; 5, p. 203.)

But, as regards death instinct in the biological sense, the authors say, "If Freud ascribes to organic matter the tendency to strive toward stable states, to seek enduring states of rest, and calls the executor of this tendency the death instinct, the expectation does not appear unjustified that progress in biology and physiology will furnish the rigorous proof that

this tendency is the special case of the principle of entropy for organic matter."

Concerning death instinct in this sense the authors also say: "Death instinct is something 'different' from destructive instinct only if it is regarded as the biopsychic special case of the stability principle, or with more physical significance, if the word death instinct is to signify the entropy striving of all systems in nature. It would be better not to designate such a general trait of all systems as an instinct." (1, p. 96; 5, p. 203.) The authors point out however that from this viewpoint there is no room for *Eros*, since the principle of entropy can have no antagonists. *Eros*, or the tendency to form larger and larger units is specific for organic systems. "The philosophically satisfying idea of 'anti-death forces' has hardly any meaning physically and certainly none in energy theory." (1, p. 97; 5, p. 204.)

The authors add a speculation concerning the difference between destructive and sexual instinct. If the potential is not too high the system can reduce it by excluding increments of energy from the environment. Otherwise however the reduction can occur only by introducing energy from without. It is suggested that these two methods correspond respectively to narcissistic-destructive and to object libidinous behavior.

2.

While the limits of this paper do not permit a full exposition of the mathematical part of the theory, certain points must be considered.

a. The fundamental quantity E_p , is nowhere precisely defined. E_p is said to be "the individualized energy". (1, p. 22; 3, p. 75.) Individualized energy is defined as "that part of the cell energy which is given off to the central nervous system, . . . the central apparatus as we shall call it". (1, p. 19; 3, p. 72.) The following definition also occurs: "The energies of the system individual, with the exception of the

cell energies, . . . we group together as individualized energy." (1, p. 63; 3, p. 116.) Since such definitions have not the precision necessary for mathematical treatment, we are forced to derive the precise meaning of E_P from the mathematical equations in which it occurs. The "fundamental formula" is given on page 22,¹ as follows (3, p. 75):

$$dE_R = dE_P + dE_C$$

This expresses the relation between changes in the energy content of the external world, the central apparatus and the cell system. Here E_P is the total energy content of the central apparatus, and it is in this sense that E_P is used in most of the

paper. For example on page 48 (3, p. 101): $I = \frac{E_P}{N}$

and on page 42 (3, p. 95): $IdN + NdI = dE_P$

in which N is the capacity of the central apparatus and I the intensity there.

However on page 43 (3, p. 96) occurs the formula

$$E_P = k \int_{p_1}^{p_2} \frac{dp}{p}$$

which can be true only if E_P is the amount of energy entering the central apparatus as a result of the stimulus intensity increasing from p_1 to p_2 . This meaning of E_P cannot be identical with the total energy in the central apparatus. That the authors have not noticed this change of meaning is indicated by the fact that on page 44 (3, p. 97) they consider the formula

$$E_P = E_R - E_C$$

in which E_P has this second meaning, to be a solution of the problem formula

$$E_P = f(E_R, E_C)$$

in which E_P has the first meaning. If E_P means the energy in

¹ Page numbers not otherwise specified refer to Bernfeld and Feitelberg, *Energie und Trieb* (1).

the central apparatus and E_C that in the cells the formula

$$E_P = E_R - E_C \text{ or } E_R = E_P + E_C$$

would mean that the energy of the stimulus, any stimulus, must be equal to the sum of the energies in the central apparatus and in the cells, which is absurd.

b. On page 23 (3, p. 76) the assumption is made that in the act of sensation, the change in the energy content of the cells is negligible. By this means the "fundamental formula"

$$dE_R = dE_P + dE_C$$

which is derived from the law of conservation of energy, is shortened to

$$dE_R = dE_P$$

Since there is no way of estimating the order of magnitude of the sensory cell energies and comparing them with the magnitudes of stimulus energies, which in many cases at least must be very small, this is a pure assumption. It says that in an act of sensation practically all the energy from the stimulus goes to the central apparatus. Upon this assumption rests the possibility of measuring E_P in units of physical energy, for E_R is the only one of the energy quantities which could be measured directly in such units. Since the whole claim of the theory to offer a possibility of measuring libido rests on the measurability of E_P (or of changes in it) the assumption that dE_C is negligible is very important for the theory.

However, the authors do not maintain this assumption consistently. In their speculative explanation of narcissistic flight from stimuli they assume that when the "potential" is low energy from sensation remains in the cells and increases the potential rather than going to the central apparatus and decreasing it. If this is possible, dE_C cannot be negligible and the possibility of measuring E_P (or changes in it) in units of physical energy is destroyed and with it the prospect of "libidometry".

c. Using the assumption that in the act of sensation alterations in cell energies are negligible, that is that $dE_C = 0$, the

authors offer the following proof that E_P is measurable (1, p. 48; 3, p. 101):

$$I = \frac{E_P}{N} \text{ }^1$$

Now since:

$$dE_P = dE_R$$

$$I = \frac{E_R}{N}$$

E_R and consequently E_P can be expressed in any chosen units of physical energy."

The authors have here committed the elementary mathematical error of neglecting the constant of integration. If $dE_P = dE_R$ it does not follow that $E_P = E_R$, only that $E_P = E_R + C$. The absurdity of equating E_P (in this sense) with E_R can be shown by expressing the equation in physical rather than mathematical terms. It states that the total energy in the central apparatus is equal to the energy introduced in any particular stimulus. Yet the possibility of measuring or expressing E_P in units of physical energy depends on its being equal to E_R which can be so measured.

d. The claim that the theory offers a prospect of enabling one to measure libido, a claim which the authors take seriously enough to speak of their study of temperature differences as a "libidometric investigation", is based on the following reasoning (1, p. 63; 3, p. 116):

"If libido (potential) be designated by the magnitude H , it follows that the rate of diminution of this quantity is:

$$-dH = dE_P \text{ }^2$$

Since changes in E_P are measurable, $-dH$ can be determined. It is true that only the intensity in the central apparatus is accessible to direct measurement. Still the desired alteration of libido may be calculated from it.

$$-dH = NdI$$

¹ Where I and N are respectively the intensity and the capacity of E_P . E_P is here used in the first sense, that of the total energy in the central apparatus.

² Strictly this should be $-dH = \frac{C_G}{C_P + C_G} dE_P$, derived by differentiating the formula in the footnote on page 451. (Footnote mine.)

or, the libido

$$\int dH = -N \int dI \quad "$$

Even if one assumes as the authors do that I or dI can be measured, and that N can be known (the authors nowhere suggest any independent means of determining N , the capacity of the central apparatus),¹ such a formula could never offer a means of measuring the libido, H , since there would be no means of eliminating the constant of integration. One would be left with

$$H = -N \int dI + C$$

The statement (*1*, p. 63; *3*, p. 116) that the intensity in the central apparatus is accessible to direct measurement has nothing to support it. In the discussion of the Weber-Fechner law it is assumed that changes in I_P are what are directly perceived as intensity of sensation, but nowhere in the paper is any method suggested whereby it may be measured, i.e., assigned a numerical value. Libido is therefore expressed as a function of three numerically indeterminate quantities, N , I , and C . Only one of these, C , can be eliminated if one wishes to measure not libido, but rate of diminution of libido, i.e., pleasure.

There are several other mathematical errors of less importance:

e. On page 39 (*3*, p. 92) appears the formula

$$(2a) \quad I_P C_P = I_R C_R - I_C C_C$$

which is said to be a restatement of the "fundamental formula", taking account of intensity and capacity factors. The "fundamental formula" however is

$$dE_P = dE_R - dE_C \quad (1, p. 22; 3, p. 75)$$

Formula 2a could not be derived from it, but only from

$$E_P = E_R - E_C$$

This mistake has no serious consequences, however, since no use is made of the formula which is derived from 2a.

¹ The only method suggested (*1*, p. 48, *3*, p. 101) depends on the measurability of I .

f. On page 43 (3, p. 96) is the formula

$$(1) \quad E_P = k \int_{p_1}^{p_2} \frac{dp}{p}$$

in which p is the intensity of the stimulus, the definite value p_1 being the "normal" intensity to which the system is exposed when no stimulus is applied. In the case of a pressure stimulus p_1 would be the atmospheric pressure. p_2 would be the pressure of the applied stimulus. E_P , expressed in this way as a definite integral means the increase in individualized energy which occurs when the greater stimulus intensity is added to the "normal" intensity. The function $\frac{dp}{p}$ is derived from Fechner. The argument continues.¹

$$(2) \quad E_R = f(p)$$

$$\text{and } (3) \quad dE_R = f'(p)dp$$

The next step

$$(4) \quad E_P = \int_{p_1}^{p_2} f'(p)dp$$

follows only if $E_R = E_P$, a condition which is true if E_P is used in the second sense (see section *a*, page 458 of the present article) and if the energy remaining in the cells is negligible.

It follows that

$$(5) \quad E_P = f(p_2) - f(p_1)$$

In the attempt to discover the physical meaning of this expression the authors say: "One is tempted to equate $f(p_1)$ in this expression with the energy of the cell (which is constant, since p_1 also has a constant value, and since it is the cell on which p_1 acts directly, i.e., which is in equilibrium with p , . . .). Since $f(p_2)$ is without question equal to E_R which is wholly transmitted to the individual, one may substitute

$$E_C = f(p_1)$$

$$E_R = f(p_2)$$

¹ In the following argument the equations are quoted from Bernfeld and Feitelberg, but the discussion is mine.

and as a solution to the equation $E_P = f(E_R, E_C)$ we would have $E_P = E_R - E_C$." (1, p. 44; 3, p. 97.)

Aside from the fact that E_P in the "solution" is used in a different sense from that in the problem formula (see above) there are several errors in this derivation.

The assumption that $f(p_1) = E_C$ because the cells are in equilibrium with p_1 is based on the false assumption that equilibrium indicates equal energies instead of equal intensities. Moreover if E_R is the energy put into the system when $p = p_2$, according to equation (2), then at $p = p_1$ when no energy enters the system E_R must equal 0, but according to equation (2) when $p = p_1$, $E_R = f(p_1)$ it follows that $f(p_1) = 0$ and the assumption that $f(p_1) =$ the energy of the cells is absurd. With this correction the final equation should read $E_P = E_R$ which is nothing new since it was tacitly assumed when equation (4) was set up.

3.

In the consideration of any theory the greatest importance must be ascribed to those parts which can be verified experimentally. The experimental approaches suggested by the authors are of two types, psychophysical experiments on sensation related to the "energy interpretation of the Weber-Fechner law", and the attempt to approach "libidometry" more directly in terms of measurements of brain and body temperatures.

a. Let us consider the second of these approaches first. In a paper on temperature differences between brain and body (4) the authors seek an experimental approach to the concept of intensity differences between cells and central apparatus and hence to their concept of libido. They study the variation, in states of fatigue, rest, work and sleep, of the quantity obtained by subtracting the brain temperature from the body temperature. They conclude that this temperature difference behaves exactly as the "free energy", i.e., the libido, might be expected to behave. It increases during rest and decreases during work. The fact that from the data this difference at times takes nega-

tive values, which the free energy cannot, is not considered a serious objection to such an interpretation, since in the living organism "transportation of energy from a colder to a warmer part of the system could be brought about by the most various arrangements". (1, p. 68; 4, p. 175.)

It is difficult to discuss any direct experimental approach to the concept of intensity for the reason that "the energy intensity" as such has no physical meaning. There are intensity factors such as force, tension, pressure, temperature, electrical potential, etc., but "the intensity" has no meaning until the particular type of energy under discussion is known. The experiments quoted by Bernfeld and Feitelberg have no relation to their theory unless it is assumed that temperature is in some way a measure of "the intensity of psychic energy". If this assumption is true, the fact that sometimes the brain temperature is higher than that of the body presents a serious difficulty not to be eliminated by an *ad hoc* assumption that in the body energy can be transported from a colder to a warmer part of the system. Such an occurrence would violate the second law of thermodynamics unless elsewhere in the system there were a compensating flow of energy from a region of high intensity to one of lower intensity. The necessity for assuming such an unknown process would so complicate the theory that any intelligible discussion of entropy would be impossible.

Moreover in the data published by Bernfeld and Feitelberg the quantity obtained by subtracting the brain temperature from that of the body does not always vary as the "free energy" or libido might be expected to. In morphine sleep it falls, and in chloroform narcosis it rises as in normal sleep. It is a commonplace of medical practice that chloroform narcosis is exhausting and morphine sleep restful.

b. An experimental approach which can be discussed with greater precision is that derived from the interpretation of the Weber-Fechner law. On page 45 (3, p. 98) there occurs a modification of this law, which the authors believe accounts for the experimental data more accurately than does Fechner's.

This is considered by the authors an important corroboration of their theory. "The complete agreement of our correction of Fechner's measurement formula, which was arrived at theoretically, with empirical fact answers affirmatively the question raised above: in principle a physically adequate measurement formula can be obtained from Fechner's measurement formula, so that the way is open to the discovery of a universal unit of measurement for individualized energy." (1, p. 48; 3, p. 101.) On page 62 (3, p. 115) it is considered evidence in favor of the theory "that from it are theoretically derived those corrections of the Fechner formula which up to the present were known as empirically discovered formulations of the facts". "From the straight line which corresponds to our formula the threshold can be determined. Its value is 0.7g, which agrees with sufficient accuracy with experience." (1, p. 46; 3, p. 99.)

In examining the validity of this claim one may raise two questions. Is the curve which has proven empirically more accurate a logical consequence of the theory; and if so, what part of the theory receives support from this fact?

To take the first question first: it is no wonder that the threshold value obtained from Hoeber's curve agrees with experience, since Hoeber's curve is derived, not from Bernfeld and Feitelberg's formula, but from empirical data. The authors claim that Hoeber's curve "corresponds" to their formula. This formula is

$$(1) \qquad \Delta I = aI + ap \qquad (1, p. 46; 3, p. 99)$$

in which p is the "normal" intensity, in this case the atmospheric pressure, and a is a constant. No actual curve can be drawn from such a formula unless a is known, which it is not. The formula cannot therefore *predict* Hoeber's curve. Moreover if one assumes that a has the value which would be necessary to fit Hoeber's curve one can calculate p and according to Bernfeld and Feitelberg the atmospheric pressure so calculated would be 238 grams per square centimeter (7, p. 416) which is less than one fourth the correct value.

Even if one considers this amount of agreement sufficient, the empirical success of this formula would not be evidence in favor of the energy interpretation of the Weber-Fechner law. This can be made clear by a more detailed consideration of the Weber-Fechner law itself. The experimental data on which this law is based show that, approximately, the barely perceptible difference of stimulus is proportional to the total stimulus, or

$$(2) \quad \frac{\Delta R}{R} = k_1$$

This is the form in which Weber wrote the law. Both R and ΔR are purely physical quantities. They say nothing about the subjective psychic experience of sensation which Fechner calls E . (See footnote p. 448 of the present article.) The full formula built upon this by Fechner is

$$(3) \quad \Delta E = k \frac{\Delta R}{R} \text{ or } E = k \int \frac{dR}{R} + C$$

but the only part of it which is based on empirical data is

$$(2) \quad \frac{\Delta R}{R} = k_1$$

There is no independent method of measuring E or ΔE . (See Titchener, 12, vol. II, part II, p. xx.)

Bernfeld and Feitelberg's interpretation of Fechner's law consists chiefly of an interpretation of E in terms of energy. Their formula reads:

$$(4) \quad dI = \frac{k}{N} \frac{d\mu}{p+\mu} \text{ or } I = \frac{k}{N} \int \frac{d\mu}{p+\mu} + C \quad (1, \text{ p. 45; 3, p. 98.})$$

But the only part of this formula which is susceptible to empirical test is

$$(5) \quad \frac{\Delta \mu}{p+\mu} = k_2^1$$

There is no way of measuring I directly, i.e., assigning it a numerical value. The empirical validity of equation (5) would

¹ Equation (5) is identical with equation (1). $\mu = I$, $k_2 = a$.

be an argument in favor of sensation being interpreted as energy only if it could be shown that the form of (5) is deduced from the assumption that sensation (the left side of the equations 3 and 4) is an energy quantity.

The consideration which led the authors to prefer their equation (5) to Weber's equation (2) is the fact that stimulation occurs only when external circumstances deviate from a certain "normal" state. For example a pressure stimulation occurs only when the pressure of the stimulus is added to the normal atmospheric pressure. The normal atmospheric pressure does not stimulate. Fechner's R therefore became divided into p , the normal intensity, $+p$ the additional intensity of the stimulus, ΔR becoming Δp . This is in no way a consequence of the interpretation of E in terms of energy and cannot therefore be used to support this assumption.

c. There are experimental facts, not considered by the authors, which contradict their "energetic interpretation of the Weber-Fechner law". This law is expressed by the formula

$$dE = k \frac{dR}{R}$$

in which E is the sensation and R the stimulus. The interpretation of Bernfeld and Feitelberg consists of two chief points, which may be considered separately. These are the interpretation of R as the intensity factor of the stimulus energy, and the interpretation of E as a quantity of energy.

To take the first question first, the authors' conclusion is based on a consideration of pressure stimuli in which R has undoubtedly the dimensions of a pressure, which is an intensity. A consideration of the other types of stimuli for which Fechner's law holds shows that this cannot be generally true. The law holds true equally in judgments of brightness of visual stimuli, and of loudness of sounds. (See Troland, 13, vol. II, pp. 75, 225.) In these cases R is directly expressible as a quantity of energy per unit time and if all stimuli are exhibited for equal durations, as a quantity of energy. The words intensity of illumination or of sound, which apply to these stimuli, are

not intensity in the sense of intensity factors of energy, which is the sense in which Bernfeld and Feitelberg use it. Moreover Fechner's law applies also to judgments of visual and tactile distances, to which the energy concept cannot be applied to all. The claim that the theory "makes possible a simple inclusive interpretation of the Weber-Fechner law" (1, p. 62; 3, p. 115) is therefore not justified. This interpretation cannot be true of brightness or loudness, nor in judgments of extensity.

The idea that E is to be interpreted in terms of an increase of bodily energy is one which occurred to Fechner as he lay in bed in the morning on Oct. 22, 1850. (See Titchener, 12, vol. II, part II, page xx.) Bernfeld and Feitelberg are quite right in pointing out that such an interpretation contradicts the law of the conservation of energy if R is interpreted as an energy quantity. (1, p. 28; 3, p. 81.) This is one of the reasons why they oppose the interpretation of R as an energy quantity. Since, however, in the case of brightness and loudness R is experimentally an energy quantity and not an intensity it follows that here the interpretation of E as energy violates the law of conservation of energy.

If this is true the energetic interpretation of Fechner's law, upon which the mathematical part of the theory is based, has been experimentally disproved in precisely the cases where the energy of the sensory stimulus can be accurately determined.

4.

I would like to devote some space to a discussion of the fundamental assumption on which the theory rests, and which the authors consider "axiomatic for scientific investigation". (1, p. 61; 3, p. 114.)

This is the assumption that mental phenomena (*das Psychische*) are subject to universal natural laws. In the sense in which it is here used as a working hypothesis, this means that the laws of physics apply to mental phenomena. It is the meaning of this hypothesis that I wish to consider further.

The laws of physics are expressed in terms of concepts, matter, energy, etc., which are not found directly in experience. The laws of physics are verified in reality by certain types of phenomena only, namely, measurements. The concepts of matter, energy, etc., in so far as they possess physical reality at all (see Reiner, 14, p. 704), are abstractions from data obtained by measurement. Those phenomena in the outside world which cannot be expressed in terms of numbers are irrelevant to the laws of physics, and therefore not subject matter for physics. As Eddington expresses it, the "world" of physics is a "schedule of pointer readings". (11, p. 281.) Everything which physics has to say about the color red is perfectly comprehensible to a color blind man.

If the laws of physics are to apply to psychic phenomena there must be some means of establishing the identity of the concepts derived from physical data and those derived from psychological data. Unless this is done mental phenomena cannot either obey or disobey the laws of physics.

Bernfeld and Feitelberg fulfil this condition by the assumption that intensity of sensation is identical with the intensity factor of the energy in the central apparatus. Since the laws of physics are mathematical, this assumption can bridge the gap between physics and psychology, i.e., make physical laws applicable to mental phenomena, only if by identical is meant numerically equal or numerically proportional. However this can have meaning only if there is some independent means of measuring, i.e., assigning a numerical value to, intensity of sensation.

The identification of concepts derived from two different groups of phenomena has of course been met with before in physics. The law of conservation of energy depends on the identification of heat with work. This identification was not established by assumption, but by the experimental fact that so many foot pounds of work produced so many calories of heat. This proportionality could not have been established if there had not been independent means of measuring work and heat.

Any attempt to measure mental phenomena independently

must begin where the measurement of physical phenomena began. It is possible to compare some mental phenomena (e.g., intensities of sensation, or the pitch of tones) and so to arrange them in a series in order of magnitude (e.g., the scale of *sensations* of auditory pitch). Such scales can be marked off by means of more or less arbitrarily selected standard phenomena. That such standard phenomena can be identified and used is proven by the fact that certain people have the sense of absolute pitch. They are able to measure physical phenomena with a mental ruler. The essentially quantitative (though not numerical) psychological judgments which the practicing analyst makes daily depend on the intuitive use of such standards. One further step is necessary before one can speak of measurement. It is necessary to reduce these quantitative judgments to numbers which can be added and subtracted and possibly subjected to other arithmetical manipulations. This cannot be done until one can compare intervals at one end of the scale with intervals at the other. Unless this can be done addition and subtraction have no meaning. In the case of the scale of sensations of pitch this condition is fulfilled by the fact that at least certain intervals have a characteristic quality. An octave is an octave on any part of the scale, and the same is true of other intervals. It is possible to add and subtract intervals up and down the scale. In those people who have learned to identify certain pitch sensations so as to use them for standards one can therefore speak of measurement of a mental phenomenon.

The difficulties in the way of applying such methods to other mental phenomena and particularly to the mental phenomena of individuals other than the observer may well be insurmountable, but until they are solved one has no right to speak of measurement of mental phenomena. This Bernfeld and Feitelberg have not attempted. Therefore in spite of the coining of such terms as "libidometry" the theory does not offer even an attempt to measure mental phenomena.

There is another way in which mental and physical phenomena can be correlated, *without* measuring mental phe-

nomena. This would be to find a measurable physical phenomenon which varies so consistently with a particular mental phenomenon that the two may be identified. This is essentially what we do when we say that redness "means" a wave length between 640 and 760 millimicra. The wave length is measured; the sensation of redness, a mental phenomenon, is not. Where such a consistent co-variation exists one may regard the phenomena as identical, and leave the precise nature of their relation to the philosophers. One could conceive, for instance, of future research revealing a similar co-variation between the *feeling* of sexual excitement, a mental phenomenon, and the concentration of some particular substance, to be measured by chemical means.

The theory of Bernfeld and Feitelberg is an attempt to do something analogous. The energy intensity in the central apparatus is a quantity which in theory is to be measured by physical means. If it should prove that increases in this energy intensity were always accompanied by increases in intensity of sensation (which can be felt but not measured) and vice versa, one would have adequate reason for identifying these phenomena, one physical and the other mental. To establish this identity *by assumption*, as Bernfeld and Feitelberg do, would seem justifiable even as a working hypothesis only if the theory offered an experimental means of giving concrete physical meaning to the concept of energy intensity in the central apparatus. The question whether the theory does so has been discussed above.

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SPECIAL REVIEW

TATTOO, SECRETS OF A STRANGE ART AS PRACTICED AMONG THE NATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES. By Albert Parry. New York: Scribners, 1933. xii+171 p.

(Reviewed by SUSANNA S. HAIGH)

The present widespread and popular method of skin pigmentation by puncture is presented in an interesting and amusing book. The author discusses not only the history and art of tattooing in the United States but also its underlying psychological connotations. Throughout, emphasis is laid upon the inherent sexual significance of the process of tattooing and of the tattooed emblem itself. The relationship of the various sexual components is discussed with illustrative clinical material.

It is of interest to note the general recognition of the close association between sex and tattooing—as evidenced by the attitude of men who consider that their wives or mistresses have had previous sexual experience when they find that they have been tattooed. Several court decisions in cases of rape and seduction are quoted wherein acquiescence by the woman is assumed because she has previously been tattooed.

There is a striking similarity in the emotional reactions of young men and women to their first tattooing and their initial sexual experience. The analogy felt between tattooing and seduction is clearly shown in two letters quoted; one, from a young girl about to be tattooed to a famous tattooed woman of the circus inquiring: "Were you sorry, Mrs. Stevens? . . . Anything you may see fit to write me about your own feeling after you get tattooed will be very much appreciated". The expressions used by another tattooed girl might equally well apply to a previous seduction:—"I was tattooed for love and live to regret it. Heaven may forgive the man who so swayed my youthful heart as to cause me to submit to his fiendish treatment but I cannot". To the young boy also his first tattoo often symbolizes his sexual initiation to which he reacts with great pride as a proof that he has become a man, or with shame, fear and disgust.

The symbolism of the act of tattooing is pointed out as obvious: the needle as the penis introducing the tattooing fluid into a cavity;

the tattooer as the more or less sadistic aggressor; the person tattooed, the passive recipient.

The exhibitionistic element in the tattoo mark is quite evident. It is of interest, however, to note the degree of clearness with which it manifests itself. The open display without shame—on the part of the circus performers wherever the face is tattooed—next where the attitude is more ambivalent, and in consequence the mark is on a part of the body which may be displayed or concealed at will—e.g., the forearm—and finally where the sexual significance of the exhibitionism is openly shown in the tattooing of the breasts and genitals. As the situation of the tattoo varies in the openness of the exhibitionistic quality, so too the design ranges from the most innocuous of mottoes through symbolic sexual designs, as snakes, to frankly sexual pictures. As might be expected the tattoo is used often as an unconscious representation of a penis both by men and women. On the other hand it may emphasize the female genitals or in a passive homosexual point openly to his rectum denying as it were that he has a penis.

The masochistic factor in tattooing on which the author lays great stress is evident—not only in the painful nature of the process and the resulting inflammation and discomfort but also in the examples given of people who have large religious designs tattooed upon themselves after unusual good fortune such as a rescue at sea—as if they delight in offering their own skin as a sacrifice. Cases are reported where tattooers are sought whose needles are very painful—particularly those of women. An interesting example of tattooing as a form of masochistic masturbation is the man who at intervals tattooed his own penis.

It is easy to see that where the tattooer and the tattooed are both men the process may easily take on a homosexual aspect. An obvious example of this is given in the appended chapter—a man who after each quarrel with his wife had his penis tattooed by a man with resulting erection and orgasm.

The relationship between clothes and tattooing is mentioned and the probable similarity of their origin in both attracting attention to and covering sexual characteristics. There is no mention, however, of the anal element in the tattoo. There is surely a definite relationship between the impulse of the child to smear itself with feces and that of the adult to have himself smeared with indelible paint. A significant example is quoted by the author in

another connection where the smearing and the reaction formation of cleanliness are present together: a man who had his penis and scrotum tattooed every two weeks in private sittings, paying the tattooer each time with crisp, new bills.

Mr. Parry has very kindly submitted to the QUARTERLY additional interesting material which he was unable to include in his book, and which now follows.

TATTOOING AMONG PROSTITUTES AND PERVERTS

BY ALBERT PARRY (NEW YORK)

Prostitutes in America, as elsewhere, get tattooed because of certain strong masochist-exhibitionistic drives. Feeling sorry for their sorry fate, they seek to give themselves more cause for self-pity by undergoing the pain of tattooing. They twist their inturning commiseration into bitter inscriptions full of cynical humor. In New York's tattedom a legend is current of an easy girl who had a tattooed inscription on the lower part of the abdomen, above the pubic hair: "Keep Off the Grass." Concealing her past she married an infatuated bank clerk. He discovered the inscription the first night and nearly murdered her. She was back on the street before the night was over. Characteristically, the tale is told by tattooers and the tattooed in accents of pity for the girl.

Another New York prostitute had ordered, for the same part of her body, this tattooed line: "Admission Fifty Cents." A tattooer of Race Street, Philadelphia, had the photograph of a twenty-year-old demi-mondaine just above the very intimate part of whose body he had tattooed two cupids holding a scroll, with the inscription: "The Love Nest." Another scout of mine reports the following two cases: a prostitute with a butterfly of yellow and blue coloring on her left breast near the nipple; a young woman with these inscriptions under her breasts: "Sweet Milk" and "Butter Milk". That the humor is bitter we have no doubts. Note the absurdly low price of fifty cents; the woman must have charged at least four times that much, at the very lowest; the price tattooed was not actual but symbolic; the humor of the inscription was that of humiliation and self-pity. In the "milk" inscription case we note how close the tattooed word "butter" is to the implied word "bitter".

In all such cases we also see a desire to hold or increase trade by unusual inscriptions or figures, whether serious or humorous. In the tattooing of prostitutes, as in the tattooing of circus freaks, the profit motive is allied with the drive of exhibitionism. The story is told of a New Orleans woman of joy who had the picture of a hula hula girl tattooed on the belly so that the prostitute's navel served as the hula hula girl's vagina. By doing a semblance of *danse du ventre*, she gave her waterfront clients some highly entertaining exhibitions.

Exhibitionism sometimes brings not only monetary profit but also physical protection. There must be something of this consideration, however inarticulate, when a prostitute orders upon her skin the name or even a likeness of her lover-protector or pimp. Thus, in the dock districts of the London East End, English prostitutes have on their skin the tattooed portraits of their Negro lovers, much to the chagrin of the white American sailors. The old-time French prostitutes bore on the abdomen the names of their lesbian lovers. In America those frail ladies who specialize in marine love are noted as the most ardent tattoo addicts. Acquisition of each transient sweetheart is celebrated by the affixing of his initials to the lady's arms or legs.¹ Thus, many present virtual walking alphabets and display wonderful mnemonics; they amaze even the callous tattooers by reciting the full names, ships and rank of the navy men standing bravely behind these initials.

However, the effect of such inscriptions and likenesses is often opposite to the one desired. They not only fail to protect the woman from over-rough handling on the part of men, but evoke male jealousy and wrath. But perhaps, unconsciously, this is the very aim of the woman: to be mistreated because of such tattooing, to suffer more and more, to have ever fresh grounds for self-pity. We note a clear masochistic drive in the old-time prostitutes of Algeria who, after quarrels with their lovers, would apply burning cigarettes to their arms or breasts to eliminate the tattooed names of their admirers.

¹ In a cheap lexicography of dream words found on the tables of a cut-rate drugstore, we read that seeing tattoo in one's dream means meeting a stranger *with whom you will be interested*. The sex note is apparent. Some tattooers in America report the so-called "tattoo-marriages", i.e., the marriages or temporary cohabitations of people who had first met in some or other tattoo shop as its clients.

We see that not infrequently prostitutes undergo tattooing on the most sensitive parts of the body, where the pain of the operation is excruciating. Prostitutes of the East sometime embellish their intimate parts, or the immediate vicinity thereof, with suggestive and symbolic art, often to ward off venereal disease. Here, magic-evoking and masochism are factors involved. By undergoing sacrificial pain the woman is calling forth the protection of the gods. In America, cases have been noted of women of the streets placing the tattooed names and portraits of their lovers on the tenderest parts of their breasts. A strong masochistic drive, devoid of exhibitionistic elements, must have motivated an American prostitute who concealed her tattooings directly under her low, narrow, hanging breasts. With such women, tattooing on the most sensitive and frankly sexual parts is in itself a sexual act. The sacrificial pain is also a sexual pleasure; the sacrifice is offered to ward off the lover's unfaithfulness.¹

The very design often betrays an exhibitionist's striving toward pain: a tattoo picture favorite with American prostitutes of the lower category is a dagger inscribed: "Death Before Dishonor." Frequently the dagger is tattooed in such a manner as to seem to be piercing the flesh of the woman. The same design, with the same inscription, is reported popular among male prostitutes, also among the more candid homosexuals in the merchant marine. Electric Elmer once said: "It is surprising how many 'Death-before-Dishonors' I put on. It shows the fine feelings and uprightness of the young men who come to me." The sentiment is a tribute either to Elmer's moral innocence or to his sense of irony.

2.

A popular American tattoo is a picture of a young female, her bare arms stretched to hold a small mirror; when gazed at from the opposite side, the arms become legs, and the woman's sexual organs are visible. In the 1890's, Dr. Francisco Baca noted among Mexican criminals and soldiers such tattooed pictures as a man and woman in the position of coition, or a woman spreading her legs and expos-

¹ There have been cases, however rare, where women of the more respectable strata had similar tattooings in similar physical areas. The late Elmer Getchell, an old-time tattooer of New York, also known as Electric Elmer, once reported that a society woman ordered her husband's portrait tattooed upon her breast.

ing exaggerated sexual organs. Similar pictures may be observed now as then not only in Mexico but in the seaports of large inland centers of North America.

Such pictures in many cases may be explained by the men's heightened heterosexuality. However, in certain other cases the suspicion is that the men who order such tattoos are homosexuals. By ordering such extreme tattoos they attempt to deny their homosexuality. The attempt is as pathetic as the desire of female and male prostitutes to prove their respectability with the "Death-before-Dishonor" tattoo-designs.

But tattoos openly admitting and even extolling their perversion are more frequent among male homosexuals. Thus, an American sailor had a tattooed arrow on his back, along the spine, pointing to the anus, an accompanying inscription reading: "For Men Only." Another man, who pandered to pederasts, had on his buttocks two inscriptions: "Open All Night" and "Pay as You Enter." Elsewhere I have written of a few cases where a pair of ship's propellers, or twin screws, were tattooed on the sailors' buttocks. The sailors' claim was that such designs enhanced the dexterity of a man's movement on deck and shore (see Chapter X, on Faith, Magic, and Disease, in my book, *Tattoo*). Here I would like to add that, in view of certain colloquial connotations of the word "screw", and in view of the peculiar location of such designs, the latter may also be a sign of passive homosexuality.

One of my informants reports that on the back of a passive pæderast, a sailor of an American windjammer, he beheld the following tattooing: a row of very lifelike red foxes running full speed down his spine, with the first fox disappearing into the rectum. He assured my informant that the tattooing worked efficiently as an admirable excitant when displayed to novices. A variation is reported to me from New Orleans: a pack of hounds on a sailor's back, represented as chasing after a rabbit who is disappearing between the buttocks, only the rabbit's hindlegs being visible. There is also this case of a Bellevue Hospital (New York City) patient: the tattoo of a cat on the belly chasing a mouse running toward the anus, an arrow pointing the way. An American novelist informs me that while on the sea he saw the tattoo of a full-rigged ship on a sailor's chest, an anchor chain going down and across the waist and attached to the anus.

Active pæderasts naturally concentrate their tattooings on their active sexual organs. There is a snake coiling around the penis, or a rose with a winding stem. An American student reports to me that while working his way across the Atlantic on a French freighter he was invited by the captain into his cabin. There, the Frenchman displayed before him his heavily tattooed penis in an effort to seduce him. The Frenchman did not try force; he was confident that the sight of the tattoos would achieve his purpose.

The process of such tattooing is often connected with auto-eroticism. An American seaman bought a tattooing set from a Bowery master, and shortly thereafter appeared displaying his testicles tattooed with blue and black dots, the sides of his penis green, its front red. This is a notable example of decoration used primarily for the purpose of sexual allure. A sailor with a venereal disease had three amicable words tattooed by himself on his penis: "Good morning, doctor".

Not all of those tattooed on their active sexual organs are pæderasts. The sexual allure of this type is often used by heterosexuals to win or hold their women. A young New Yorker had a spider tattooed on his penis; he explained that he was accustomed to begin his sexual act by exhibiting the design to the woman and saying to her: "Now, let's put the spider in his web." A young seaman had a blue star tattooed at the base of the penis. When he was in a state of sexual excitement, yellow rays around the star became visible. An army man had a green snake tattooed on his body; the tail of the snake began on his chest and wriggled its way down to the male member, the head of which coincided with that of the snake. Some of the American tattoo masters say that the design of a serpent is often selected for the more innocent tattooings because it is the symbol of both wisdom and eternity; neither the tattooer nor the tattooed is aware of the phallic significance of the serpent's shape.

A sweetheart's name on a man's penis is often his boast of his virility. This is mirrored in the famous story, common in America, of which I have heard at least four versions. Here is one: a doctor examines a patient and expresses his concern over a tiny red spot on the patient's penis; the patient sets the doctor's worry at rest by explaining that the tiny spot, at an opportune moment, spells the tattooed name of the patient's sweetheart: "Mabel Cecilia Cunningham of Jefferson City, Tennessee."

3.

With some of the American seamen visiting Japan, tattooing was a frankly sexual, masochistic experience. There, in the beginning of this century, many of the tattooers were not men, but young women. They had an increasingly larger volume of trade than men-tattooers—for the same erotic reason that there appeared in the American Far West, within the last decade or so, a number of women barbers.¹

Some of these Japanese girl tattooers also practised prostitution. Not infrequently, the two acts were combined, the sailors and other white men being tattooed on their sexual organs. Some of the girls did the usual methodic wiping off of the tattooing fluids not with the customary cloth or cotton but with their tongues. As tattooing of the natives was forbidden by the Japanese government many years ago, the Japanese tattooers had to confine their clientele to foreign visitors. Later, about fifteen or twenty years ago, even this trade was restricted. The American tattooers explain this restriction by the fact that the tattooing of foreign visitors in Japan had become so overwhelmingly and openly sexual. The tattooers tell me that after this restriction many of the girl tattooers migrated to the Philippines and Hawaii where they continued their trade in the same fashion. One of the most representative examples of such tattooing is a Japanese resident of Ithaca, New York. On his penis and testicles he has butterflies, birds, flies, spiders and centipedes, all very miniature, tattooed with considerable skill. He is an exhibitionist with a definitely passive homosexuality: on his occasional trips to New York, he visits a Bowery tattooer to whom again and again he displays his tattooing and fondly recalls the strong masculine girl back in Yokohama who did the job. To him the Bowery tattoo man is a counterpart of the Yokohama girl.

¹ In Algeria, at one time, women were the professional tattooers, and stood in the market place offering their skill. Up till lately the best known tattooer in the sailors' quarters of Norfolk, Va., was a woman. During the late war, Burchett, the London tattooer, had a young woman assistant, and his shop was crowded with what he characteristically called "patients", both English and American. At the same time, American sailors and soldiers gave generous custom to a French lass in Bordeaux, daughter of a sailor-tattooer lost at sea in the sinking of a French submarine. She was as truly masculine and sadistic as her job called for; one of her American customers reports to me that "her needles hurt more than any others and there was a soreness for several weeks".

The Bowery tattooers tell me of two regular customers they have. A man of about fifty-five, a Brooklyn home-owner, well-off, comes in after he has a fight with his wife; he gets tattooed on his penis, asking for such delicate designs as butterflies and roses. The penis becomes erect during the operation; sometimes an orgasm results. The rest of the body is entirely free of tattooings. It is not difficult, nor incorrect, to surmise that he is of passive sexual habits; that his quarrels with his wife result from her expectations of active sexual endeavors on his part, of which he is not fully capable.

The other man is about seventy, also well-to-do. He appears every week or fortnight for five or ten minutes of tattooing on his penis and testicles. He orders no pictures, but only dots; his organs by now have the appearance of being heavily beaded. He insists on strictly private sittings, and pays with a crisp new ten or twenty dollar bill. The neatness of the money undoubtedly represents his unconscious desire to allay his feeling of guilt, to whitewash this experience, to picture it to himself and to the tattooer as a pure, normal phenomenon.

Most other such clients not only do not insist on privacy but welcome spectators during the operation. Thus they display their sexual exhibitionism. Some even like to be photographed, up to their necks, or—those who see in it a manifestation of their manly daring—the head and face included.

BOOK REVIEWS

A HUNDRED YEARS OF PSYCHOLOGY (1833-1933). By J. C. Flügel, University College, London. New York: Macmillan Company, 1933. 362 p.

This medium-sized book contains a complete history of psychology from the time of Aristotle to the present. It is avowedly an epitome and by no means intended to take the place of more exhaustive works on the subject. The author shows unusual powers for condensation and clarity and wherever the material permits, the presentation has a freshness and zest which give a pleasure in reading reminiscent of the writings of William James. In spite of the comprehensiveness of subject matter, the book is much more than a simple outline. At no apparent sacrifice of factual material, there is room left for comparative and critical consideration of psychological science at its various stages, intimate glimpses of the leading personalities identified with it, and a constant orientation between psychology and human affairs in general.

The volume is in four parts with a total of thirty-nine chapters arranged for easy reading and ready reference. Part I outlines the field of psychological knowledge available for an imaginary student beginner in 1833, and the probable state of mind of this pioneer in mental science as he familiarized himself with what little was already known and contemplated the uncharted regions which lay ahead. The other three sections cover respectively the periods 1830-1860; 1860-1900; and 1900 to the present. The author draws an anthropomorphic parallel which if accepted will be a bit chastening to the more complacent of contemporary psychologists, not excepting psychoanalysts. Psychology in 1833, he says, may be compared to an embryo conceived and under way but hidden from the world of men. Today it is like a year-old child, lusty and with promise that it will grow up to compare with its more adult brothers and sisters in science. At present it is full of vigorous though often ill-directed activities and shows signs of beginning to walk and talk, but most of its development is still to come.

Professor Flügel has made this compact work so much of a review in itself that any descriptive abstract is impractical. The more definite historical content of the first three parts will be of value to the mature reader somewhat in inverse ratio to his train-

ing in academic psychology. Those who have approached psychopathology by way of medicine should profit in particular by this summarized outline and appraisal of pre-clinical psychology. It is shown how early associative and faculty psychology, offshoots of philosophy, were cross-bred with the physiological psychology which followed the growing knowledge of the structure and function of the nervous system, and which incidentally was forced to acknowledge phrenology as a distant and dubious member of the family tree. The influence of physiological psychology brought the subject of mind into a connection with medicine which has grown closer through the years. In this medical psychology the modern era has seen a distinct shift of emphasis from soma to psyche, and psychopathology, emancipated pro tem from organic dependencies, has taken the central place. The reason for this is an obvious and practical one. Medicine is primarily concerned with therapy and for this purpose in a large group of mental problems, relative fruitfulness from the psychological approach must be contrasted with relative sterility from the organic.

Abnormal psychology was born when mental illness was once thoroughly recognized as something other than the work of the devil or a pure problem of internal medicine. Mesmerism contributed a central kernel of truth obscured by an abundance of chaff. The evolutionism of Darwin and Spencer gave a new direction to the study of mind. Other influences were a growing interest in animal psychology, the study of the individual with resulting emphasis on differences rather than general laws, and the development of child and social psychology. Above all, experimental psychology with the three great figures, Galton, Helmholtz and Wundt, as its originators, broadened the scope of the science of the mind and opened new vistas for the future. It was once again the development of physiological psychology that made possible the experimental method and thereby moved psychological study from arm-chair to laboratory thus transferring the subject from the realm of philosophy to that of science.

The final section of the book on the psychology of the twentieth century, with particular emphasis on "schools", is of the greatest interest to the practical worker in the field and is given the most detailed consideration by the author. There are briefly and sympathetically treated configurationism (gestalt); behaviorism and animal psychology; modern physiological psychology; McDougall

and "hormic" psychology; Freud and psychoanalysis; Adler, Jung, and type psychology; mental tests; Spearman and the "factor" school; and applied psychology in relation to sociology, anthropology, education and industry. Through the multi-dimensional relationships and interlocking connections of all these fields past and present, the author steers a clear course and gives a more simple orientation, chronological, geographical, comparative, and inter-relational, than the most hopeful reader would be likely to expect.

For the psychoanalyst, with the focus of his attention on the psychology of the unconscious, a point of special interest will be to trace those connections of Freud's work, based on empirical method in the clinical field, with that of a more strictly theoretical nature which preceded. A few high lights may be mentioned here. The *petites perceptions* of Leibnitz constituted the first clear statement of anything approaching the modern doctrine of the unconscious. Herbart as early as 1816 outlined a dynamic concept of mental processes in which ideas are held out of consciousness by something akin to repression. He also constructed an ego which had certain things in common with the later work of both Freud and McDougall. (See pp. 19-20.) Beneke somewhat later formulated a distinctly dynamic theory of mind which he vigorously championed against both transcendentalism and faculty psychology. Lotz, who in 1844 succeeded Herbart to the chair of philosophy at Göttingen, found it necessary to postulate unconscious mental processes, led first to this conclusion by his work in space perception. (See pp. 85-86.) In the contemporary field, McDougall is given credit with Freud for first making psychology available for practical application to everyday affairs. A comparison is drawn between the self-regarding instinct of McDougall and the superego of Freud. For specific presentation of psychoanalysis there has been prepared a fifteen-page chapter which rivals anything in the literature as a summary of the subject, and includes some critical estimates and a bit of prophecy.

From the standpoint of the psychoanalyst, the author of this historical work has unique qualifications for his task. His position in psychoanalysis is unquestioned, while at the same time he is sufficiently a scholar in general psychology to retain a thoroughly objective viewpoint and thus avoid all special pleading and destructive criticism. To him the structure of psychology today, with psychoanalysis in the foreground, is the result of evolution, not

revolution, and all the laborious steps taken in the past have their significant place either as temporary scaffolding or permanent foundation. Those who were brought up on early twentieth century psychology will be gratified to find that in this book their old gods are given creditable standing instead of that summary elimination meted out by writers from whom obsolescence obscures merit. For students in general, this volume should do much to give the work of Freud its proper place without the complications of partisanship pro or con. For psychoanalysts it will be useful to help establish a balanced background in general psychology and may well become a part of required reading for the student beginner.

MARTIN W. PECK (BOSTON)

MENTAL HYGIENE IN THE COMMUNITY. By Clara Bassett. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934. 394 p.

There exists no stranger hybrid than what is called mental hygiene. Born twenty-five years ago of the determination of Mr. Clifford W. Beers to introduce reforms in the care of the mentally sick in hospitals, it has become within a few years a national movement, and at the First International Congress in Washington in 1930 there were over three thousand delegates in attendance. It has already a program of activity which is to invade the life of the average citizen from birth to the grave, and in this volume the author defines its program and states its aims. In the introduction the reader is told what the science of mental hygiene is.

Mental hygiene is defined as "that growing body of knowledge and techniques which has for its purpose the understanding of the evolution of human personality; the promotion of mental health as an expression of the highest development and integration possible, at each age level, of the physical, emotional and mental powers of personality; the study, treatment and prevention of emotional and behavior disorders which preclude the happy and effective individual or social functioning of personality, as well as of the more radically incapacitating nervous and mental diseases and defects; the efficient organization and operation of community facilities which may be necessary for the achievement of these aims and the progressive modification of social institutions and agencies which vitally affect the mental health of large groups, so that the principles, methods and practices in use may more successfully con-

serve mental health and contribute to the growth of personality". The means by which this New Deal in human existence is to be brought about is naturally the new science of mental hygiene which, further, "is a 'mosaic of aspects' of biology, medicine, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, psychology, sociology, anthropology, education, social case work, eugenics, euthenics, etc." The *etc.* is the author's. Two years ago Frankwood Williams in this *QUARTERLY* raised the question: Is There a Mental Hygiene? and answered his question negatively. No such pusillanimous doubts assail Miss Bassett. Armed with statistics and questionnaire she bravely sets out to purge the mephitic social stables.

The technique of mental hygiene includes physical examinations and treatment (which receives the major emphasis), psychological tests for diagnosis and classification, psychiatric interviews and personality studies. The aims for the individual are adjustment, self-guidance, and self-control. In the case material briefly cited a diagnosis is made, the fallacies in the situation are pointed out, or some unconscious motive is detected, but the treatment and the result are rarely mentioned. For example: "The nurse may discover that the real cause of a child's frequent headaches or other physical indispositions necessitating repeated absences from school are traceable to the fond mother's devoted indulgence and care which makes illness a delightful experience, to be repeated as often as possible." What is the nurse to do? This knowledge, however correct, cannot be utilized by mother or child with profit. What has mental hygiene to offer the child as a substitute for his fond mother's devoted indulgence?

The best chapter is the one on Delinquency and Law where the sadomasochistic alliance between offender and officer of the law leads to glaring abuses which cry for practical reform. Those parts of the book which deal with personal problems and relationships are suffused with a sweetness and light which is a product of wish-fulfilment fantasy rather than of practical experience. For example: "The cultivation of the child's æsthetic and religious life requires some knowledge and appreciation of the various stages of development in regard to these aspects of personality and the healthy direction of these emotions. In order that home life may be enriched through the cultivation of varied individual interests and abilities, shared play and family adventures and festivals, some acquaintance with recreational methods and recreational resources

in the neighborhood and community is helpful in the wise utilization of the growth values inherent in leisure time activities". Again: "A great many mental patients display symptoms of serious moral and religious conflicts and their delusions and hallucinations frequently take a religious form of expression. . . . The minister representing the authority, sanction and power of the church may, in coöperation with the psychiatrist, contribute much to the relief and consolation of individual patients suffering from such conflicts"; or, the author quoting: "Probation officers should have the requisite education, training, and experience. There is no excuse for their not knowing the elements of biology, psychology, sociology, and the facts of mental hygiene. They should be social physicians and their attitude should be that of the social worker, he who builds up social relationships. . . . They should believe in miracles, those daily miracles of the reconstruction of broken lives."

It is the ultimate development of nearly all "movements", and especially those of reform, to progress to a phase of messianic absolutism which becomes itself a subject of reform. Developed in a country notoriously susceptible to fads, mental hygiene has in a short time experienced a phenomenal growth. Before extending its scope, it should soberly appraise its proven accomplishments and plan its future within these limitations, if it is not to prove a disappointment to those who earnestly devote their energies to further its aims and to the community to which it promises so much.

RAYMOND GOSSELIN (NEW YORK)

THE GREAT DOCTORS. By Henry E. Sigerist. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1933. Second Edition. 436 p.

Here is a third popular book from the pen of Professor Sigerist. It presents brief biographical sketches beginning with Imhotep and Æsculapius and ending with Osler, whose photograph appears on the jacket, a selection which no doubt the publisher can explain. The chapter on Osler has been added to the second edition which appeared simultaneously with the English translation.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the book is its table of contents, which lists fifty-six names of great doctors. The author is correct in his statement, in the preface to the first edition, that the reader will miss name after name he might have expected men-

tioned. This was at least true in the case of the reviewer. But Dr. Sigerist explains that the plan of the work "excluded anything more than a passing allusion to the names of the living, and that for this reason an account of a number of momentous discoveries and important movements had to be omitted", as for instance, "recent developments in psychological medicine". Besides he asserts that he was not aiming at "encyclopaedic completeness", but was content "to bring into the limelight certain basic evolutionary tendencies in the science and art of medicine".

Professor Sigerist's learning in the field of medical history is such that any list compiled by him of those physicians whom he calls "great" is itself of interest and value and must necessarily impress the reader.

It is difficult to comment on the individual chapters. They are done with sympathetic imagination. In a few pages the author recaptures a whole epoch, as for example, in the chapters on Virchow, Koch and Semmelweis, or gives us the living portrait of a man, as he does so well in the chapter on John Hunter. There is a sentimental dedication "To the Unknown Doctor who in unselfish and inconspicuous activities fulfils the teachings of the great Doctors". Let us hope that he does. Many known doctors do not. The translated style is at times stilted. The book is well made and has many excellent illustrations.

CARL BINGER (NEW YORK)

HOW THE MIND WORKS. By Cyril Burt, Ernest Jones, Emanuel Miller and William Moodie. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1934. 333 p.

Under this title is collected a number of chapters on psychology which were originally delivered as a series of radio broadcast talks. Two of the authors are psychoanalysts, one is a psychologist, and the fourth approaches his subject from the standpoint of one trained in mental hygiene or child guidance. The result is that the book lacks any unity of concept. However, since these talks are intended for the information of a large and varied lay audience the authors succeed well enough in their aim as it is stated by the editor: "to show by simple instances and in plain terms, how the interest in the human mind has grown into a serious scientific study, and how the conclusions reached have a close and practical bearing on the problems of everyday life". For a popular presen-

tation, the book would be far more instructive and less confusing if it were less ambitiously comprehensive.

RAYMOND GOSSELIN (NEW YORK)

POETRY OF THE INSANE. Compiled by Dr. Charles E. Mayos, with a Foreword by Dr. George A. Zeller and an Introduction by Dr. Charles F. Read. Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Co., 1933. 112 p.

The compiler and his friends are enthusiasts for rhyme and meter, but psychological interest is entirely lacking. It is difficult to find a justification for a mere array of mediocre verse simply because it was written by inmates of a mental hospital—the more so, since a beginning has, in fact, already been made in the direction of an interpretation of the artistic works of the insane. The book, therefore, is not only of no value whatever but actually darkens counsel by giving the impression that no such investigation is achievable.

D. F.

CURRENT PSYCHOANALYTIC LITERATURE

Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse. Vol. XX, Number 2, 1934.

- OTTO FENICHEL: Weiteres zur präöedipalen Phase der Mädchen (*Further Notes on the Pre-Œdipal Phase in Girls*).
- ANNY ANGEL: Einige Bemerkungen über den Optimismus (*Some Remarks on Optimism*).
- H. BEHN-ESCHENBURG: Beiträge zur Vorgeschichte des Oedipuskomplexes (*Contributions to the Pre-History of the Œdipus Complex*).
- KARL DREYFUSS: Der Fall Wieland (*The Case Wieland*).
- MOSES BARINBAUM: Zum Problem des psychophysischen Zusammenhangs mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Dermatologie (*The Problem of Psychophysical Relation with Special Reference to Dermatology*).
- EDMUND BERGLER: Über einige noch nicht beschriebene Spezialformen der Ejakulationsstörung (*On Some as yet Undescribed Special Forms of Disorder of Ejaculation*).
- IMRE HERMANN: Die Verwendung des Begriffes "aktiv" in der Definition der Männlichkeit (*The Application of the Concept "Active" in the Definition of Masculinity*).

Imago. Vol. XX, Number 2, 1934.

- DOROTHY TIFFANY BURLINGHAM: Mitteilungsdrang und Geständniszwang (*The Urge to Confide and the Compulsion to Confess*).
- ALFRED WINTERSTEIN: Der Zornaffekt (*The Affect of Anger*).
- JOHANNES LANDMARK: Über den Triebbegriff (*The Concept of the Instincts*).
- ARTHUR KIELHOLZ: Rätsel und Wunder der Heilung (*Riddle and Miracle of Cure*).
- ALEXANDER METTE: Zur Psychologie des Dionysischen (*Psychology of the Dionysian Spirit*).
- PAUL SCHILDER: Zur Psychopathologie alltäglicher telepathischer Erscheinungen (*Psychopathology of Everyday Telepathic Phenomena*).
- SIEGFRIED BERNFELD & SERGEI FEITELBERG: Bericht über einige psycho-physiologische Arbeiten (*Report on Some Contributions to Psychophysiology*).
- OTTO FENICHEL: Analyse einer Namensverwechslung nach zwanzig Jahren (*Analysis of a Change of Name after Twenty Years*).
- IMMANUEL VELIKOVSKY: Kann eine neuerlernte Sprache zur Sprache des Unbewussten werden? (*Can a Newly Acquired Language Become the Language of the Unconscious?*)
- A. J. STORFER: Die Psychoanalyse in Sammelwerken und Enzyklopädien, I. u. II. (*Psychoanalysis as Treated in Compilations and Encyclopædias*).

Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik. Vol. VIII, Numbers 3-4, March-April, 1934.

- AUGUST AICHHORN: Kann der Jugendliche straffällig werden? Ist der Jugendgerichtshof eine Lösung? (*Are Juveniles Punishable? Is the Juvenile Court a Solution?*).
- LISELOTTE GERÖ: Psychoanalytische Gespräche mit einem kleinen Kind (*Psychoanalytic Talks with a Little Child*).
- MELITTA SCHMIEDEBERG: Intellektuelle Hemmung und Essstörung (*Intellectual Inhibition and Disturbances in Eating*).
- S. LINDNER: Das Saugen an den Fingern, Lippen, etc., bei den Kindern (*Sucking of Fingers, Lips, etc., in Children*).

Revue Française de Psychanalyse. Vol. VII, Number 1, 1934.

- MARIE BONAPARTE: La Pensée magique chez le primitif (*Magical Thinking among Primitives*).
- R. LAFORGUE: La Pensée magique dans la religion (*Magical Thinking in Religion*).
- J. LEUBA: La Pensée magique chez le névrosé (*Magical Thinking in Neurotics*).
- H. CODET: La Pensée magique dans la vie quotidienne (*Magical Thinking in Everyday Life*).
- ADRIEN BOREL: La Pensée magique dans l'art (*Magical Thinking in Art*).
- S. NACHT: La Pensée magique dans le rêve (*Magical Thinking in Dreams*).
- SOPHIE MORGENSTERN: La Pensée magique chez l'enfant (*Magical Thinking in the Child*).

NOTES

THE EDUCATIONAL COMMITTEE of The New York Psychoanalytic Institute announces that Dr. Sandor Rado, Educational Director of the Institute, will give the following lectures and seminars during the academic year 1934-1935. (1) The Ego and Its Conscience (eight lectures).—(2) Fear, Obsession and Delusion (eight lectures).—(3) Social Psychology: Our Human Environment (eight lectures).—(4) Technical Seminar (twenty-four sessions).—Lectures are open to members of the Society, to students in training and to other interested scientists on special application. The Seminar is open only to members of the Society and students in training. The ultimate decision as to eligibility to any course is vested in the Educational Committee.

THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTE offers the following extension courses during the academic year 1934-1935, beginning the first week in October, 1934. (1) The Application of Psychoanalysis to Social Work (15 sessions). An advanced course for executives in social work, experienced field workers, and visiting teachers of commensurate status; approved for alertness credit by the New York State Education Department (Leader: Dr. I. T. Broadwin).—(2) The Utilization of Psychoanalytic Viewpoints in Social Case Work (10 sessions. Begins in January, 1935). An intermediate case discussion seminar for social workers (Leader: Dr. Adolph Stern).—(3) Psychoanalysis in Medicine (15 lectures). An introductory clinical course for physicians. (Not a training course.) Lecturers: Drs. Daniels, Lehrman, Lorand, Meyer, Oberndorf.—(4) Parent-Child and Sibling Relationships, with special reference to maternal over-protection, maternal rejection and sibling rivalry (6 lectures). General Course. (Lecturer: Dr. David M. Levy).—(5) Popular Lectures on Psychoanalytic Topics (5 lectures). Open to the general public. For further details, apply to the Executive Director.

THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION held its annual session on Wednesday afternoon, May 30. Papers were read by Drs. Fritz Wittels, Lewis B. Hill and Sándor Lorand.

Abstracts of Papers:

1. Masculine and Feminine in the Three Psychic Systems. By Fritz Wittels (New York City).—Masculine and feminine seen from the standpoint of the superego may be defined as follows: We experience as masculine or feminine that which, at any given time or place, is held to be such. In the system "id", the concepts of masculine and feminine cannot be differentiated from each other inasmuch as the "id" in conformity with its origin from the biological stratus is bisexual. The ego (superego) demands two things from the instincts arising from the id. The second demand goes further than the first and seems to abolish it. The first demand: Be heterosexual! The second demand: Don't

be sexual at all! Accordingly, we find two dissimilar conflicts: one between heterosexuality and bisexuality, the other between sexual instincts and "ego" instincts. These two conflicts must be treated separately in analysis.

2. A Psychoanalytic Observation on Essential Hypertension. By Lewis B. Hill (Baltimore, Maryland).—An opportunity was afforded during the psychoanalytic study of a patient to observe the disappearance of an essential hypertension of some years standing. The disorder could be traced to a traumatic episode, and disappeared when this experience was abreacted by the cathartic method. The case material suggests an explanation of the psychogenesis of essential hypertension, and offers a rational method of psychotherapy. The observation is presented to invite attention to the disorder and further studies.

3. Fairy Tales and Neurosis. By Sándor Lorand (New York).—As a result of an extensive study of a case of anxiety hysteria, it became apparent that the structure of the whole neurosis was based on fairy tale material. Pleasant and unpleasant early childhood memories and anxieties were all centered around fairy tales which were told to the patient up to the age of six or seven, by the mother. His nervous symptoms and anxieties at the time of his analysis paralleled the fairy tale material which was pleasant and which helped to solve the Oedipus conflict of the patient in childhood. In his adult period, the same fairy tales became objects of fear, keeping the patient in a steady panic as an ego defense against his instinctual sexual urges. In the course of analysis he developed new anxieties, which were revealed to be based also on forgotten fairy tales, which subsequently emerged from his unconscious. On the basis of that study it became evident that fairy tale material is found not only in the dreams of the neurotic as Freud pointed out, but it may be present also in the neurosis of children, and utilized as well in the anxiety of the adult. General conclusions were made concerning fairy tales; the possible advantage and disadvantage of telling them to children, their importance as a possible outlet or pleasure for the adult who likes to relate and create fairy tales, the manner, the time, and the situations in which they are told, are discussed.

THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION held a joint session with the American Psychiatric Association on Wednesday, May 30, at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York. The session was devoted to a Symposium on the Relation of Psychoanalysis to Psychiatry by Dr. A. A. Brill, and papers were read by Drs. Leland E. Hinsie, R. McC. Chapman, Harry Stack Sullivan, Fritz Wittels, Lewis B. Hill and Sándor Lorand.

Abstracts of Papers:

1. The Relationship of Psychoanalysis to Psychiatry. By Leland E. Hinsie (New York City).—The psychoanalytic formulations of Freud provide the most comprehensive attitude not only for the understanding of the dynamic forces operative in the various psychogenic syndromes, but also for the treatment of those forces. There are various modifications by which psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic information are often applied, the methods depending upon the circumstances peculiar to the syndrome that is under management. But, there are much broader phases encountered in psychiatric practice that cannot as yet

be understood or treated by a psychoanalytic approach. These phases include: (1) a thorough study and treatment of somatic issues, perhaps with special stress on constitutional pathology and anomaly; this includes special laboratory investigations; (2) an appreciation of sociological and other environmental influences; (3) an extensive knowledge of the many types of psychiatric reactions, psychotic as well as psychoneurotic, somatogenic as well as psychogenic. It seems inadvisable to draw any distinction between a psychiatrist and a psychoanalyst. A psychoanalyst should be a psychiatrist first of all, a psychiatrist who is capable of employing psychoanalysis when psychoanalysis is the procedure of choice; but the psychoanalyst should also be able to understand and to treat those psychiatric problems that are not amenable to the strict and formal psychoanalytic technic. A well-qualified psychiatrist is, *inter alia*, a well-qualified psychoanalyst.

2. Psychoanalysis in Psychiatric Hospitals. By Ross McClure Chapman (Towson, Maryland).—Brief comment on the history of the psychoanalytic method (in this country). Its contribution to psychiatry with that of the study of personality development during the past twenty-five years. Granted that the psychiatric hospital is the training school for the psychiatrist and that psychoanalysis has come to be acknowledged as a valuable method of treatment in certain cases and an instrument for clinical research, how is its use to be taught and to whom? The great need for close clinical direction. The necessity for control of the rather natural experimental ventures of the young psychiatrist in training. The necessity of having on the staff of the hospital a psychiatrist qualified in the use of the method—that is, a psychoanalyst. The disadvantages under which the psychoanalyst works in hospitals. The advantages of his position and his usefulness to the hospital, patients and staff.

3. Psychiatric Training Prerequisite to Psychoanalytic Practice. By Harry Stack Sullivan (New York City).—Psychoanalytic patients include borderline psychoses and people who develop psychiatric processes during analysis. These situations require competent handling of the transference. Psychiatric training that prepares the analyst for efficient management of these problems is needed. It requires much more than residence in a mental hospital. The rate of profit from experience in internship and the like varies enormously because of many factors some few of which are discussed. Qualifications for treatment work and particularly for psychoanalytic training of student psychiatrists.

THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION held its ninetieth annual meeting at the Hotel Waldorf Astoria, New York, on May 28, 29, 30, 31 and June 1. Among psychoanalysts who read papers before the various sections were Drs. Smith Ely Jelliffe, Gregory Zilboorg, William Healy, George E. Daniels, W. Flanders Dunbar and Karl A. Menninger. Round table discussions on "Clinical Forms of Neurosis and Character Disorder Encountered in Present-day Analytic Practice" and "Criminology" were held with Drs. Bertram D. Lewin and William A. White as moderators. Drs. Leland E. Hinsie and Clarence P. Oberndorf acted as moderators at round table discussions on "Occupation Therapy" and "Out-patient Psychiatric Service" respectively.

Abstracts of Papers:

(1) *Pyknolepsies*. By Dr. Smith Ely Jelliffe (New York) and John Notkin (Poughkeepsie): The symptom-complex not unknown to the older workers but definitely described by M. Friedman in 1905. The controversy concerning the nomenclature and the etiologic speculations that followed Friedman's publication of the casuistic material and citation of own observations. The relationship of convulsive states and the writer's suggestion of pyknolepsy as a form of epilepsy with a multiplicity of etiologic factors.—(2) *Analytical Studies of Homicide Cases in Sing Sing Prison*. By Gregory Zilboorg (New York): A clinical illustration of the psychological mechanisms and of the developmental factors operative in some impulsive acts of murder. Evaluation of these factors from the standpoint of possible therapeutic inferences.—(3) *Criteria for Estimating Psychiatric Service in the Field of Criminology*. By Bernard Glueck (New York): A critical examination of some recent evaluative research in the field of criminology offers the opportunity for a clearer definition than has been possible heretofore of the place of psychiatry in the field of criminology. The continuous extension of psychiatric service into fields other than medicine makes it incumbent upon psychiatrists to guide this tendency along lines consistent with the best psychiatric principles. The paper constitutes an attempt to survey the situation as it stands today.—(4) *Psychiatry and the Juvenile Delinquent*. By William Healy (Boston): A certain percentage of juvenile delinquents present problems that belong in the groups of classically defined psychiatric material. But also the larger percentage in which environmental, social, economic and familial factors are obviously paramount very properly belongs to the investigative and partly to the therapeutic field of psychiatry. While not under-evaluating these external elements, there remain the problems of urges, drives, emotional attitudes, satisfactions and dissatisfactions which in every case form part of the etiological picture. The broader aspects of the newer psychiatry cover not only the questions of mental life as phrased in terms of mental disorder, abnormality, defect, or imbalance, but also the study of behavior tendencies as they always involve the dynamics of mental life. At every turn in the investigation of juvenile delinquency we are confronted by the problems of activities, attitudes, adjustments and content of the psyche. Many examples show the utter need for recognition of what is going on within the individual's mental life, if good work is to be done for the prevention of delinquency.—(5) *Neuroses Associated With the Gastro-Intestinal Tract*. By George E. Daniels (New York): Neuroses simulating or associated with physical disease, though varying in underlying reaction type, often present clinical pictures that are confusingly similar. Whether the condition is essentially a simple anxiety, a conversion hysteria or a hypochondriasis is important for both classification and treatment. The primacy of the neurosis or physical disease, when both are present, is also of more than academic interest. The clearest understanding of these differences is obtained in terms of the libido theory. The purpose of this paper is to present these problems directly and simply by the use of illustrative clinical material limited to conditions affecting the gastro-intestinal tract. The case material selected from studies made at the Columbia Medical Center.—

(6) Trends in Modern Medicine and Research as Related to Psychiatry. By H. Flanders Dunbar (New York): The general problem of the relationship of psychiatry to medicine and of psychic and somatic components in illness is discussed in the light of recent trends in research in the so-called medical sciences and in clinical practice. Material is presented with reference to an abstracted bibliography just completed at the end of five years' investigation, which represents the attempt to bring together under one cover the facts established on the basis of experiment in various fields, which are pertinent to the problem of psychosomatic relationships. Certain fundamental contributions from the fields of biology, including many of its special aspects, of neuro-anatomy, of experimental surgery and medicine, and of psychological and psychoanalytic investigation are considered especially as to their significance for the problem of acute and chronic illness. This furnishes the background for a discussion of mechanisms of psychosomatic relationship in terms of physiology and of dynamic psychology. Emphasis is on the significance of these facts together with the relevant concepts in general medical practice. A practical classification is given of psychiatric aspects of medical problems as encountered on medical and surgical wards. Illustration is by case material from wards and clinic at the Columbia Medical Center.

(7) Localized Self-Destruction: Self-Mutilations. By Karl A. Menninger (Topeka, Kansas): The author relates the motives of localized self-destruction to those of suicide, as set forth in a previous paper (Psychoanalytic Aspects of Suicide, Int. J. Ps-A. XIV). Suicide represents the victory of death over life with the active coöperation of the personality, impelled by strong unconscious motives which are described as the wish to kill, the wish to be killed and the wish to die. In order to satisfy the aggressive destructive tendencies (the wish to kill) and the submissive masochistic tendencies (the wish to be killed) it is not essential that actual death of the total personality result. These components may be satisfied by a partial suicide, attenuated in time (as in asceticism, martyrdom, slow starvation) or in space (attacks by the self on separate parts of the self, insufficient to result in death). The latter form, designated as focal suicide or localized self-destruction, is the subject of the main portion of the paper. The clinical forms of localized self-destruction are considered in four groups: (a) "Purposeless" self-mutilations such as are commonly seen in bizarre forms in the psychoses and in more conventional forms in the neuroses and in religious ceremony and social custom. (b) Malingering. (c) Compulsive submission to one or multiple surgical operations. (d) Accidents of unconscious intent, resulting in local injury. All four forms have this in common: that a part of the body is injured and perhaps destroyed with the partial coöperation of the rest of the personality, thereby gratifying unconscious wishes of self-indulgence and self-punishment.

The first of these groups (self-mutilation) is considered in detail. Several cases of *psychotic* self-mutilation are presented, including one of a young mother who killed her child and then was committed to the state hospital from which she escaped later long enough to place her arm across the railroad tracks in such a way that it was amputated by an oncoming train. After this she made a rather rapid and complete recovery and has been well since. Self-castration

is the basic form of psychotic self-mutilation. The patient feels guilty about homosexual or narcissistic sexual indulgences and punishes himself by an attack upon his sexual organs. At the same time he derives erotic satisfaction from being converted into a passive individual. Self-mutilations of psychotic patients resemble the self-mutilations of certain fanatical religious sects such as the Skoptsi, which are discussed at some length in the paper, and differ from the self-mutilations of neurotic patients and more familiar religious ceremonial mutilations in that reality is enormously disregarded in the former. The erotic gain is altogether passive and the punitive function greatly exaggerated. The neurotic individual punishes himself by a symbolic castration which, however, acts as a permit for an active satisfaction of tangible and real value. Puberty rites such as circumcision, etc., are found to be a form of vicarious sacrifice in which a part is offered to save the whole. They serve as symbolic punishment for the adolescent's incestuous wishes and as propitiation for anticipated sexual indulgence. Neurotic self-mutilations such as nail biting and neurotic excoriations are described. A case is cited of a young woman who developed a compulsion to pull out handfuls of her own hair immediately following the marriage of her younger sister of whom she had always been jealous. The case of a young man who cut his own hair in a repulsively grotesque effect is also cited and the unconscious motives—defiance and escape from his father and a punishment of himself—determining this behavior, as discovered in the course of psychoanalytic treatment, are traced. The celebrated Wolf-Man case reported by Freud is also cited. Instances of self-mutilation in several individuals suffering from organic disease are presented and it is shown that these do not appear to differ in motivation from those studied in connection with the psychoses, neuroses and religious ceremonials. The effects of the organic disease appear to be that of releasing unconscious tendencies which have been held in control only by a maximal integrative effort which could not sustain the additional burden of the physical illness. Customary and conventional forms of self-mutilation such as ear piercing, trimming the nails, hair cutting and shaving are discussed from the standpoint of unconscious motivation.

The careful consideration of self-mutilation, found under the varying circumstances of psychosis, neurosis, religious ceremony, social convention and also, occasionally, in some individuals who suffer from some physical disease but show no evidences of mental abnormality, aside from the self-mutilation impulse, shows the same motives to be present regularly, in varying degrees, namely: acceptance of passive gratifications as a substitute for active sexual and aggressive acts or wishes, and a renunciation of a part of the active tendencies as a sacrifice for past aggressions and as a purchase price for future indulgence. Self-mutilation, therefore, is a partial or local self-destruction which has as its chief purpose the preserving of life. It serves as a compromise formation to avert total destruction (suicide).

THE THOMAS W. SALMON MEMORIAL COMMITTEE of The New York Academy of Medicine, has selected Dr. William Alanson White, Superintendent of Saint Elizabeths Hospital, Washington, D. C., as the 1935 Thomas W. Salmon Memorial lecturer. Dr. White will deliver a series of three lectures on April 12th, 19th and 26th, 1935. His subjects will be: Psychiatry as a Medical Specialty, The Social Significance of Psychiatry and The General Implications of Psychiatric Thought.

